On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 05:49:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> >>
> >>Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle "323"?
> >
> >I don't believe so.
> So you agree that comp entails "323"?
> This makes even harder my understanding of your refutation attempt.

Maybe you haven't explained the 323 principle properly. My
understanding was that if a program did not need register 323 in order
to be conscious, then it would be possible to remove that register,
and still run that program.

However, if that register is required by the program in order for it
to handle counterfactuals, then it is quite possible that it is needed
for consciousness, and that removing it will render to program
unconscious. IIUC, the latter case is not covered by the 323 principle.

> >>>
> >>>It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a
> >>>Multiverse.
> >>
> >>I am not sure about that. Many would say that the very idea of
> >>"multiverse" is an attempt of describing "God's viewpoint".
> >>With mechanism we have universal dreams and universal dreamers,
> >>sharing, or not, dreams and subroutines.
> >>
> >
> >It cannot be a God's point of view. The Multiverse is too simple to
> >admit an observer...
> ?

See page 183 of my book (2nd edition, or around the same page number
in the 1st edition). But this is more of a side comment, not important
for the current discussion.

> >
> >This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
> This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless
> you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp
> indeterminacy). By definition of "correct level" you keep both of
> them "intact" through a single turing emulation in your local
> "physical" reality.

I am unsure if it means !COMP. See page 72 of ToN.

Nevertheless, it is but one way in which consciousness could supervene
on multiple branches of an MV. Eliminating it by definition of COMP
does not remove the possibility that the supervenience happens by some
other mechanism.

One would need to demonstrate that all means of supervenience on
multiple branches entails !COMP - which hasn't been your approach to date.

> >
> >>Many neurophysiologists would be that such a portion of reality is
> >>in the skull, and that the process is Turing emulable (and I think
> >>it your position).
> >
> >Sure, but the contents of the skull is an object that extends over
> >multiple branches of the Multiverse.
> With mechanism it must be the primitive matter (the "matter" whose
> determination below our level is not needed in the computation of my
> actual state) which is multiversal. If the computational content
> extends in the multiverse then you are just making our level *very*
> low. Again, if that is Turing emulable MGA can be applied, and if it
> is not, then comp is false.

I'm going to post another description below of this to highlight why I
think this statement is too glib.

> It seems to me you are trying to make the comp level below the
> substitution level, like if the consciousness of the guy
> reconstituted in Moscow was needing the presence of the other in
> Washington to be conscious.

That seems a fair categorisation, although after a fairly short
"decoherence time", the presence of the other may no longer be important.

> That notion makes sense, with comp, and if the quantum multiverse
> results from comp, it would mean our brains/body would be quantum
> computers, and our level would be very low. 

Quantum computing is a specific process of exploiting entangled
states. I do not mean that, and think it unlikely that nature works
that way (contra Penrose). Supervenience over multiple MW branches
does not entail that sort of quantum computing.

> >Only
> >in the 3rd person dovetailed POV. And, I find it hard to think of the
> >dovetailer as conscious.
> It does not need to be conscious. It needs only to instantiate
> consciousness. As it does, even in "time and space" when it is a
> concrete UD running in a primary physical universe, and that is all
> we need to get the epistemological contradiction: primitive matter
> has no interaction with consciousness. It becomes like invisible
> horses pulling cars.

I have no problem with the statement "primitive matter is like
invisible horses pulling cars". But this is not the MGA.


> >I don't expect there will be interference between the realities. Why
> >does supervenience over multiple branches entail there must be
> >interactions between realities?
> To make your argument working. If the parallel realities play no
> role, then the MGA works even without mentioning them. I was just
> trying to get your point.

Why does supervenience over multiple parts require that the parts
interact? Are you invoking emergence here?

> >
> >>The point is that if it is
> >>Turing emulable, then the MGA applies.
> >
> >I don't see this.
> If it is Turing emulable, then it is emulable in a single reality,
> by definition of what is a computation.

Emulation of a Multiverse in a single reality is by dovetailing. Why
does this preserve consciousness in COMP (see below).


> >>
> >>You might try to refute the 323 principle as clearly as possible by
> >>using a *physical* multiverse. I think you will see by yourself that
> >>you have to endow some primitive Matter with some non Turing
> >>emulable processes at some point.
> >
> >I don't see the 323 principle as being relevant here - perhaps you can
> >explain more why its needed.
> The 323 principle states that if we assume comp *and* physical
> supervenience (even multiversal) then if a piece is inactive (but
> then also multiversally inactive) the presence or absence of
> consciousness in a single computation does not depend on the
> presence or absence of that inactive piece.

That is my understanding.

> But then we have to accept that a movie of a filmed universal
> boolean graph instantiates a consciousness by virtue of comp,
> despite there is no more any computation at all.

This is not such an obvious absurdity, which is why I'm focussing on Maudlin.

Clearly, if we conclude Maudlin fails to rule out multiversal
supervenience, we would then need to see if the MGA also suffers from
the same critique, or is in fact inequivalent.

> This prevents physics to be explained by any *choice* or *inference*
> of a primitive universal entity, or universal law. We have to
> recover physics by a sum on all universal machines competition below
> our substitution level (by UDA1-7, + MGA).
> I thought your were trying to refute the 323 principle. But you seem
> to me just lowering the substitution level.

I'm doing neither, really. I'm just noting that Maudlin's argument
implicitly assumes a single universe reality, that dovetailing a
multiverse does not invalidate supervenience on multiple branches (see
below for another angle on this).


Consider a dovetailer program running in some well defined physical machine. In
particular, the states of the machine, its transition table and
machine code are all defined in terms of whatever physical process is
used to instantiate it.

At each step, the dovetailer program runs one step of a program, then
switches to the next program (or next input) as appropriate.

Now consider the sequence of states the machine passes through. All
state transitions are legal (exist in the transition table), otherwise
it wouldn't be a program.

So we could consider the dovetailer as running two steps of a program,
before switching to the next. Or running three steps of a programming
before switching to the next. Indeed, there must be 2^\aleph_0 valid ways of
partitioning the running program into dovetailed programs, the vast
majority of which presumably do not dovetail on all possible programs.

One way of partitioning the UD so that not all programs are executed
is to only switch tracks if the machine's next instruction is
instruction 0. This means that all programs beginning with instruction
1 are never executed.

Does this not mean that the fact that the UD instantiates conscious
programs is purely in the eye of the beholder? So to say that
dovetailing preserves supervenience would be an incorrect assumption.


Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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