On 22 Dec 2011, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless
you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp
indeterminacy). By definition of "correct level" you keep both of
them "intact" through a single turing emulation in your local
If you rely on the thermal interaction with the environment, then
you save comp at the expense of enlarging the local reality to be
Not necessarily. If the dependence is statistical I am not obliged
to emulate the exact environment. But for some logical purpose we
might imagine the foolish idea that our consciousness depends on
the computational precise state of some large environment. The
Heisenberg Matrix of our galaxies cluster at the level of M theory,
That's demanding a lot to the doctor, of course. But the UD
provides it in infinitely many exemplars including the consistent
extensions, for free (assuming 0, s(0), ... and the laws of
addition and multiplication, only).
It get trivial as explanations, but again, such view are proposed,
I think, only through attempts to invalidate the argument that comp
leads to immaterialism, or to the reduction of the mind-body
problem to a body problem appearance in computer science/arithmetic.
It would only invalidate immaterialism in the sense that
consciousness and matter would both have to arise from something
more basic, e.g. computation, and that you could not generate one
without the other - which seems likely to me.
OK. That's what the MGA proves, in the mechanist theory.
I doubt that consciousness without a physical body/world to be
conscious *of* is a coherent concept.
Dreams are cited as a counter example, but all of my dreams are
built out of things in the world.
Locally. But MGA+UDA1-7 explains that if we are machine, the coupling
consciousness/physical realities originates from the number
relations. This explains "things in the world" without taking them
for granted or as primitive notion.
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