On 22 Dec 2011, at 00:30, Russell Standish wrote:

On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 05:49:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle "323"?

I don't believe so.

So you agree that comp entails "323"?
This makes even harder my understanding of your refutation attempt.

Maybe you haven't explained the 323 principle properly. My
understanding was that if a program did not need register 323 in order
to be conscious, then it would be possible to remove that register,
and still run that program.

However, if that register is required by the program in order for it
to handle counterfactuals, then it is quite possible that it is needed
for consciousness, and that removing it will render to program
unconscious. IIUC, the latter case is not covered by the 323 principle.

The 323 principle *is* that later case. It says explicity that if a program does not need some register FOR A SPECIFIC COMPUTATION (supposed to be conscious, with sup-phys) then that specific computation will remain conscious when the register is removed.

I was correct that you were arguing against 323.

You have to explain how an inactive machinery has a physical activity in a computation.

It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a

I am not sure about that. Many would say that the very idea of
"multiverse" is an attempt of describing "God's viewpoint".
With mechanism we have universal dreams and universal dreamers,
sharing, or not, dreams and subroutines.

It cannot be a God's point of view. The Multiverse is too simple to
admit an observer...


See page 183 of my book (2nd edition, or around the same page number
in the 1st edition). But this is more of a side comment, not important
for the current discussion.

This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.

This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless
you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp
indeterminacy). By definition of "correct level" you keep both of
them "intact" through a single turing emulation in your local
"physical" reality.

I am unsure if it means !COMP. See page 72 of ToN.

Nevertheless, it is but one way in which consciousness could supervene
on multiple branches of an MV. Eliminating it by definition of COMP
does not remove the possibility that the supervenience happens by some
other mechanism.

Either that other mechanism is Turing emulable, or not. If it is, MGA will apply, unless you are using a supervenience violating 323. This needs magic, it seems to me. The kind of magic whose existence would make me doubt that I can survive "qua computatio".

One would need to demonstrate that all means of supervenience on
multiple branches entails !COMP - which hasn't been your approach to date.

Can you explain what is !COMP ?


Many neurophysiologists would be that such a portion of reality is
in the skull, and that the process is Turing emulable (and I think
it your position).

Sure, but the contents of the skull is an object that extends over
multiple branches of the Multiverse.

With mechanism it must be the primitive matter (the "matter" whose
determination below our level is not needed in the computation of my
actual state) which is multiversal. If the computational content
extends in the multiverse then you are just making our level *very*
low. Again, if that is Turing emulable MGA can be applied, and if it
is not, then comp is false.

I'm going to post another description below of this to highlight why I
think this statement is too glib.

It seems to me you are trying to make the comp level below the
substitution level, like if the consciousness of the guy
reconstituted in Moscow was needing the presence of the other in
Washington to be conscious.

That seems a fair categorisation, although after a fairly short
"decoherence time", the presence of the other may no longer be important.

That notion makes sense, with comp, and if the quantum multiverse
results from comp, it would mean our brains/body would be quantum
computers, and our level would be very low.

Quantum computing is a specific process of exploiting entangled
states. I do not mean that, and think it unlikely that nature works
that way (contra Penrose). Supervenience over multiple MW branches
does not entail that sort of quantum computing.

But if would make comp false if that kind of supervenience is not Turing Emulable.

in the 3rd person dovetailed POV. And, I find it hard to think of the
dovetailer as conscious.

It does not need to be conscious. It needs only to instantiate
consciousness. As it does, even in "time and space" when it is a
concrete UD running in a primary physical universe, and that is all
we need to get the epistemological contradiction: primitive matter
has no interaction with consciousness. It becomes like invisible
horses pulling cars.

I have no problem with the statement "primitive matter is like
invisible horses pulling cars". But this is not the MGA.

? It is, or should be.


I don't expect there will be interference between the realities. Why
does supervenience over multiple branches entail there must be
interactions between realities?

To make your argument working. If the parallel realities play no
role, then the MGA works even without mentioning them. I was just
trying to get your point.

Why does supervenience over multiple parts require that the parts
interact? Are you invoking emergence here?

If they don't interact, they don't play any role in the computation. They can only play a role in the first person probabilities of living such or such continuations.

The point is that if it is
Turing emulable, then the MGA applies.

I don't see this.

If it is Turing emulable, then it is emulable in a single reality,
by definition of what is a computation.

Emulation of a Multiverse in a single reality is by dovetailing. Why
does this preserve consciousness in COMP (see below).

? (see below).


You might try to refute the 323 principle as clearly as possible by
using a *physical* multiverse. I think you will see by yourself that
you have to endow some primitive Matter with some non Turing
emulable processes at some point.

I don't see the 323 principle as being relevant here - perhaps you can
explain more why its needed.

The 323 principle states that if we assume comp *and* physical
supervenience (even multiversal) then if a piece is inactive (but
then also multiversally inactive) the presence or absence of
consciousness in a single computation does not depend on the
presence or absence of that inactive piece.

That is my understanding.

It is always meant "in a single computation". Meaning it concerns some specific computation.

But then we have to accept that a movie of a filmed universal
boolean graph instantiates a consciousness by virtue of comp,
despite there is no more any computation at all.

This is not such an obvious absurdity, which is why I'm focussing on Maudlin.

But this is very weird. In some paragraph, the inactive piece plays a role. But the Movie has all the inactive counterfactual machinery removed. Here you do endorse the 323 principle, but then sup-phys entails the movie is thinking, and there is no computation at all. Comp lost his meaning.

Clearly, if we conclude Maudlin fails to rule out multiversal
supervenience, we would then need to see if the MGA also suffers from
the same critique, or is in fact inequivalent.

They are close.

This prevents physics to be explained by any *choice* or *inference*
of a primitive universal entity, or universal law. We have to
recover physics by a sum on all universal machines competition below
our substitution level (by UDA1-7, + MGA).

I thought your were trying to refute the 323 principle. But you seem
to me just lowering the substitution level.

I'm doing neither, really. I'm just noting that Maudlin's argument
implicitly assumes a single universe reality, that dovetailing a
multiverse does not invalidate supervenience on multiple branches (see
below for another angle on this).


Consider a dovetailer program running in some well defined physical machine. In
particular, the states of the machine, its transition table and
machine code are all defined in terms of whatever physical process is
used to instantiate it.

At each step, the dovetailer program runs one step of a program, then
switches to the next program (or next input) as appropriate.

Now consider the sequence of states the machine passes through. All
state transitions are legal (exist in the transition table), otherwise
it wouldn't be a program.

So we could consider the dovetailer as running two steps of a program,
before switching to the next. Or running three steps of a programming
before switching to the next. Indeed, there must be 2^\aleph_0 valid ways of
partitioning the running program into dovetailed programs, the vast
majority of which presumably do not dovetail on all possible programs.

One way of partitioning the UD so that not all programs are executed
is to only switch tracks if the machine's next instruction is
instruction 0. This means that all programs beginning with instruction
1 are never executed.

Does this not mean that the fact that the UD instantiates conscious
programs is purely in the eye of the beholder? So to say that
dovetailing preserves supervenience would be an incorrect assumption.

What matters is that you dovetail on conscious programs, and the UD dovetails on all programs. Why would a dovetailer missing a program have to generate the consciousness of that program? That a dovetailer does not instanciate the consciousness of the conscious program would mean that delays of reconstitution, or virtuality, prevents the existence of consciousness. Are you backtracking on UDA step 2, and step 6?



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