On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 12:06:54PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Dec 2011, at 00:30, Russell Standish wrote:
> >Maybe you haven't explained the 323 principle properly. My
> >understanding was that if a program did not need register 323 in order
> >to be conscious, then it would be possible to remove that register,
> >and still run that program.
> >However, if that register is required by the program in order for it
> >to handle counterfactuals, then it is quite possible that it is needed
> >for consciousness, and that removing it will render to program
> >unconscious. IIUC, the latter case is not covered by the 323
> The 323 principle *is* that later case. It says explicity that if a
> program does not need some register FOR A SPECIFIC COMPUTATION
> (supposed to be conscious, with sup-phys) then that specific
> computation will remain conscious when the register is removed.
> I was correct that you were arguing against 323.
> You have to explain how an inactive machinery has a physical
> activity in a computation.
Because in the latter case, the "inactive" machinery is not really
inactive. It is only inactive in one branch.
> Either that other mechanism is Turing emulable, or not. If it is,
> MGA will apply, unless you are using a supervenience violating 323.
> This needs magic, it seems to me. The kind of magic whose existence
> would make me doubt that I can survive "qua computatio".
By the sounds of things from what you've described above, I am using
supervenience violating 323. And no, I wouldn't describe it as
magical, no more magical than the fact that the irreverible 2nd of
thermodynamics supervenes on reversible Newtonian dynamic. But I don't
need to provide a mechanism to find a flaw in the argument - the
argument needs to prove that no such mechanism can possibly exist, and
I don't think it does that.
In any case, Maudlin's argument does not assume the 323 principle,
> >One would need to demonstrate that all means of supervenience on
> >multiple branches entails !COMP - which hasn't been your approach
> >to date.
> Can you explain what is !COMP ?
Sorry - I forget you don't speak C. It means "not COMP"
> >Quantum computing is a specific process of exploiting entangled
> >states. I do not mean that, and think it unlikely that nature works
> >that way (contra Penrose). Supervenience over multiple MW branches
> >does not entail that sort of quantum computing.
> But if would make comp false if that kind of supervenience is not
> Turing Emulable.
Why? Turing emulability of the physics that supervened on is surely irrelevant.
> >>>in the 3rd person dovetailed POV. And, I find it hard to think
> >>>of the
> >>>dovetailer as conscious.
> >>It does not need to be conscious. It needs only to instantiate
> >>consciousness. As it does, even in "time and space" when it is a
> >>concrete UD running in a primary physical universe, and that is all
> >>we need to get the epistemological contradiction: primitive matter
> >>has no interaction with consciousness. It becomes like invisible
> >>horses pulling cars.
> >I have no problem with the statement "primitive matter is like
> >invisible horses pulling cars". But this is not the MGA.
> ? It is, or should be.
Because the MGA aims to show something stronger - that primitive
matter is actually incompatible with COMP.
> >Why does supervenience over multiple parts require that the parts
> >interact? Are you invoking emergence here?
> If they don't interact, they don't play any role in the computation.
How does that work?
> >Consider a dovetailer program running in some well defined
> >physical machine. In
> >particular, the states of the machine, its transition table and
> >machine code are all defined in terms of whatever physical process is
> >used to instantiate it.
> >At each step, the dovetailer program runs one step of a program, then
> >switches to the next program (or next input) as appropriate.
> >Now consider the sequence of states the machine passes through. All
> >state transitions are legal (exist in the transition table), otherwise
> >it wouldn't be a program.
> >So we could consider the dovetailer as running two steps of a program,
> >before switching to the next. Or running three steps of a programming
> >before switching to the next. Indeed, there must be 2^\aleph_0
> >valid ways of
> >partitioning the running program into dovetailed programs, the vast
> >majority of which presumably do not dovetail on all possible programs.
> >One way of partitioning the UD so that not all programs are executed
> >is to only switch tracks if the machine's next instruction is
> >instruction 0. This means that all programs beginning with instruction
> >1 are never executed.
> >Does this not mean that the fact that the UD instantiates conscious
> >programs is purely in the eye of the beholder? So to say that
> >dovetailing preserves supervenience would be an incorrect assumption.
> What matters is that you dovetail on conscious programs, and the UD
> dovetails on all programs. Why would a dovetailer missing a program
> have to generate the consciousness of that program?
> That a dovetailer does not instanciate the consciousness of the
> conscious program would mean that delays of reconstitution, or
> virtuality, prevents the existence of consciousness. Are you
> backtracking on UDA step 2, and step 6?
We are always focussed on step 8. What I am saying is that there is
no unique interpretation of the UD is actually doing. But possibly,
the UD still executes all programs anyway. One way of avoiding the
above example is to note that the UD will also execute all programs
that differ from another program only by ignoring the first step (or
ignoring the first input).
Could it be proved that a UD always executes all programs (albeit in
different order and possibly different measure), regardless of the
partitioning of UD*?
This would differ from a non-universal dovetailer, of course, but
could follow from the "miracle" of Turing completeness being closed
This still does not eliminate the fact that supervenience in the case
of a consciousness generated by a UD is on the emulated physics
(Brent's point), not on whatever the UD is constructed from.
So this doesn't contradict the possibility that the Multiverse is
"primitive matter". The "sire, je n'ai besoin de cet hypthese"
argument is something completely different, it is not what the MGA is
trying to address.
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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