On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:08 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com>wrote:
I am truly agnostic. I really have no earthly idea. But assuming
>> computationalism, as in the MGA, I have to say yes. With this assumption,
>> the particular physical implementation of a program, however bizarre, is
>> not relevant -- only the execution of the algorithm matters.
> I agree that only the algorithm matters, but my contention is that in this
> case, the isolated neurons operating on input from the star do not
> implement the same algorithm. A bunch of logic gates from a CPU,
> physically separated (without any intercommunication) has no causal
> interdependence, the bits they contain have no relation to each other.
>> As Bruno has emphasized again and again, if you reject this, then you
>> reject comp as well.
> I accept comp, but I reject the MGA (as I currently understand it). It
> may be that I do not understand the MGA. My objection is that I find it
> less than clear whether Alice remains conscious when her neurons are
> processing shallow input.
I guess its an open question. I certainly can't solve this issue. Maybe
I'll think about it and come up with something. However my argument in the
OP is independent of this criticism.
>> What you say is interesting though, because I think it bears on the issue
>> of the unity of
>> Perhaps such a completely disconnected brain would be incapable of
>> experiencing what we humans call the" unity of consciousness".
> If the neurons in this scenario really do implement the same algorithm,
> then they would necessarily experience the same unity of consciousness.
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