On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 04:27:28PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:
> Regarding Maudlin’s argument: Russell has recently stated that Maudlin’s
> argument doesn’t work in a multiverse, and that consciousness is thus a
> multiverse phenomenon. I disagree for the same reason that Bruno disagrees:
> the region of the multiverse on which consciousness supervenes can just be
> Turing emulated in a huge water/trough/block computer, and Maudlin’s
> argument can be reapplied. I realize that this could lead to an infinite
> regress…hmm…

You reminding us all of what supervenience really means is very

In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer. If
the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer
does not - as it is a static, quite singular object.

Consiousness does still supervene on the simulated physics, though -
assuming it supervened on the original multiversal physics.

Please could someone explain how to apply Maudlin's argument to a
dovetailed multiverse. People keep asserting it is just the same as
the orignal argument, when it is clearly not. There are no Klaras, for
instance, no counterfactuals, and no supervenience, as your posting
has made clear.

I wouldn't fuss too much about the infinite regress - there's a lot of
those as soon as dovetailers are involved.



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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