On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 01:39:56PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:
> > In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
> > case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer. If
> > the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer
> > does not - as it is a static, quite singular object.
> >
> 
> Surely it is only static in the sense that any program is static (in a
> Platonic sense)? For now, I am referring to a concrete UD. A concrete UD
> can be in different states at different times, so I don't see a problem.

Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
different in the case of difference consious states.

...

> 
> I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole UD, just the
> branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals between these
> branches?

Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,
it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.

Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable, and
something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
supervene on the original. Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?


-- 

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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