On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 01:06:44AM +0000, David Nyman wrote:
> On 23 December 2011 23:24, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> > The argument cannot extend to an apparatus made of extended
> > multiversal objects, as the "inactive" parts are no longer
> > inactive. But it does require the supervenience to be extended across
> > multiple multiverse branches in a way that hasn't been made precise (but
> > presumably not magic!).
> Forgive me if I'm repeating myself here, but one might well think it
> at least as reasonable that - from the pov of the compartmentalisation
> of first-person experience - that the "parts" in the extended branches
> relevant to the experiences one is NOT having "here and now" are
> indeed effectively inactive.  

It doesn't seem so obvious to me. One of the problems is that
arguments based on intuition are inherently unreliable, as not
everyone has the same intuition. Bear in mind I'm being a devil's
advocate here. MGA is meant to be a proof, not an argument appealing
to intuition.

> Given the mutual exclusivity of states
> of consciousness, it might seem almost perverse to postulate - as
> presumably a "brute fact" of MAT - that the total activity of parts
> across all branches is nonetheless relevant to the supervention of a
> particular state of consciousness on the branch (or branches)
> associated with a single observer moment selected from the ensemble.
> That said, if one indeed postulates that it simply is a brute fact
> that univocal conscious states must somehow supervene on primitively
> physical multiversal structures as a whole, I suppose this might well
> be defended against arguments from Turing-emulability, as the logic
> now seems to hinge on (primitively) physical structural facts, rather
> than purely computational ones.  But perhaps this is why Bruno says
> that such a conclusion must lead in effect to non-comp.
> David

Maybe - I am personally ambivalent on that issue, so would like an
unequivocable proof that that is the case. So far, the argument by
dovetailing the multiverse doesn't impress me, for various reasons I
have advanced (some of which admittedly I overreached on - I am still
groping for an understanding of the subject). If the argument for
applying Maudlin to an emulated physical universe is to work, I think
the steps need to be spelled out in more detail, just glibly saying it
works is unconvincing.


Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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