On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 03:30:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 06:18, Russell Standish wrote:
In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer.
I guess you mean "on universal dovetailing". It is still ambiguous
if you mean it to be concrete/primitively-physical, or immaterial,
like with its arithmetical implementations.
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience", like Kim
and most "expert" on supervenience.
I use "physical supervenience", because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the physical
supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which do no more
refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this stage to the
appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the physical laws from
machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates for AUDA.
But what I meant here by "universal dovetailer" was any physically
instantiated universal dovetailer, otherwise we're no longer talking
Yes. That's what we do in the MGA, and in Maudlin's Olympia.
the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer
does not - as it is a static, quite singular object.
If the conscious content differs, it cannot be related to the same
executions among the infinitely many done by the UD.
True, but the UD does not change itself.
So the consciousness are not
supervening on the UD, by definition of supervenience.
The consciousness of mister x does supervene on the running of the
relevant computation done by the UD. His consciousness supervene on
(infinitely many) subcomputations of the UD computation. That's why in
UDA step seven we have already the reversal physics/computer science
in the case we suppose our physical universe to be robust (= executing
concretely a universal dovetailer).
The consciousness of one student in a classroom, full of many
students, does supervene on the physical activity occurring in the
classroom as a whole, despite the classroom does not change itself per
se. (It does it in some sense, but then the UD does it to, after all
he changes itself into an infinity of different programs, including
many which changes themselves).
Actually my responses to Joe Knight's comments may be more useful at
getting to why I'm dissatisfied with Maudlin's argument.
I try hard to understand the point.
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