On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:53, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 11:17:33AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:
Because in the latter case, the "inactive" machinery is not really
inactive. It is only inactive in one branch.
If the activity of the piece in another branch plays an active role
in the computation "here and now", then it is part of the
computation, and I have to ask the doctor that the artificial brain
takes the other branches into account.
But that's why MGA can be reapplied on multiversal physics.
Either that other mechanism is Turing emulable, or not. If it is,
MGA will apply, unless you are using a supervenience violating 323.
This needs magic, it seems to me. The kind of magic whose existence
would make me doubt that I can survive "qua computatio".
By the sounds of things from what you've described above, I am using
supervenience violating 323. And no, I wouldn't describe it as
magical, no more magical than the fact that the irreverible 2nd of
thermodynamics supervenes on reversible Newtonian dynamic.
It is different. We have an explanation of why 2nd emerges, from the
laws of big numbers.
But you are asking for a physically inactive object (with respect to
a computation) to have a physical role.
Why do you think that we couldn't find a similar sort of explanation
for why the activity in other branches is relevant to consciousness
(assuming that it is the case, of course). Before Boltzmann, the
irreversibility of the second law was totally mysterious, but I doubt
anyone seriously thought it magical.
Yes. The vitalistes for example. Who used this fact for saying that
life was not just physical phenomena.
What MGA shows is that the materialist have to do the same thing with
You could tell me: "why do you think that we couldn't find a similar
sort of explanation for why God's activity is relevant to
consciousness". Well I am rather sure he is, that simple fact does not
refute comp, like we already know that comp makes consciousness
multiversal in a robust universe (even a Newtonian one!).
You use of multiverse consists in trying to invalidate the MGA point,
fair enough, but to invalidate it, you need to add a third person non
Turing emulable relation between the physical computations in the
multiverse. if not you are just making the comp algorithm of the
person more complex, indeed infinitely complex in the limit.
My point is only that Maudlin has not ruled this out. And I fail to
see an easy way of ruling it out - emulating the Multiverse doesn't
really seem to do it.
We rule out nothing, but if we keep comp, we rule out useless
additions. Comp shows where and how the laws of physics come from, but
by MGA we show directly that primitive matter cannot be used to relate
consciousness to physical facts, and that it is on the contrary the
physical facts which have to be related to consciousness experience.
At step seven (UDA), we know already that physics (the ideally correct
science) is already a branch of computer science, and machine self-
reference, ... unless the physical universe is little (does not run
any significant part of the UD).
This means that your multiverse has to be little, but to use it get
the counterfactuals, and comp, it needs to be already as big as the UD.
This is another way to make the life hard for your argument.
(Although you seem to abandon that idea for saying that the film
(projection in time and place) is conscious).
I'm trying to abandon discussion of the MGA at present as an
unnecessary complication, as I understand that argument even less.
It is needed to get the reversal, without delving in the harder
mathematical part, which shows the "how", and the origin of the qualia/
But I don't
need to provide a mechanism to find a flaw in the argument - the
argument needs to prove that no such mechanism can possibly exist,
I don't think it does that.
If such a mechanism exist, it can be simulated. if not, comp is
Maybe consciousness is possible without physics, maybe not. Why should
COMP hinge upon that fact?
Because comp shows that physics, although real, is coming from a
mathematical phenomenon of consciousness, more or les described by the
intensional variants of self-reference. May be physics is not possible
without (numbers') consciousness.
In any case, Maudlin's argument does not assume the 323 principle,
Yes, that's the role of the Klara, but it concludes that we have to
provide a physical activity to something which, for a particular
computation is physically inactive, and functionally equivalent to
the absence of those piece.
In the case of Klara, the Klaras are physically active as extended
multiversal object. With your register 323, the register is also a
physically active extended multiversal object too. Your "323
principle" states that one can remove the 323 register without
affecting the computation. But it seems to me it does, or at least it
is far from obvious that you can remove the register without affecting
the computation - ie I don't believe your 323 principle, as you are
now stating it.
With comp and sup-phys we associate consciousness to a singular
computation through its physical activity. Removing that register does
not change the computational activity, nor the physical activity,
relevant for that computation in that single reality.
Also, this contradict your statement that the movie graph (the
physical projection of the movie) is conscious, because such a movie
is Olympia with all the Klaras having been removed.
Because the MGA aims to show something stronger - that primitive
matter is actually incompatible with COMP.
It shows it to be useless both for consciousness and the appearance
It seems to me that Kant already did this ca 200 years ago. Without
even invoking the concept of COMP.
Kant did not prove that physics is a branch of number theory.
Pythagorus and the neoplatonist proposes something of that kind much
before, though. Kant get close, no doubt.
The point here consists in making a precise argument, made possible by
the discovery of the universal machine/numbers.
Physics is shown to be entirely redefined, through comp.
Why does supervenience over multiple parts require that the parts
interact? Are you invoking emergence here?
If they don't interact, they don't play any role in the
How does that work?
By definition of a computation. Like with QM, independence is
isolation. Computation relies on the causal, or arithmetical,
relations between parts. Non interacting parts can play a role in
the measure on computations, not on any singular computations.
The parts of the computation are extended multiversal objects.
As far as you can emulate them on a classical Turing computation (like
division into branches is a distinction made by the consiousness.
The word part
here is being used somewhat ambiguously.
They are used in the sense of any theory of classical computations,
including quantum computation and multiverse emulation.
Your attempt to refute MGA lead you to a notion of non Turing emulable
multiversal computation. It seems to me.
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