On 24 Dec 2011, at 21:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 24, 11:00 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 22, 7:18 am, alexalex <alexmka...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Hello, Everythinglisters!

The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may represent.
I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to hear
your opinion about what it says.

Thanks!

<<<A simpler model of the world with different points of view>>>

It can often get quite amusing watching qualophiles' self- confidence,
mutual assurance and agreement when they talk about something a
priori
defined as inherently private and un-accessible to third-party
analysis (i.e. qualia), so they say, but they somehow agree on what
they're discussing

I feel the same way about quantophiles' confidence in theoretical
abstraction and endless capacity to deny the existence of the very
subjectivity that they use to deny it with.

You are quite unfair. the whole point of the UDA (and MGA) consists in
taking as important, and even fundamental (in the sense of "key", not
in the sense of "primary") the first person experience, and thus
consciousness.

That's true, although UDA is not typical of computationalism.

The UD argument is an argument based on the weaker version of mechanism (and this makes its consequences valid for all stronger form of mechanism).



I
actually wasn't thinking of your work here which to me is more of a
arithmetic theology than a Dennett style quantitative mechanism.

Dennett uses the same comp hypothesis. Being rather rigorous, and because he want to keep materialism, he is literally condemned to eliminate consciousness away. I think most here (me and you in particular) agree that it forget the most key data on consciousness, that we cannot doubt it without lying to oneself.





Agreement is not a
contradiction to the privacy of qualia because the privacy of qualia
is specific to groups of subjects as well as individuals. Human beings
experience universal levels of qualia (physics, chemistry), organic
levels (biology, zoology, neurology), anthropomorphic levels
(psychology, sociology), and individual levels which are relatively
unique or idiosyncratic.

But this, on the contrary, is only a succession of Aristotelian dogma.
In my opinion biology is more universal than physics.

Interesting. How so? If something dies, it still survives as a
physical process.

In the dream of some numbers. Physical process, including time, belongs to number's imagination (and this is not necessarily true, but is a theorem in the comp theory).



Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
years, right?

Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple, both conceptually and technically.




psychology (of
numbers) is more universal than biology.

I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia of
their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).

You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a computation (as can appear in a cartoon).





The picture is rational and
almost upside down with aristotle ontology.

We are both human so we share the broader
levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
narrows and deepens toward individuality.

about even though as far as I've been able to
understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence which
would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that could
bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) of
personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of
reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a theory.

My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if you
have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES

How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't
subject it to what science has been and will always be?

By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not shivering
in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask
about subjectivity.

Third-party analysis.

If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it
will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is by
definition subjective.

This is wrong.
The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I would
add) limited to third person parties.
But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.

It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of course,
I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person
subjectivity.

That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first person discourses.



The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts, or,
I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
flattened by externalization.

By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds and different persons.





Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.

Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, since
about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the science,
will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
not member of some club).


We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my
ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.

I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or compelling, etc. You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some hard to understand ways.



They seem to have no
opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science.
It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
born out of thought experiments and not academic training.

Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution. The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is non sense, and it hides the real honest researches.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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