On Dec 25, 4:44 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 24 Dec 2011, at 21:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Dec 24, 11:00 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> On Dec 22, 7:18 am, alexalex <alexmka...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>>> Hello, Everythinglisters!
> >>>> The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may
> >>>> represent.
> >>>> I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
> >>>> translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to
> >>>> hear
> >>>> your opinion about what it says.
> >>>> Thanks!
> >>>> <<<A simpler model of the world with different points of view>>>
> >>>> It can often get quite amusing watching qualophiles' self-
> >>>> confidence,
> >>>> mutual assurance and agreement when they talk about something a
> >>>> priori
> >>>> defined as inherently private and un-accessible to third-party
> >>>> analysis (i.e. qualia), so they say, but they somehow agree on what
> >>>> they're discussing
> >>> I feel the same way about quantophiles' confidence in theoretical
> >>> abstraction and endless capacity to deny the existence of the very
> >>> subjectivity that they use to deny it with.
> >> You are quite unfair. the whole point of the UDA (and MGA) consists
> >> in
> >> taking as important, and even fundamental (in the sense of "key", not
> >> in the sense of "primary") the first person experience, and thus
> >> consciousness.
> > That's true, although UDA is not typical of computationalism.
> The UD argument is an argument based on the weaker version of
> mechanism (and this makes its consequences valid for all stronger form
> of mechanism).
> > I
> > actually wasn't thinking of your work here which to me is more of a
> > arithmetic theology than a Dennett style quantitative mechanism.
> Dennett uses the same comp hypothesis. Being rather rigorous, and
> because he want to keep materialism, he is literally condemned to
> eliminate consciousness away. I think most here (me and you in
> particular) agree that it forget the most key data on consciousness,
> that we cannot doubt it without lying to oneself.
> >>> Agreement is not a
> >>> contradiction to the privacy of qualia because the privacy of qualia
> >>> is specific to groups of subjects as well as individuals. Human
> >>> beings
> >>> experience universal levels of qualia (physics, chemistry), organic
> >>> levels (biology, zoology, neurology), anthropomorphic levels
> >>> (psychology, sociology), and individual levels which are relatively
> >>> unique or idiosyncratic.
> >> But this, on the contrary, is only a succession of Aristotelian
> >> dogma.
> >> In my opinion biology is more universal than physics.
> > Interesting. How so? If something dies, it still survives as a
> > physical process.
> In the dream of some numbers. Physical process, including time,
> belongs to number's imagination (and this is not necessarily true, but
> is a theorem in the comp theory).
Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
> > Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
> > matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
> > Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
> > years, right?
> Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple,
> both conceptually and technically.
How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
> >> psychology (of
> >> numbers) is more universal than biology.
> > I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
> > vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
> > an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
> > quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia of
> > their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
> > experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
> You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
> arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
> computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic or physics,
any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs. Computation is
felt directly as a sensorimotive experience, or it is inferred in a
physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something
physical thinks it appears. The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
spirits, it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
through sense and motive. Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with
arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many
kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
Numbers have no independent realism.
> >> The picture is rational and
> >> almost upside down with aristotle ontology.
> >>> We are both human so we share the broader
> >>> levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
> >>> different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
> >>> narrows and deepens toward individuality.
> >>>> about even though as far as I've been able to
> >>>> understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence which
> >>>> would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that could
> >>>> bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) of
> >>>> personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of
> >>>> reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a
> >>>> theory.
> >>> My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if you
> >>> have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES
> >>>> How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't
> >>>> subject it to what science has been and will always be?
> >>> By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not shivering
> >>> in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask
> >>> about subjectivity.
> >>>> Third-party analysis.
> >>> If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it
> >>> will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is
> >>> by
> >>> definition subjective.
> >> This is wrong.
> >> The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I would
> >> add) limited to third person parties.
> >> But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
> >> qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
> >> It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
> >> axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
> >> We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.
> > It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of course,
> > I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person
> > subjectivity.
> That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first
> person discourses.
Only because our first person discourses overlap. You can't talk to a
congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
> > The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
> > is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts, or,
> > I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
> > systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
> > discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
> > flattened by externalization.
> By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
> notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds
> and different persons.
What's wrong with blurring the notion of person? I think that would be
the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify as a
person in the first place. Once you can join nervous systems, then you
could make appliances that could step down the process to any level so
that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel
how it is to be them, then plug large molecules into the cells to see
what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on
an interstellar scale even.
> >>> Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
> >>> science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.
> >> Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, since
> >> about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
> >> reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
> >> science,
> >> will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
> >> not member of some club).
> > We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my
> > ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.
> I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a
> way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
> compelling, etc.
> You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
> matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
> argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition
> already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the
> universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
> unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
> electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some
> hard to understand ways.
That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that
both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive but
their realism is modulated by perspective. Both are real in some
sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real nor
unreal in some sense. The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a monosense
view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to make
it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create
'now'?) - which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
others, both and neither in others.
My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is
experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we get
determinism. Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
superstition. If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/14722448115) in
the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism too if
taken to it's literal extreme. If we take these profound perspectives
too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.
Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound
meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and lowest
ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material
objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the anti-
poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity. When
you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any
other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem with it
is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience, and
then defensively denies it. That's what all sufficiently progressed
points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress.
My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have
it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language) but I
think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us,
which is really all that I'm after.
> > They seem to have no
> > opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
> > physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
> > suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science.
> > It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
> > born out of thought experiments and not academic training.
> Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
> academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
> The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is non
> sense, and it hides the real honest researches.
I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my hypothesis
out there? Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
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