On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 25, 4:44 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 24 Dec 2011, at 21:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:









On Dec 24, 11:00 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 22, 7:18 am, alexalex <alexmka...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Hello, Everythinglisters!

The below text is a philosophical essay on what qualia may
represent.
I doubt you'll manage to finish reading it (it's kind of long, and
translated from anoter language), but if you do I'll be happy to
hear
your opinion about what it says.

Thanks!

<<<A simpler model of the world with different points of view>>>

It can often get quite amusing watching qualophiles' self-
confidence,
mutual assurance and agreement when they talk about something a
priori
defined as inherently private and un-accessible to third-party
analysis (i.e. qualia), so they say, but they somehow agree on what
they're discussing

I feel the same way about quantophiles' confidence in theoretical
abstraction and endless capacity to deny the existence of the very
subjectivity that they use to deny it with.

You are quite unfair. the whole point of the UDA (and MGA) consists
in
taking as important, and even fundamental (in the sense of "key", not
in the sense of "primary") the first person experience, and thus
consciousness.

That's true, although UDA is not typical of computationalism.

The UD argument is an argument based on the weaker version of
mechanism (and this makes its consequences valid for all stronger form
of mechanism).

I
actually wasn't thinking of your work here which to me is more of a
arithmetic theology than a Dennett style quantitative mechanism.

Dennett uses the same comp hypothesis. Being rather rigorous, and
because he want to keep materialism,  he is literally condemned to
eliminate consciousness away. I think most here (me and you in
particular) agree that it forget the most key data on consciousness,
that we cannot doubt it without lying to oneself.











Agreement is not a
contradiction to the privacy of qualia because the privacy of qualia
is specific to groups of subjects as well as individuals. Human
beings
experience universal levels of qualia (physics, chemistry), organic
levels (biology, zoology, neurology), anthropomorphic levels
(psychology, sociology), and individual levels which are relatively
unique or idiosyncratic.

But this, on the contrary, is only a succession of Aristotelian
dogma.
In my opinion biology is more universal than physics.

Interesting. How so? If something dies, it still survives as a
physical process.

In the dream of some numbers. Physical process, including time,
belongs to number's imagination (and this is not necessarily true, but
is a theorem in the comp theory).

Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?

I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological. Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers, the programs, the digital machines, )

I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self- reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.






Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
years, right?

Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple,
both conceptually and technically.

How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
locally?

Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of the relations are not biological. But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.








psychology (of
numbers) is more universal than biology.

I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia of
their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).

You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
computation (as can appear in a cartoon).

I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic

This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be discovered in arithmetic. The question of the existence of computations in nature is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.



or physics,
any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.

Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable exists.



Computation is
felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,

I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a bit my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be felt. Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that exists). Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive experience" has no meaning for me. Sorry.



or it is inferred in a
physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something
physical thinks it appears.

Why?
I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct to reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this and that is more real than beyond.
Where does any place and time come from?

As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a person, than the illusion of person to matter.

We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers and they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in numbers.

Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far beyond, of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can justified in some conditional way already by themselves,




The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
spirits,

It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers, of many sorts.




it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
through sense and motive.

All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new territory through sense and motive.



Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with
arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many
kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
Numbers have no independent realism.

In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the sense that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent thing they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical (Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy. But just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any theory. We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory", "proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered surprising property of numbers.


















The picture is rational and
almost upside down with aristotle ontology.

We are both human so we share the broader
levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
narrows and deepens toward individuality.

about even though as far as I've been able to
understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence which would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that could bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) of
personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of
reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a
theory.

My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if you
have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES

How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't
subject it to what science has been and will always be?

By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not shivering
in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask
about subjectivity.

Third-party analysis.

If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it
will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is
by
definition subjective.

This is wrong.
The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I would
add) limited to third person parties.
But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.

It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of course,
I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person
subjectivity.

That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first
person discourses.

Only because our first person discourses overlap.

Notably on numbers.


You can't talk to a
congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
universally scoped).

I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first person plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of QM.





The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts, or,
I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
flattened by externalization.

By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds
and different persons.

What's wrong with blurring the notion of person?

Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self- experimentation of that kind.


I think that would be
the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify as a
person in the first place.

Yes. That's interesting.



Once you can join nervous systems, then you
could make appliances that could step down the process to any level so
that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel
how it is to be them,

No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you have less wrong feelings about that.


then plug large molecules into the cells to see
what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on
an interstellar scale even.

Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical scale on which our consciousness already supervene on. But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating in the quest for truth.









Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.

Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, since
about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
science,
will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
not member of some club).

We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my
ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.

I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a
way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
compelling, etc.
You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition
already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the
universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some
hard to understand ways.

That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that
both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive but
their realism is modulated by perspective.

Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except that the primitive are given by the laws of addition and multiplication on numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics is given by such hypostase-modality-modulation.



Both are real in some
sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real nor
unreal in some sense.

"it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to each hypostases.



The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a monosense
view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to make
it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create
'now'?)

Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical knower. Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of the machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which plays the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape. But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04 paper, at least (and ask question).



- which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
others, both and neither in others.

My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is
experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we get
determinism.

Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD, where we look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective.



Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
superstition.

Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand possible wounds we do to ourselves.


If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/14722448115) in
the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism  too if
taken to it's literal extreme.

Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism. There, we can quickly see reductionism cannot work.



If we take these profound perspectives
too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.

Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound
meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and lowest
ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material
objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the anti-
poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity.

Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :)


When
you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any
other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem with it
is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience, and
then defensively denies it.

It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the numbers are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep, and we can listen to what they say.
You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete experiences.


That's what all sufficiently progressed
points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress.
My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have
it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language) but I
think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us,
which is really all that I'm after.

We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown reason you don't want the machines to be part of it. You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with that position (to be frank).




They seem to have no
opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science.
It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
born out of thought experiments and not academic training.

Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is non
sense, and it hides the real honest researches.

I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my hypothesis
out there?

By writing text to convince other people, academic or not.



Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
cred? ;)

Not sure this would really help you, to be honest.
Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work starts from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and the spiritual, without assuming them at the start. I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and many mystics got it right, I think.

We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is "try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way, you have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF, or any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but it is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you really believe that you are not Turing emulable. I doubt this will add any new observable effects, though. You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of explaining does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an explanation.

I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give some food, in your restaurant, to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who lost its biological brain ...

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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