On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > > Does that mean that you consider numbers biological? > > I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological. > Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers, the > programs, the digital machines, ) Why would numbers differ in quality when they already differ precisely in quantity? Seems superfluous. > > I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of > biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self- > reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc. I see recursion as just one defining exterior behavior of biology. I don't see pain and pleasure being an inevitable arithmetic product of recursion but they are an equally definitive biological quality. > > > > >>> Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic > >>> matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it. > >>> Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion > >>> years, right? > > >> Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple, > >> both conceptually and technically. > > > How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter > > locally? > > Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of the > relations are not biological. > But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the > infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on. Would you say that the infinity of biological number relations is as large as the infinity of physical relations? > > > > >>>> psychology (of > >>>> numbers) is more universal than biology. > > >>> I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of > >>> vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers > >>> an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are > >>> quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia > >>> of > >>> their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has > >>> experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia). > > >> You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in > >> arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a > >> computation (as can appear in a cartoon). > > > I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic > > This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be discovered > in arithmetic. Discovered by mathematicians, but does arithmetic itself know whether or not it is discovering computation? > The question of the existence of computations in nature > is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis. > > > or physics, > > any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs. > > Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable > exists. How so? If all you have is a tree but no light source, you can't have a shadow. If all you have is a light bulb but no surfaces to illuminate, you can't have a shadow either. The realism of a shadow is in the the visual sense relation between light source, obstacle, and space. > > > Computation is > > felt directly as a sensorimotive experience, > > I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a bit > my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be > felt. If you are trying to solve an equation, you are feeling computation. You have a sense of what the problem is, what outcome you intend, and this provides a motive which propels your enactment of the computation. > Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be > felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that exists). It's not underlying, it's symmetrical. The native sensation we experience begins and ends on a human scale. > Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive experience" > has no meaning for me. Sorry. It means that counting or solving a math problem is something that you participate in as a person. You don't just look at a math problem and have no choice but to solve it, you have to choose to engage in this tangible puzzling out of the thing. You have to try, maybe struggle, to wonder, to feel 'aha!'. These are journeys of sense making motivation on the human scale. > > > or it is inferred in a > > physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something > > physical thinks it appears. > > Why? Because I think that counting is a sensorimotive experience which is associated with the interior of the physical universe. We don't see any examples of phenomena with no physical association. Empty space literally 'doesn't count'. > I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct to > reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this and > that is more real than beyond. That's where the multisense realism comes in. In one sense we *must* believe that the here and now and I is more real than everything else, that is literally what subjectivity is. That's what I mean when I say that subjectivity is about orientation and significance. What and who is close to us, literally in space and time or figuratively in any number of qualities and affinities, is what matters to us. The more distant it is, the less it 'matters' and the more it is just 'matter' (or noise or illusion, etc). This is a universal truth of subjectivity. No person has ever felt that their own survival was less important than the survival of a distant star, even though that star's destruction may destroy countless lives. Both views are real in a sense and unreal in another. > Where does any place and time come from? They come from the involuted subjective-objective singularity involuting itself further as spatiotemporal multiplicity. > > As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a person, > than the illusion of person to matter. > > We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do > instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers and > they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in > numbers. > > Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that > those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far > beyond, of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can > justified in some conditional way already by themselves, > > > The universe is not haunted by arithmetic > > spirits, > > It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers, of > many sorts. How does the arithmetic realm influence the physical realm, and why don't we see any examples of that? I need physical energy to run a computer or a machine. Why is that? > > > it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory > > through sense and motive. > > All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new > territory through sense and motive. Only if we, or some physical interpreter does the interpreting of that elaboration. As far as we know. > > > Sense and motive may well be guided by non- > > local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be > > manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with > > arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many > > kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive. > > Numbers have no independent realism. > > In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the sense > that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent thing > they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical > (Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy. But > just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any theory. > We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory", > "proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered > surprising property of numbers. Oh I wouldn't dispense with numbers at all. Arithmetic sensemaking is a critical link between subjectivity and objectivity. I'm just saying they present us with a framework which we can elaborate on forever without ever making sense of biological feeling. > > > > >>>> The picture is rational and > >>>> almost upside down with aristotle ontology. > > >>>>> We are both human so we share the broader > >>>>> levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have > >>>>> different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia > >>>>> narrows and deepens toward individuality. > > >>>>>> about even though as far as I've been able to > >>>>>> understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence > >>>>>> which > >>>>>> would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that > >>>>>> could > >>>>>> bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) > >>>>>> of > >>>>>> personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of > >>>>>> reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a > >>>>>> theory. > > >>>>> My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if > >>>>> you > >>>>> have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES > > >>>>>> How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't > >>>>>> subject it to what science has been and will always be? > > >>>>> By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not > >>>>> shivering > >>>>> in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask > >>>>> about subjectivity. > > >>>>>> Third-party analysis. > > >>>>> If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it > >>>>> will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is > >>>>> by > >>>>> definition subjective. > > >>>> This is wrong. > >>>> The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I > >>>> would > >>>> add) limited to third person parties. > >>>> But the object of science is everything including consciousness, > >>>> qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc. > >>>> It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as > >>>> axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them. > >>>> We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument. > > >>> It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of > >>> course, > >>> I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person > >>> subjectivity. > > >> That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first > >> person discourses. > > > Only because our first person discourses overlap. > > Notably on numbers. Yes and no. I can only overlap minimally with your discourse because I don't have an adequate sense of numbers. We overlap much more in other areas and opinions. But yes, if we did overlap, the level of precision and dis-ambiguity is absolute. That is the purpose of enumeration. That's why I call it the exoskeleton of sense, just as it could be said that law is the exoskeleton of motive. > > > You can't talk to a > > congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective > > agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we > > consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more > > universally scoped). > > I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for > granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first person > plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something > confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of QM. I think many universe is what you get when you turn sensorimotive agency inside out. > > > > >>> The only way we can address consciousness scientifically > >>> is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts, > >>> or, > >>> I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous > >>> systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as > >>> discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being > >>> flattened by externalization. > > >> By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the > >> notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds > >> and different persons. > > > What's wrong with blurring the notion of person? > > Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One > day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when > building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or > two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self- > experimentation of that kind. > > > I think that would be > > the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify as a > > person in the first place. > > Yes. That's interesting. > > > Once you can join nervous systems, then you > > could make appliances that could step down the process to any level so > > that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel > > how it is to be them, > > No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you > have less wrong feelings about that. Maybe but not necessarily. The brain-conjoined twins aren't diffracted. Why can't I have a crab or a bag of algae instead of a left hand? > > > then plug large molecules into the cells to see > > what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on > > an interstellar scale even. > > Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical > scale on which our consciousness already supervene on. > But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating in > the quest for truth. How can arithmetic have a scale? Compared to what? > > > > >>>>> Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change, > >>>>> science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe. > > >>>> Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice, > >>>> since > >>>> about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are > >>>> reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the > >>>> science, > >>>> will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers, > >>>> not member of some club). > > >>> We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my > >>> ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'. > > >> I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a > >> way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or > >> compelling, etc. > >> You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive > >> matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the > >> argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition > >> already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the > >> universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is > >> unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like > >> electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some > >> hard to understand ways. > > > That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that > > both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive but > > their realism is modulated by perspective. > > Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except that > the primitive are given by the laws of addition and multiplication on > numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics is > given by such hypostase-modality-modulation. The 8 hypostases are just eight distinctions within a single sense, like the eight trigrams of the I Ching. There is deep and universal truth there, but deep universality is ultimately a privileged semantic awareness. Most of what our lives are about is not deep, universal, or true. Multisense realism embraces this as an ontological reality. > > > Both are real in some > > sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real nor > > unreal in some sense. > > "it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to > each hypostases. But hypostases in general only exist in a specific and rarefied sense. > > > The realism arises from the symmetry - the very > > sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many > > figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a monosense > > view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to make > > it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create > > 'now'?) > > Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical knower. > Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of the > machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which plays > the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape. > But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04 paper, > at least (and ask question). Being able to describe mathematically that the self-like functions exist isn't the same thing as being the self. A picture of an apple is not an apple. > > > - which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in > > others, both and neither in others. > > > My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical > > continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is > > experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and > > there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we get > > determinism. > > Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD, where we > look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective. Indeterminism in the sense of not being sure which of the available deterministic paths will be chosen statistically, not in the sense of genuine creativity,novelty, and intention. > > > Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get > > superstition. > > Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand > possible wounds we do to ourselves. Sure, yes. Abuse of power. Escalation of intolerance to supernatural levels. > > > If we take these perspectives too literally, we get > > pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/14722448115) in > > the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism too if > > taken to it's literal extreme. > > Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism. There, > we can quickly see reductionism cannot work. Dennett seems pretty reductionistic. The vaccine seems not to have kicked in yet? > > > If we take these profound perspectives > > too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and > > neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday. > > > Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound > > meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and lowest > > ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic > > contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching > > meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of > > hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material > > objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the anti- > > poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity. > > Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :) Excellent point. I should have said that it appeals to masculine minds instead of being masculine itself. It's more of a Hermetic priesthood that is rooted in non-anthropomorphic sentience. You're right, it could be rather feminine in the sense of being receptive and oracular, full of secrets. > > > When > > you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some > > powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any > > other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place > > along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to > > universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem with it > > is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience, and > > then defensively denies it. > > It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the numbers > are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep, and > we can listen to what they say. > You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete experiences. It's circular reasoning because you are a priori assuming that our experiences are the experiences of numbers. How can you be so sure that numbers exist or have experiences independently of physical entities making sense of themselves and their world that way? > > > That's what all sufficiently progressed > > points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress. > > My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have > > it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes > > subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the > > sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further > > removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language) but I > > think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us, > > which is really all that I'm after. > > We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown reason > you don't want the machines to be part of it. > You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating > them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with that > position (to be frank). Because machines only become real through material enactments. The abstraction of machines is only half of the story. > > > > >>> They seem to have no > >>> opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology, > >>> physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any > >>> suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science. > >>> It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are > >>> born out of thought experiments and not academic training. > > >> Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some > >> academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution. > >> The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is > >> non > >> sense, and it hides the real honest researches. > > > I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my hypothesis > > out there? > > By writing text to convince other people, academic or not. Unfortunately the people who would care are already convinced of the existing monosense fundamentalisms. > > > Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic > > cred? ;) > > Not sure this would really help you, to be honest. > Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work starts > from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and the > spiritual, without assuming them at the start. > I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and > many mystics got it right, I think. > > We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is > "try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can > explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way, you > have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF, or > any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but it > is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you > really believe that you are not Turing emulable. It's not just me, I don't think that anything is actually Turing emulable to it's native substitution level, we just don't care that it isn't real when it's something other than ourselves. We can fool one or more channels of our own sense into accepting the 'emulation', but there is no literal emulation happening except through the tolerance of subjective pattern recognition. Pixels do not literally emulate images, we just read image and emulated perceptual referents through the pixels by pinching out the discontinuity. What makes me even more suspect of emulation when it comes to human subjectivity is that since we are participants in a narrative which is temporal, and temporality is a continuous accumulation of entangled events, it is not clear that we can be divorced from our temporal context. I do not exist in any other timeframe but my own. An exact duplicate of me still comes into being at a different time than I did, so his orientation to the present is different than mine. His memories are my memories. We both remember the other one being created in a lab but one of us is objectively correct. If I stand on a red square and he materializes on a blue square, his memory is tangibly false of himself being on a red square and seeing me materialize on a blue square. There is not necessarily an absolute substitution level for anything as each thing bears a specific potential relation to all other events. > I doubt this will add > any new observable effects, though. > You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of explaining > does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always > relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non > Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an > explanation. Feeling and imagination is pretty close to being magical. If we could project it outside of our heads or bring everyone else inside our minds, then how much more magic would magic really be? > > I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give some > food, in your restaurant, to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who > lost its biological brain ... How about I will put both virtualized and biological entrees on the menu an he can choose his preference? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.