On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 05:45:46PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:53, Russell Standish wrote:
> >Why do you think that we couldn't find a similar sort of explanation
> >for why the activity in other branches is relevant to consciousness
> >(assuming that it is the case, of course). Before Boltzmann, the
> >irreversibility of the second law was totally mysterious, but I doubt
> >anyone seriously thought it magical.
> Yes. The vitalistes for example. Who used this fact for saying that
> life was not just physical phenomena.
> What MGA shows is that the materialist have to do the same thing
> with weak materialism.

OK. Complexity science is still young.

> You could tell me: "why do you think that we couldn't find a similar
> sort of explanation for why God's activity is relevant to
> consciousness". 

Since God is rather ill-defined, its a bit hard to make sense of that.

> Well I am rather sure he is, that simple fact does
> not refute comp, like we already know that comp makes consciousness
> multiversal in a robust universe (even a Newtonian one!).
> You use of multiverse consists in trying to invalidate the MGA
> point, fair enough, but to invalidate it, you need to add a third
> person non Turing emulable relation between the physical
> computations in the multiverse. 

Why? I not doing this explicitly.

> if not you are just making the comp
> algorithm of the person more complex, indeed infinitely complex in
> the limit.

I doubt it - but perhaps you could expand.

> >
> >My point is only that Maudlin has not ruled this out. And I fail to
> >see an easy way of ruling it out - emulating the Multiverse doesn't
> >really seem to do it.
> We rule out nothing, but if we keep comp, we rule out useless
> additions. 

So are you saying that the MGA doesn't show that COMP is incompatible
with SUP-PHYS? That's surprising.

> Comp shows where and how the laws of physics come from,
> but by MGA we show directly that primitive matter cannot be used to
> relate consciousness to physical facts, and that it is on the
> contrary the physical facts which have to be related to
> consciousness experience.

How does primitivity come into the picture? Neither COMP nor SUP-PHYS
define the concept "primitive".

> At step seven (UDA), we know already that physics (the ideally
> correct science) is already a branch of computer science, and
> machine self-reference, ... unless the physical universe is little
> (does not run any significant part of the UD).


> This means that your multiverse has to be little, but to use it get
> the counterfactuals, and comp, it needs to be already as big as the
> UD.


> This is another way to make the life hard for your argument.
> >
> >>(Although you seem to abandon that idea for saying that the film
> >>(projection in time and place) is conscious).
> >
> >I'm trying to abandon discussion of the MGA at present as an
> >unnecessary complication, as I understand that argument even less.
> It is needed to get the reversal, without delving in the harder
> mathematical part, which shows the "how", and the origin of the
> qualia/quanta separation.

Doesn't the reversal come from steps 1-7 of the UDA? I thought that
was independant of the MGA.

> With comp and sup-phys we associate consciousness to a singular
> computation through its physical activity. Removing that register
> does not change the computational activity, nor the physical
> activity, relevant for that computation in that single reality.
> Also, this contradict your statement that the movie graph (the
> physical projection of the movie) is conscious, because such a movie
> is Olympia with all the Klaras having been removed.

Let's not focus on that too much, as it is irrelevant to Maudlin's
argument in a multiverse. But what I actually said was it wasn't a
priori absurd that a recording could be consciousness. The MGA
depended on that absurdity at some point. I didn't say that recordings
could be conscious. There is a difference.

I appreciate your recent comment about doevtailing on too many
conversations. Excuse my massive pruning of the conversation to assist
in that direction!



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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