On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 05:45:46PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:53, Russell Standish wrote: > >Why do you think that we couldn't find a similar sort of explanation > >for why the activity in other branches is relevant to consciousness > >(assuming that it is the case, of course). Before Boltzmann, the > >irreversibility of the second law was totally mysterious, but I doubt > >anyone seriously thought it magical. > > Yes. The vitalistes for example. Who used this fact for saying that > life was not just physical phenomena. > What MGA shows is that the materialist have to do the same thing > with weak materialism.
OK. Complexity science is still young. > > You could tell me: "why do you think that we couldn't find a similar > sort of explanation for why God's activity is relevant to > consciousness". Since God is rather ill-defined, its a bit hard to make sense of that. > Well I am rather sure he is, that simple fact does > not refute comp, like we already know that comp makes consciousness > multiversal in a robust universe (even a Newtonian one!). > You use of multiverse consists in trying to invalidate the MGA > point, fair enough, but to invalidate it, you need to add a third > person non Turing emulable relation between the physical > computations in the multiverse. Why? I not doing this explicitly. > if not you are just making the comp > algorithm of the person more complex, indeed infinitely complex in > the limit. > I doubt it - but perhaps you could expand. > > > > > >My point is only that Maudlin has not ruled this out. And I fail to > >see an easy way of ruling it out - emulating the Multiverse doesn't > >really seem to do it. > > We rule out nothing, but if we keep comp, we rule out useless > additions. So are you saying that the MGA doesn't show that COMP is incompatible with SUP-PHYS? That's surprising. > Comp shows where and how the laws of physics come from, > but by MGA we show directly that primitive matter cannot be used to > relate consciousness to physical facts, and that it is on the > contrary the physical facts which have to be related to > consciousness experience. > How does primitivity come into the picture? Neither COMP nor SUP-PHYS define the concept "primitive". > At step seven (UDA), we know already that physics (the ideally > correct science) is already a branch of computer science, and > machine self-reference, ... unless the physical universe is little > (does not run any significant part of the UD). > OK. > This means that your multiverse has to be little, but to use it get > the counterfactuals, and comp, it needs to be already as big as the > UD. > ? > This is another way to make the life hard for your argument. > > > > > >>(Although you seem to abandon that idea for saying that the film > >>(projection in time and place) is conscious). > > > >I'm trying to abandon discussion of the MGA at present as an > >unnecessary complication, as I understand that argument even less. > > > It is needed to get the reversal, without delving in the harder > mathematical part, which shows the "how", and the origin of the > qualia/quanta separation. > Doesn't the reversal come from steps 1-7 of the UDA? I thought that was independant of the MGA. ... > > With comp and sup-phys we associate consciousness to a singular > computation through its physical activity. Removing that register > does not change the computational activity, nor the physical > activity, relevant for that computation in that single reality. > > Also, this contradict your statement that the movie graph (the > physical projection of the movie) is conscious, because such a movie > is Olympia with all the Klaras having been removed. > Let's not focus on that too much, as it is irrelevant to Maudlin's argument in a multiverse. But what I actually said was it wasn't a priori absurd that a recording could be consciousness. The MGA depended on that absurdity at some point. I didn't say that recordings could be conscious. There is a difference. I appreciate your recent comment about doevtailing on too many conversations. Excuse my massive pruning of the conversation to assist in that direction! Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
