On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
> >UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
> >different in the case of difference consious states.
> 
> 
> This is ambiguous. There are infinities of UD programs. And the
> consciousness instantiated in the UD, is never the UD's
> consciousness, but the consciousness of the person executed in some
> part of the UD processing. With sup-phys, this entails that there
> are finite portion of UD* which do the "conscious person
> computation". We can apply MGA. It might be that in some of those
> computation some register are not used, and, with 323, we can remove
> them.
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >...
> >
> >>
> >>I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole
> >>UD, just the
> >>branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals
> >>between these
> >>branches?
> >
> >Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
> >does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,
> 
> That is enough to throw out physicalism.

This seems to contradict your earlier statement in this post where you
say consciousness only supervenes on part of the UD.

> 
> 
> >it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.
> 
> Like it may still supervene on a God's created multiversal physics.
> Yes. Why not. But you need to say that it might still supervene ONLY
> on a multiversal physics. But then why not "ONLY a God's created
> multiversal physics"? Such move can always be done, but it is a
> crime against Occam, because the reasoning shows that there is
> nothing computationally relevant in those additions.
> If it where, it would mean we have been incorrect in the choice of
> the substitution level.
> 

So long as the supervenience is on phenomoinal physics experienced by
the conscious entitity, it really matters not whether the physics is
made by a God. I don't particularly care if I supervene on a computer
located on the 3rd planet of beta Carianae - what matters is that I
supervene on the physics of this world, right here and now - whatever
that physics actually is.

> 
> >
> >Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable, and
> >something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
> >supervene on the original.
> 
> ?

Its a pretty straight forward question. I'll put it in symbols. Let sup
mean supervene and em mean emulates:

If X em Y, then A not sup X => A not sup Y.

Is this true? If so, why?


> 
> 
> 
> 
> >Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?
> 
> It seems to me neither assumed, nor used (but it is a bit unclear,
> also, so I might miss something).
> 

Because I don't otherwise see how one can go from showing lack of
supervenience on an emulation to showing lack of supervenience on the original.

It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.

> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
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University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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