On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:12:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> It looks like. But with comp we would survive even if we are sent in
> a classical universe, once it runs the classical computation.
> Russell is adding something to the comp hypothesis. 

I don't believe I am, except for considering the argument in a
Multiverse. I am trying to understand the MGA qua proof. I'm not
trying to postulate any additional mechanism of consciousness beyond
that of computationalism. I'm am just trying to understand why
supervenience on a multiversal physics is ruled out.

> It presupposes
> that comp works only in some type of universe. Such a refutation is
> a bit "bibilical". It is like saying yes to the doctor because some
> transcendant entity (God, a universe of type X, ...) makes it
> possible. it is implicit in comp that we survive because the physics
> allow the running of a computation in its usual classical (Church-
> Turing-Post sense). I might need to make that explicit perhaps?
> 

No need to make it more explicit: comp includes the functionalist
assumption that any reimplementation of the conscious computation on
no matter what hardware reimplements the consciousness.

Since it is the same consciousness, the reimplementation of the
physics must also be indistinguishable by supervenience. But that
physics can be emulated (ie needn't be concrete), just
indistinguishable. It seems the me that the dovetailer faithfully
reproduces the multiversal physics, albeit emulated, so I don't see
the contradiction with SUP-PHYS.


-- 

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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