On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:28, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 05:45:46PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:53, Russell Standish wrote:
Why do you think that we couldn't find a similar sort of explanation
for why the activity in other branches is relevant to consciousness
(assuming that it is the case, of course). Before Boltzmann, the
irreversibility of the second law was totally mysterious, but I
anyone seriously thought it magical.
Yes. The vitalistes for example. Who used this fact for saying that
life was not just physical phenomena.
What MGA shows is that the materialist have to do the same thing
with weak materialism.
OK. Complexity science is still young.
You could tell me: "why do you think that we couldn't find a similar
sort of explanation for why God's activity is relevant to
Since God is rather ill-defined, its a bit hard to make sense of that.
You can use any precise definition of God, here. Even "white man with
a beard responsible for the entire creation".
BTW, primitive matter is rather ill-defined too.
Well I am rather sure he is, that simple fact does
not refute comp, like we already know that comp makes consciousness
multiversal in a robust universe (even a Newtonian one!).
You use of multiverse consists in trying to invalidate the MGA
point, fair enough, but to invalidate it, you need to add a third
person non Turing emulable relation between the physical
computations in the multiverse.
Why? I not doing this explicitly.
Without that non Turing emulable part, the whole system is emulable in
a single universe, and the MGA applies.
if not you are just making the comp
algorithm of the person more complex, indeed infinitely complex in
I doubt it - but perhaps you could expand.
Because each time I will simulate the relevant part of you multiverse,
you will introduce a new multi-multiverse, making the simulation more
complex. But this will never work, because that new multi-multi-verse
will still be emulable. Unless, you make explicit it is not, but then
comp is wrong.
My point is only that Maudlin has not ruled this out. And I fail to
see an easy way of ruling it out - emulating the Multiverse doesn't
really seem to do it.
We rule out nothing, but if we keep comp, we rule out useless
So are you saying that the MGA doesn't show that COMP is incompatible
with SUP-PHYS? That's surprising.
Not at all. I often say that MGA leads to an epistemological
contradiction. Without occam we can never prove any in-existence.
MGA shows only primitive matter, or physicalism to be useless for the
mind and body.
Comp shows where and how the laws of physics come from,
but by MGA we show directly that primitive matter cannot be used to
relate consciousness to physical facts, and that it is on the
contrary the physical facts which have to be related to
How does primitivity come into the picture? Neither COMP nor SUP-PHYS
define the concept "primitive".
SUP-PHYS, by definition, concern the physics of physicalism, not the
comp physics. By saying "yes" to the doctor we already agree on a form
of "sup-phys" with physics being not necessarily primary. MGA says
nothing about the fact that consciousness supervene on some physics.
It just show that such physics cannot be the fundamental science.
At step seven (UDA), we know already that physics (the ideally
correct science) is already a branch of computer science, and
machine self-reference, ... unless the physical universe is little
(does not run any significant part of the UD).
This means that your multiverse has to be little, but to use it get
the counterfactuals, and comp, it needs to be already as big as the
This is another way to make the life hard for your argument.
(Although you seem to abandon that idea for saying that the film
(projection in time and place) is conscious).
I'm trying to abandon discussion of the MGA at present as an
unnecessary complication, as I understand that argument even less.
It is needed to get the reversal, without delving in the harder
mathematical part, which shows the "how", and the origin of the
Doesn't the reversal come from steps 1-7 of the UDA? I thought that
was independant of the MGA.
With UDA1-7 we have the reversal if the universe is supposed to be
robust. MGA shows that such a robustness of the universe is a red
With comp and sup-phys we associate consciousness to a singular
computation through its physical activity. Removing that register
does not change the computational activity, nor the physical
activity, relevant for that computation in that single reality.
Also, this contradict your statement that the movie graph (the
physical projection of the movie) is conscious, because such a movie
is Olympia with all the Klaras having been removed.
Let's not focus on that too much, as it is irrelevant to Maudlin's
argument in a multiverse. But what I actually said was it wasn't a
priori absurd that a recording could be consciousness.
It is. There is no more computations there. Comp assumes consciousness
relying on a computation, and with sup-phys, it asspciate it with the
primitive physical activity done during that computation.
depended on that absurdity at some point. I didn't say that recordings
could be conscious. There is a difference.
I appreciate your recent comment about doevtailing on too many
conversations. Excuse my massive pruning of the conversation to assist
in that direction!
No problem. It is helpful to clarify some points. For example, I
should make clearer that sup-phys (Maudlin's and Kim's notion of
physical supervenience, involves "primitive physics", not the eventual
physics extracted from comp.
Another clarification is that you can only use a little (non robust)
multiverse in your move, because a big multiverse makes the UDA1-7
already entailing the reversal. But to handle the counterfactuals, as
you need for the argument, it needs to be big. To handle the
counterfactuals of a universal program, the multiverse has to be
robust, and thus equivalent with the UD*, but then we are in the
conditions where step-7 is already enough.
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