On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience", like Kim
and most "expert" on supervenience.
I use "physical supervenience", because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
That is why I say supervenience has no purchase on concreteness.
So the consciousness are not
supervening on the UD, by definition of supervenience.
The consciousness of mister x does supervene on the running of the
relevant computation done by the UD. His consciousness supervene on
(infinitely many) subcomputations of the UD computation. That's why
in UDA step seven we have already the reversal physics/computer
science in the case we suppose our physical universe to be robust (=
executing concretely a universal dovetailer).
The consciousness of one student in a classroom, full of many
students, does supervene on the physical activity occurring in the
classroom as a whole, despite the classroom does not change itself
per se. (It does it in some sense, but then the UD does it to, after
all he changes itself into an infinity of different programs,
including many which changes themselves).
Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change!
Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.
They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in particular.
A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird) entails some
change in the classroom.
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