On 25 Dec 2011, at 23:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD
different in the case of difference consious states.
This is ambiguous. There are infinities of UD programs. And the
consciousness instantiated in the UD, is never the UD's
consciousness, but the consciousness of the person executed in some
part of the UD processing. With sup-phys, this entails that there
are finite portion of UD* which do the "conscious person
computation". We can apply MGA. It might be that in some of those
computation some register are not used, and, with 323, we can remove
I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole
UD, just the
branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals
Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,
That is enough to throw out physicalism.
This seems to contradict your earlier statement in this post where you
say consciousness only supervenes on part of the UD.
To supervene of X entails to supervene on any Y extending X.
If my consciousness supervenes on X, then a change in my consciousness
does necessitate a change in X, which necessitates a change in X union
it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.
Like it may still supervene on a God's created multiversal physics.
Yes. Why not. But you need to say that it might still supervene ONLY
on a multiversal physics. But then why not "ONLY a God's created
multiversal physics"? Such move can always be done, but it is a
crime against Occam, because the reasoning shows that there is
nothing computationally relevant in those additions.
If it where, it would mean we have been incorrect in the choice of
the substitution level.
So long as the supervenience is on phenomoinal physics experienced by
the conscious entitity, it really matters not whether the physics is
made by a God. I don't particularly care if I supervene on a computer
located on the 3rd planet of beta Carianae - what matters is that I
supervene on the physics of this world, right here and now - whatever
that physics actually is.
OK. My point is that such a physics cannot be primary. Sorry if I was
Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable,
something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
supervene on the original.
Its a pretty straight forward question. I'll put it in symbols. Let
mean supervene and em mean emulates:
If X em Y, then A not sup X => A not sup Y.
Is this true? If so, why?
If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not
supervene on the low level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not
supervene on the higher level too. That's why once we can say yes to
the doctor for a correct level, we can automatically say yes for any
coarse grained level (if we can afford it). If I emulate my brain at
the level of quantum strings, and if my consciousness is not present
in that emulation, it means the real level is lower, not higher.
Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?
It seems to me neither assumed, nor used (but it is a bit unclear,
also, so I might miss something).
Because I don't otherwise see how one can go from showing lack of
supervenience on an emulation to showing lack of supervenience on
It would mean that the emulation is not done at the right (or below)
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best answer to your concrete multiverse argument, is that such
multiverse has to be robust to handle the "universal counterfactuals",
but then it contains a UD*, and we are back at the step 7, and *in
that case* the step seven is enough for the reversal physics/
mathematical computer science (arithmetic).
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