On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> >On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>>The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
> >>>otherwise of the supervened on.
> >>
> >>Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience", like Kim
> >>and most "expert" on supervenience.
> >>I use "physical supervenience", because in the dilemma mechanism/
> >>materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
> >>physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
> >>do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
> >>stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
> >>physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
> >>for AUDA.
> >
> >Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
> >indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
> >supervenes on
> >it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
> 
> Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
> is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
> We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
> supervenience.
> I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
> 

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.


> >Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
> >is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
> >classroom does not change!
> 
> Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
> If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
> relevance.
> 

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains. First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
"hardware", which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

> 
> 
> >So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
> >consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
> >on subsystems of the classroom.
> 
> They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
> particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
> entails some change in the classroom.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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