On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?

I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers, the
programs, the digital machines, )

Why would numbers differ in quality when they already differ precisely
in quantity? Seems superfluous.

It is not a matter of choice. Relatively to each other universal number does discover those quality, and develop all the mind-body problem discourses. You can call them zombie, but you can also do that with humans. After all emiminativist does talk about consciousness as been causally superfluous. But in the case of nulbers, at least we can show that those who begins to bet on their nown consistency/ consciousness develop self-speeding up ability relatively to their most probable universal number/environment, so it is not superfluous. A number, when seen relatively to some universal number is really a machine or a program.





I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of
biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self-
reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.

I see recursion as just one defining exterior behavior of biology. I
don't see pain and pleasure being an inevitable arithmetic product of
recursion but they are an equally definitive biological quality.

This is because we are forbidden to do that. If we could access the functional level of pain and pleasure, we would no more evolved and disappear. Our "not seeing pain and pleasure being inevitably arithmetic (or even physics)" is programmed at the start. Indeed some people fears "drugs" because they believe it can gives us such an access, but such an idea is a myth. It can only be superficially true (and at that level, the brain already is a big "drug dealer").







Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four billion
years, right?

Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more simple,
both conceptually and technically.

How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
locally?

Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of the
relations are not biological.
But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the
infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.

Would you say that the infinity of biological number relations is as
large as the infinity of physical relations?

I would say, without thinking too much, that the biological relations are far more numerous. The physical relations are first person constructs of the Löbian machines relations, most plausibly related to deep (necessary long) computations, and which are relatively rare, despite their continuum of consistent extensions.







psychology (of
numbers) is more universal than biology.

I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of numbers
an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia
of
their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).

You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
computation (as can appear in a cartoon).

I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic

This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be discovered
in arithmetic.

Discovered by mathematicians, but does arithmetic itself know whether
or not it is discovering computation?

Some numbers can know that. Arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is plausibly not a person (or only in some non Löbian weak sense). But its "inhabitants" can make the discovery, and indeed do it. Machines can discover their own hypostases. Correct machines cannot miss them eventually.





The question of the existence of computations in nature
is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.

or physics,
any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.

Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable
exists.

How so? If all you have is a tree but no light source, you can't have
a shadow. If all you have is a light bulb but no surfaces to
illuminate, you can't have a shadow either. The realism of a shadow is
in the the visual sense relation between light source, obstacle, and
space.

I agree. But those things exist in the relevant relative sense. Likewise with the numbers.




Computation is
felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,

I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a bit
my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be
felt.

If you are trying to solve an equation, you are feeling computation.

In a weak superficial sense. I am not feeling the computation done by my brain for me to be aware that I am solving an equation, and that's what I meant. If not you are confusing level of descriptions. I don't feel my neurons either.



You have a sense of what the problem is, what outcome you intend, and
this provides a motive which propels your enactment of the
computation.

Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be
felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that exists).

It's not underlying, it's symmetrical.

You have to prove this. In the comp theory, mind and matter are not symmetrical. matter is the border of something much greater (if only the mindscape of the universal numbers).



The native sensation we
experience begins and ends on a human scale.

You say so. I don't believe this is necessary.




Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive experience"
has no meaning for me. Sorry.

It means that counting or solving a math problem is something that you
participate in as a person. You don't just look at a math problem and
have no choice but to solve it, you have to choose to engage in this
tangible puzzling out of the thing. You have to try, maybe struggle,
to wonder, to feel 'aha!'. These are journeys of sense making
motivation on the human scale.

Notably. OK. It could work with the universal larger scale too.




or it is inferred in a
physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something
physical thinks it appears.

Why?

Because I think that counting is a sensorimotive experience which is
associated with the interior of the physical universe. We don't see
any examples of phenomena with no physical association. Empty space
literally 'doesn't count'.

I have no problem with this.




I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct to
reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this and
that is more real than beyond.

That's where the multisense realism comes in. In one sense we *must*
believe that the here and now and I is more real than everything else,
that is literally what subjectivity is.

OK.


That's what I mean when I say
that subjectivity is about orientation and significance. What and who
is close to us, literally in space and time or figuratively in any
number of qualities and affinities, is what matters to us. The more
distant it is, the less it 'matters' and the more it is just
'matter' (or noise or illusion, etc). This is a universal truth of
subjectivity. No person has ever felt that their own survival was less
important than the survival of a distant star, even though that star's
destruction may destroy countless lives. Both views are real in a
sense and unreal in another.

OK.



Where does any place and time come from?

They come from the involuted subjective-objective singularity
involuting itself further as spatiotemporal multiplicity.

?





As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a person,
than the illusion of person to matter.

We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do
instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers and
they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in
numbers.

Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that
those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far
beyond,  of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can
justified in some conditional way already by themselves,

The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
spirits,

It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers, of
many sorts.

How does the arithmetic realm influence the physical realm, and why
don't we see any examples of that?

We see this all the time, and since Descartes we makes this explicit, by inferring that natural phenomena obeys to computable number relations.



I need physical energy to run a
computer or a machine. Why is that?

Because the material hypostases leads necessarily to a quantization of physics which is symmetrical on the state accessed to the UD. Because the physics of numbers is symmetrical on its bottom propositional tautologies (unlike classical tautologies). That's not obvious, but can be proved in comp + classical theory of knowledge.





it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
through sense and motive.

All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new
territory through sense and motive.

Only if we, or some physical interpreter does the interpreting of that
elaboration. As far as we know.

The universal numbers do the interpretations very well.





Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with
arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many
kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
Numbers have no independent realism.

In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the sense
that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent thing
they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical
(Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy. But just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any theory.
We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory",
"proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered
surprising property of numbers.

Oh I wouldn't dispense with numbers at all. Arithmetic sensemaking is
a critical link between subjectivity and objectivity. I'm just saying
they present us with a framework which we can elaborate on forever
without ever making sense of biological feeling.

The hypostases just contradict this.







The picture is rational and
almost upside down with aristotle ontology.

We are both human so we share the broader
levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
narrows and deepens toward individuality.

about even though as far as I've been able to
understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence
which
would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that
could
bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL)
of
personal experience and the scientific, objective descriptions of
reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a
theory.

My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if
you
have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES

How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we can't
subject it to what science has been and will always be?

By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not
shivering
in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who ask
about subjectivity.

Third-party analysis.

If science will always be limited to third-party analysis, then it will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since it is
by
definition subjective.

This is wrong.
The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I
would
add) limited to third person parties.
But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.

It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of
course,
I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person
subjectivity.

That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first
person discourses.

Only because our first person discourses overlap.

Notably on numbers.

Yes and no. I can only overlap minimally with your discourse because I
don't have an adequate sense of numbers.

You need only to accept some principle, like those taught in high school. No need of complex philosophy. If you believe that 0 + x = x, and that (x + (y + 1)) = (x + y) + 1, that's almost good enough.



We overlap much more in other
areas and opinions.

Not so sure.



But yes, if we did overlap, the level of precision
and dis-ambiguity is absolute. That is the purpose of enumeration.
That's why I call it the exoskeleton of sense, just as it could be
said that law is the exoskeleton of motive.


You can't talk to a
congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
universally scoped).

I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for
granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first person
plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something
confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of QM.

I think many universe is what you get when you turn sensorimotive
agency inside out.

UDA1-7 gives some comp sense to this, OK. (thanks comp!).







The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts,
or,
I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can become as
discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
flattened by externalization.

By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other minds
and different persons.

What's wrong with blurring the notion of person?

Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One
day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when
building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or
two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self-
experimentation of that kind.

I think that would be
the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify as a
person in the first place.

Yes. That's interesting.

Once you can join nervous systems, then you
could make appliances that could step down the process to any level so
that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel
how it is to be them,

No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you
have less wrong feelings about that.

Maybe but not necessarily. The brain-conjoined twins aren't
diffracted. Why can't I have a crab or a bag of algae instead of a
left hand?


then plug large molecules into the cells to see
what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on
an interstellar scale even.

Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical
scale on which our consciousness already supervene on.
But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating in
the quest for truth.

How can arithmetic have a scale? Compared to what?

Compared to the observable or inferable physical universe. Arithmetical truth is *very big*.







Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.

Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice,
since
about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There are
reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
science,
will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real peers,
not member of some club).

We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of my
ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.

I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a
way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
compelling, etc.
You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition
already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of the
universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some
hard to understand ways.

That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that
both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive but
their realism is modulated by perspective.

Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except that
the primitive are given by the laws of addition and multiplication on
numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics is
given by such hypostase-modality-modulation.

The 8 hypostases are just eight distinctions within a single sense,
like the eight trigrams of the I Ching. There is deep and universal
truth there, but deep universality is ultimately a privileged semantic
awareness. Most of what our lives are about is not deep, universal, or
true. Multisense realism embraces this as an ontological reality.

That's would be only a vocabulary move. With comp, almost everything (consciousness and matter) are epistemological distinctions.




Both are real in some
sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real nor
unreal in some sense.

"it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to
each hypostases.

But hypostases in general only exist in a specific and rarefied sense.

All correct universal machines have them.





The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a monosense view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to make
it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create
'now'?)

Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical knower.
Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of the
machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which plays
the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape.
But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04 paper,
at least (and ask question).

Being able to describe mathematically that the self-like functions
exist isn't the same thing as being the self. A picture of an apple is
not an apple.

Sure. But math is not just description. It relates to truth. Conventionalism in math is dead.





- which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
others, both and neither in others.

My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is
experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we get
determinism.

Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD, where we
look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective.

Indeterminism in the sense of not being sure which of the available
deterministic paths will be chosen statistically, not in the sense of
genuine creativity,novelty, and intention.

In the UD? OK. In the first person hypostases? I am not sure.




Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
superstition.

Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand
possible wounds we do to ourselves.

Sure, yes. Abuse of power. Escalation of intolerance to supernatural
levels.


If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/ 14722448115) in
the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism  too if
taken to it's literal extreme.

Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism. There,
we can quickly see reductionism cannot work.

Dennett seems pretty reductionistic. The vaccine seems not to have
kicked in yet?

Sure. That's not the problem of comp. That's the problem of its physical reductionism. Dennett assume both comp and math, making him epistemologically inconsistent.





If we take these profound perspectives
too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.

Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound
meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and lowest
ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material
objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the anti-
poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity.

Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :)

Excellent point. I should have said that it appeals to masculine minds
instead of being masculine itself. It's more of a Hermetic priesthood
that is rooted in non-anthropomorphic sentience. You're right, it
could be rather feminine in the sense of being receptive and oracular,
full of secrets.

OK :)




When
you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any
other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem with it is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience, and
then defensively denies it.

It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the numbers
are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep, and
we can listen to what they say.
You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete experiences.

It's circular reasoning because you are a priori assuming that our
experiences are the experiences of numbers. How can you be so sure
that numbers exist or have experiences independently of physical
entities making sense of themselves and their world that way?

I am sure of nothing. Comp is just empirically plausible, and is based on a very solid notion, by Church thesis. You are the one who seems sure that numbers (in their relative relations with each other) cannot have experience.





That's what all sufficiently progressed
points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress.
My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have
it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language) but I
think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us,
which is really all that I'm after.

We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown reason
you don't want the machines to be part of it.
You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating
them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with that
position (to be frank).

Because machines only become real through material enactments. The
abstraction of machines is only half of the story.

Matter become perceivable when a machine looks to itself and environment near its subst comp level, and this without assuming it. So comp explains something you need to assume. So it is simpler.






They seem to have no
opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines cosmology,
physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called science. It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations are
born out of thought experiments and not academic training.

Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is
non
sense, and it hides the real honest researches.

I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my hypothesis
out there?

By writing text to convince other people, academic or not.

Unfortunately the people who would care are already convinced of the
existing monosense fundamentalisms.

That's why research is an hard endeavor. But you have no choice, if you want share your ideas. Science is intrinsically a fight against fundamentalism, including the one which crops is scientific circles all the time.





Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
cred? ;)

Not sure this would really help you, to be honest.
Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work starts
from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and the
spiritual, without assuming them at the start.
I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and
many mystics got it right, I think.

We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is
"try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can
explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way, you
have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF, or
any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but it
is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you
really believe that you are not Turing emulable.

It's not just me, I don't think that anything is actually Turing
emulable to it's native substitution level,

This does not make sense. If something is not Turing emulable: there are just no substitution levels, by definition of the comp subst-level.



we just don't care that it
isn't real when it's something other than ourselves. We can fool one
or more channels of our own sense into accepting the 'emulation', but
there is no literal emulation happening except through the tolerance
of subjective pattern recognition. Pixels do not literally emulate
images, we just read image and emulated perceptual referents through
the pixels by pinching out the discontinuity.

Pixels don't. Logical gates do.


What makes me even more suspect of emulation when it comes to human
subjectivity is that since we are participants in a narrative which is
temporal,

Locally.


and temporality is a continuous accumulation of entangled
events, it is not clear that we can be divorced from our temporal
context. I do not exist in any other timeframe but my own. An exact
duplicate of me still comes into being at a different time than I did,
so his orientation to the present is different than mine. His memories
are my memories. We both remember the other one being created in a lab
but one of us is objectively correct. If I stand on a red square and
he materializes on a blue square, his memory is tangibly false of
himself being on a red square and seeing me materialize on a blue
square. There is not necessarily an absolute substitution level for
anything as each thing bears a specific potential relation to all
other events.

That begs the question. If you decide that the copy is no more a human and send it to a camp, then I might say no to the doctor just by fear of persecution. This is like saying that cannabis can destroy your life, because indeed, it can send you to jail. saying that there is no subst-level is the same as saying that comp is false. It is not an argument: you are just putting some infinities explicitly in the working of the mind.




I doubt this will add
any new observable effects, though.
You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of explaining
does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always
relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non
Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an
explanation.

Feeling and imagination is pretty close to being magical. If we could
project it outside of our heads or bring everyone else inside our
minds, then how much more magic would magic really be?

It is easier to start from the simple, and if it does not work, to correct it and find something else. But yoiu can decide in advance that something is magical, and search for a magical explanation. that leads to god-gap (or primitive matter-gap) sort of explanation, which leads to the "shut-up and compute" form of reductionism.




I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give some
food, in your restaurant,  to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who
lost its biological brain ...

How about I will put both virtualized and biological entrees on the
menu an he can choose his preference?

Nice. you progress! I know my sun in law, the brain is digital but the stomach is biogical: he will choose the biological, (unless you make him sleepy, and make him dream eating, but we have not yet that technology). Thanks for him.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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