On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience", like Kim
and most "expert" on supervenience.
I use "physical supervenience", because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.


This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.

"Suopervenience", as used in today's philosophy of mind, is a 100% Aristotelian notion, relating consciousness to physical events, thought as being primitive by definition. It is naturalism, weak materialism. Maudlins completely lacks the idea that physics might not be the fundamental science. This is clear in his book on QM too. Most people conceive matter as being primitive. The notion of non primitive matter has been completely abandoned since the dismissing of Platonist conception of reality. Nobody doubts the primitive nature of matter, except when they begin to grasp the comp mind-body problem. Thare has been a time where I use the word "matter" in the its primitive Aristotelian sense, but this leads to the shocking statement that matter does not exist (which of course meant (Aristotle primary matter does not exist in any sense relating it to consciousness).






Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.


No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains.

What would that mean?


First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
"hardware", which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

I don't see this at all. If I run the UD, an infinity of different consciousness will supervene on the physical phenomenon consisting in that execution. I do already believe that different consciousness occur in my own brain: they supervene on the activity of the whole brain though. Supervenience of Y on X, means only that a change of Y needs a change on X, not the reverse.

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.


Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

I have no understanding of what you mean by swapping consciousness of two people.

Bruno




So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.

They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
entails some change in the classroom.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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