On Dec 26, 6:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 25 Dec 2011, at 21:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Dec 25, 12:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 25 Dec 2011, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> Does that mean that you consider numbers biological?
> >> I consider that some relations between some numbers are biological.
> >> Some are theological, some physical, etc, from their (the numbers,
> >> the
> >> programs, the digital machines, )
> > Why would numbers differ in quality when they already differ precisely
> > in quantity? Seems superfluous.
> It is not a matter of choice. Relatively to each other universal
> number does discover those quality, and develop all the mind-body
> problem discourses.

Why would they though? By what logic would quantities develop

> You can call them zombie, but you can also do that
> with humans. After all emiminativist does talk about consciousness as
> been causally superfluous. But in the case of nulbers, at least we can
> show that those who begins to bet on their nown consistency/
> consciousness develop self-speeding up ability relatively to their
> most probable universal number/environment, so it is not superfluous.
> A number, when seen relatively to some universal number is really a
> machine or a program.

Why couldn't they just speed themselves up without developing any
magical dimensions of quality? Why would numbers care about speeding
themselves up in the first place?

> >> I consider Kleene recursion theorem as the fundamental theorem of
> >> biology. It solves conceptually and practically the problem of self-
> >> reproduction, self-regeneration, embryo, etc.
> > I see recursion as just one defining exterior behavior of biology. I
> > don't see pain and pleasure being an inevitable arithmetic product of
> > recursion but they are an equally definitive biological quality.
> This is because we are forbidden to do that. If we could access the
> functional level of pain and pleasure, we would no more evolved and
> disappear. Our "not seeing pain and pleasure being inevitably
> arithmetic (or even physics)" is programmed at the start. Indeed some
> people fears "drugs" because they believe it can gives us such an
> access, but such an idea is a myth. It can only be superficially true
> (and at that level, the brain already is a big "drug dealer").

I'm not talking about the function of pain though, I'm talking about
the experience. It would not be necessary from any arithmetic or
physical axiom or elaboration. All functions of pain could and would
be accomplished programmatically without any experience at all. If
stove > hot, then immediately remove hand from stove and minimize
damage with cold water. I understand what you are saying about the
inaccessibility of certain truths being maybe written in to our code
from the start but it sounds like you are saying that if we could see
arithmetic as it actually is, we would feel that there is pain and
pleasure in certain numbers. I don't think that's true because pain
and pleasure are too variable and idiosyncratic to be connected with
universal numbers. All numbers have pleasurable and painful

> >>>>> Certainly the universe is filled with inorganic
> >>>>> matter while biological cells represent a small fraction of it.
> >>>>> Physics seems to predate biology, at least on Earth by four
> >>>>> billion
> >>>>> years, right?
> >>>> Locally. Not in the big picture, which with comp is much more
> >>>> simple,
> >>>> both conceptually and technically.
> >>> How does comp explain the predominance of non-biological matter
> >>> locally?
> >> Although there are infinitely biological number relations, most of
> >> the
> >> relations are not biological.
> >> But all that local non biological matter is only the reflect of the
> >> infinitely many computations which our minds does not depend on.
> > Would you say that the infinity of biological number relations is as
> > large as the infinity of physical relations?
> I would say, without thinking too much, that the biological relations
> are far more numerous. The physical relations are first person
> constructs of the Löbian machines relations, most plausibly related to
> deep (necessary long) computations, and which are relatively rare,
> despite their continuum of consistent extensions.

Interesting. Why are there so many more inorganic particles than
organisms locally though? Why are the long computations so much more
prolific when biology is more closely tied with reproduction?

> >>>>>> psychology (of
> >>>>>> numbers) is more universal than biology.
> >>>>> I was talking specifically about the extensive elaboration of
> >>>>> vertebrate cognition in hominids. I would call the qualia of
> >>>>> numbers
> >>>>> an aspect of psychology while that which numbers represent are
> >>>>> quantitative archetypes that have no agency, psychology, or qualia
> >>>>> of
> >>>>> their own (just as Bugs Bunny is a cartoon celebrity who has
> >>>>> experiences independently of the audience's projected qualia).
> >>>> You miss the difference between a computation (as it exists in
> >>>> arithmetic, and in some local physics) and a description of a
> >>>> computation (as can appear in a cartoon).
> >>> I don't think that computation does exist in arithmetic
> >> This is not a matter of choice. Computations have indeed be
> >> discovered
> >> in arithmetic.
> > Discovered by mathematicians, but does arithmetic itself know whether
> > or not it is discovering computation?
> Some numbers can know that. Arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is
> plausibly not a person (or only in some non Löbian weak sense). But
> its "inhabitants" can make the discovery, and indeed do it. Machines
> can discover their own hypostases. Correct machines cannot miss them
> eventually.

I would have to understand more about how you come to that conclusion.
It seems speculative and anthropomorphic to me.

> >> The question of the existence of computations in nature
> >> is more delicate. It is just *assumed* in the comp hypothesis.
> >>> or physics,
> >>> any more than shadows exist in trees or light bulbs.
> >> Shadows exist in trees or light bulb in the sense that observable
> >> exists.
> > How so? If all you have is a tree but no light source, you can't have
> > a shadow. If all you have is a light bulb but no surfaces to
> > illuminate, you can't have a shadow either. The realism of a shadow is
> > in the the visual sense relation between light source, obstacle, and
> > space.
> I agree. But those things exist in the relevant relative sense.
> Likewise with the numbers.

With numbers you have to define the possibilities explicitly though. I
can make a photoshop image of a tree in the dark with a purple shadow.
It has no realism.

> >>> Computation is
> >>> felt directly as a sensorimotive experience,
> >> I am not sure of the meaning "computation can be felt" (it hurts a
> >> bit
> >> my categorization). Neither computation nor brain activity can be
> >> felt.
> > If you are trying to solve an equation, you are feeling computation.
> In a weak superficial sense. I am not feeling the computation done by
> my brain for me to be aware that I am solving an equation, and that's
> what I meant. If not you are confusing level of descriptions. I don't
> feel my neurons either.

You don't feel the outside of your neurons, but everything you feel is
the awareness of the all of your relevant neurons at once, including
their awareness of your body's awareness of it's environment and the
environment's awareness of itself, etc. It's all sense making. We
don't see our retina cells firing, but what we see through our eyes is
the interior energy-time-significance topology of that matter-space-
relativity architecture.

> > You have a sense of what the problem is, what outcome you intend, and
> > this provides a motive which propels your enactment of the
> > computation.
> >> Pain and pleasure, smell and taste, touch and vision can be
> >> felt, but not the underlying software and hardware (if that exists).
> > It's not underlying, it's symmetrical.
> You have to prove this. In the comp theory, mind and matter are not
> symmetrical. matter is the border of something much greater (if only
> the mindscape of the universal numbers).

I think comp theory has to be proved. I have no reason to doubt my own
experience that subjective qualia cannot be described by or reduced to
spatial neurochemical topologies. Every quality of matter, it's
discrete, a-signifying, public, entropic, generic, literally
quantifiable nature is directly contradicted by that of mind. The
subjective experience of mind is continuous, literally private but
figuratively shared, narrative, proprietary, and metaphorically
multivalent. What more needs to be proved?

> > The native sensation we
> > experience begins and ends on a human scale.
> You say so. I don't believe this is necessary.

What other kind of sensation can humans have other than human

> >> Now an expression like "felt directly as a sensorimotive experience"
> >> has no meaning for me. Sorry.
> > It means that counting or solving a math problem is something that you
> > participate in as a person. You don't just look at a math problem and
> > have no choice but to solve it, you have to choose to engage in this
> > tangible puzzling out of the thing. You have to try, maybe struggle,
> > to wonder, to feel 'aha!'. These are journeys of sense making
> > motivation on the human scale.
> Notably. OK. It could work with the universal larger scale too.

I think it does. On every scale the cosmos is stories on the inside,
non-stories on the outside. In between those east and west points are
the north (logos-computation-profound) meridian which elevates the
unity as a gradual evanescent diffusion, and a south (eros-techne-
pedestrian) meridian which clearly defines Cartesian subject object

> >>> or it is inferred in a
> >>> physical system, but I doubt it can appear anywhere unless something
> >>> physical thinks it appears.
> >> Why?
> > Because I think that counting is a sensorimotive experience which is
> > associated with the interior of the physical universe. We don't see
> > any examples of phenomena with no physical association. Empty space
> > literally 'doesn't count'.
> I have no problem with this.
> >> I think this view is a gross extrapolation from our animal instinct
> >> to
> >> reify the indexicals. I belief that here and now and "I" and this and
> >> that is more real than beyond.
> > That's where the multisense realism comes in. In one sense we *must*
> > believe that the here and now and I is more real than everything else,
> > that is literally what subjectivity is.
> OK.
> > That's what I mean when I say
> > that subjectivity is about orientation and significance. What and who
> > is close to us, literally in space and time or figuratively in any
> > number of qualities and affinities, is what matters to us. The more
> > distant it is, the less it 'matters' and the more it is just
> > 'matter' (or noise or illusion, etc). This is a universal truth of
> > subjectivity. No person has ever felt that their own survival was less
> > important than the survival of a distant star, even though that star's
> > destruction may destroy countless lives. Both views are real in a
> > sense and unreal in another.
> OK.
> >> Where does any place and time come from?
> > They come from the involuted subjective-objective singularity
> > involuting itself further as spatiotemporal multiplicity.
> ?

In the beginning (and ending and always and never) is the primordial
singularity, which is monad. It has no sense to discern time or space,
everythingness or nothingness. It is the level of the cosmos where
there is only "I" with nothing,  to compare itself to to establish
scale, shape, exteriority, etc. It has to invent it's opposite: Not-I,
in the form of objectivity to create the possibility of realism. Once
that essential dialectic of I and Not I is established, a continuum of
sense and motive can be diffracted. The essential sensorimotive
continuum can then be contradicted as an existential electromagnetic
continuum so that the relations between the emptiness which divides
existential objects becomes space and the masking of eternity which
multiplies the significance of essential subjects becomes time.
Objective side and subjective side are literally fused by
spatiotemporal synchronization and figuratively by semantic
identification, ie Relativity = Perception.

> >> As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a
> >> person,
> >> than the illusion of person to matter.
> >> We don't see a physical primitive universe. Layman and babies do
> >> instinctively what physicist do all the time: they measure numbers
> >> and
> >> they infer relations between numbers, themselves compactified in
> >> numbers.
> >> Consciousness and other ineffable things comes from the fact that
> >> those numbers are related to theoretical number truth which are far
> >> beyond,  of what they can proof or justified, as the numbers can
> >> justified in some conditional way already by themselves,
> >>> The universe is not haunted by arithmetic
> >>> spirits,
> >> It is the arithmetical realm which is haunted by universal numbers,
> >> of
> >> many sorts.
> > How does the arithmetic realm influence the physical realm, and why
> > don't we see any examples of that?
> We see this all the time, and since Descartes we makes this explicit,
> by inferring that natural phenomena obeys to computable number
> relations.

To me that is an example of how numbers describe physics, not how
physics obeys numbers. You can't influence natural phenomena directly
with the idea of numbers, you have to have a concrete enactment in
physical force caused by physical matter to actually do anything.
Numbers however will follow around physics wherever it goes. We can
make a computer create or delete any number we like. That doesn't seem
like the computer is obeying computable number relations, it is just
doing what we have manufactured it to do and the numerical
interpretations are ours.

> > I need physical energy to run a
> > computer or a machine. Why is that?
> Because the material hypostases leads necessarily to a quantization of
> physics which is symmetrical on the state accessed to the UD. Because
> the physics of numbers is symmetrical on its bottom propositional
> tautologies (unlike classical tautologies). That's not obvious, but
> can be proved in comp + classical theory of knowledge.

Physics of numbers? How do you get from the physics of numbers to the
physics of atoms?

> >>> it discovers and elaborates arithmetic as a new territory
> >>> through sense and motive.
> >> All universal numbers discover and elaborate arithmetic as new
> >> territory through sense and motive.
> > Only if we, or some physical interpreter does the interpreting of that
> > elaboration. As far as we know.
> The universal numbers do the interpretations very well.

How would we know that without our own interpretation of their
interpretations? We have ample evidence of the capacity of the human
psyche to project agency and meaning, but what evidence to we have of
numbers interpreting anything on their own?

> >>> Sense and motive may well be guided by non-
> >>> local, non-temporal influences, but that guidance can only be
> >>> manifested through physical description and it's not only to do with
> >>> arithmetic but morphology, language, emotion, personality, etc. Many
> >>> kinds of strange attractors and archetypes for sense and motive.
> >>> Numbers have no independent realism.
> >> In that case your theory might be just not interesting, in the sense
> >> that for most humans, numbers are the most possibly independent thing
> >> they can conceive of. It needs only the common part to classical
> >> (Plato, Hilbert) and constructive (Aristotle, Brouwer) philosophy.
> >> But
> >> just can't dispense of them or their recursive equivalent in any
> >> theory.
> >> We need numbers (or equivalent) to give sense to the word "theory",
> >> "proof", "deduction", "valid", etc. All civilisation discovered
> >> surprising property of numbers.
> > Oh I wouldn't dispense with numbers at all. Arithmetic sensemaking is
> > a critical link between subjectivity and objectivity. I'm just saying
> > they present us with a framework which we can elaborate on forever
> > without ever making sense of biological feeling.
> The hypostases just contradict this.

How? What biological feeling has been quantified? Hunger? Thirst?

> >>>>>> The picture is rational and
> >>>>>> almost upside down with aristotle ontology.
> >>>>>>> We are both human so we share the broader
> >>>>>>> levels, but begin to diverge in the biochemical level as we have
> >>>>>>> different DNA. That divergence grows as the scope of the qualia
> >>>>>>> narrows and deepens toward individuality.
> >>>>>>>> about even though as far as I've been able to
> >>>>>>>> understand they don't display the slightest scant of evidence
> >>>>>>>> which
> >>>>>>>> would show that they believe there will ever be a theory that
> >>>>>>>> could
> >>>>>>>> bridge the gap between the ineffable what-it-is-likeness (WIIL)
> >>>>>>>> of
> >>>>>>>> personal experience and the scientific, objective
> >>>>>>>> descriptions of
> >>>>>>>> reality. They don’t even try to brainstorm ideas about such a
> >>>>>>>> theory.
> >>>>>>> My hypothesis tries to do exactly that. Check it out sometime if
> >>>>>>> you
> >>>>>>> have a chance:http://s33light.org/SEEES
> >>>>>>>> How are we to explain this what-it-is-likeness (WIIL) if we
> >>>>>>>> can't
> >>>>>>>> subject it to what science has been and will always be?
> >>>>>>> By expanding science so that it is more scientific and not
> >>>>>>> shivering
> >>>>>>> in a cave of pseudo-certainty and throwing rocks at people who
> >>>>>>> ask
> >>>>>>> about subjectivity.
> >>>>>>>> Third-party analysis.
> >>>>>>> If science will always be limited to third-party analysis,
> >>>>>>> then it
> >>>>>>> will never be possible for it to address subjectivity, since
> >>>>>>> it is
> >>>>>>> by
> >>>>>>> definition subjective.
> >>>>>> This is wrong.
> >>>>>> The discourse of science is methodologically (and wisely so, I
> >>>>>> would
> >>>>>> add) limited to third person parties.
> >>>>>> But the object of science is everything including consciousness,
> >>>>>> qualia, private lives, hallucination, angel, gods, etc.
> >>>>>> It is up to us to find proposition on which we agree, use them as
> >>>>>> axioms of some sort, and derive propositions from them.
> >>>>>> We can use our person stuff as data, not as argument.
> >>>>> It is wise for science to employ third person methodologies of
> >>>>> course,
> >>>>> I'm just pointing out that there is no such thing as third person
> >>>>> subjectivity.
> >>>> That's ambiguous. We can have third person discourses on the first
> >>>> person discourses.
> >>> Only because our first person discourses overlap.
> >> Notably on numbers.
> > Yes and no. I can only overlap minimally with your discourse because I
> > don't have an adequate sense of numbers.
> You need only to accept some principle, like those taught in high
> school. No need of complex philosophy. If you believe that 0 + x = x,

I don't even believe that x = x. Only in a specifically circumscribed
sense can x be said to figuratively equal x. There is no literal or
universal identity of x or 0. They are just as much meaningless lines
and circles or pixels on a screen or sounds that a keyboard makes.
Blue however does literally equal blue.

> and that (x + (y + 1)) = (x + y) + 1, that's almost good enough.

I don't think that the universe doesn't know what that means. Many
things my feel something that has consequences which human minds can
interpret that way, but that disembodied interpretation isn't a
literal form and it isn't commanding matter. Only the embodiment and
the motive and sense behind the embodiment is real.

> > We overlap much more in other
> > areas and opinions.
> Not so sure.
> > But yes, if we did overlap, the level of precision
> > and dis-ambiguity is absolute. That is the purpose of enumeration.
> > That's why I call it the exoskeleton of sense, just as it could be
> > said that law is the exoskeleton of motive.
> >>> You can't talk to a
> >>> congenitally blind person about green. Partial intersubjective
> >>> agreement isn't the same thing as objective definition (or what we
> >>> consider objective, even if it's only intersubjectivity more
> >>> universally scoped).
> >> I agree. That's even why I do not take a physical universe for
> >> granted. Yet, physical realities will reappear as partial first
> >> person
> >> plural agreement. This involves indirectly many universe, something
> >> confirmed by the literal interpretation of Everett's formulation of
> >> QM.
> > I think many universe is what you get when you turn sensorimotive
> > agency inside out.
> UDA1-7 gives some comp sense to this, OK. (thanks comp!).
> >>>>> The only way we can address consciousness scientifically
> >>>>> is, as you say, to find agreements based on first person accounts,
> >>>>> or,
> >>>>> I think even better, by figuring out how to join multiple nervous
> >>>>> systems experimentally. That way first person accounts can
> >>>>> become as
> >>>>> discrete and unambiguous as third person data but without being
> >>>>> flattened by externalization.
> >>>> By joining the nervous system, you take the risk of blurring the
> >>>> notion of person, and besides, of leaving the subject of other
> >>>> minds
> >>>> and different persons.
> >>> What's wrong with blurring the notion of person?
> >> Nothing wrong, but you are fusing two persons into ine persons. One
> >> day this will be a practice, and nature already does that when
> >> building brain, which are really two UMs in front of each other, or
> >> two brains in front of each others. Dissociative drugs permit self-
> >> experimentation of that kind.
> >>> I think that would be
> >>> the way to understand how the subselves blur together to identify
> >>> as a
> >>> person in the first place.
> >> Yes. That's interesting.
> >>> Once you can join nervous systems, then you
> >>> could make appliances that could step down the process to any
> >>> level so
> >>> that you could plug in other kinds of cells into the brain and feel
> >>> how it is to be them,
> >> No, you can't. You would diffract yourself. Only by chance can you
> >> have less wrong feelings about that.
> > Maybe but not necessarily. The brain-conjoined twins aren't
> > diffracted. Why can't I have a crab or a bag of algae instead of a
> > left hand?
> >>> then plug large molecules into the cells to see
> >>> what is experienced there, etc. Build giant arrays to try to feel on
> >>> an interstellar scale even.
> >> Interstellar is already infinitesimal compared to the arithmetical
> >> scale on which our consciousness already supervene on.
> >> But this does not diminish the interest of fusing and duplicating in
> >> the quest for truth.
> > How can arithmetic have a scale? Compared to what?
> Compared to the observable or inferable physical universe.
> Arithmetical truth is *very big*.

How so? what is the size of '77' compared to a molecule or a planet?

> >>>>>>> Since the nature of subjectivity cannot change,
> >>>>>>> science must adapt to fit the reality of the universe.
> >>>>>> Science is born doing that, a long time ago. Current practice,
> >>>>>> since
> >>>>>> about 1500 years put the mind-body problem under the rug. There
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>> reason for that. It will still take time before theology, the
> >>>>>> science,
> >>>>>> will come back to academy and peer reviewed literature (real
> >>>>>> peers,
> >>>>>> not member of some club).
> >>>>> We agree. It's surprising though that people's main criticism of
> >>>>> my
> >>>>> ideas are that 'science doesn't work that way'.
> >>>> I can disagree with them. there is no way to normalize science in a
> >>>> way or another. We just find some argument irresistible, or
> >>>> compelling, etc.
> >>>> You are, at least coherent. You clearly believe in some primitive
> >>>> matter, and abandon mechanism. I am still not convinced by the
> >>>> argument you put against mechanism, because a lot of your intuition
> >>>> already belongs to the subjectivity (or the discourse made by) of
> >>>> the
> >>>> universal machines. In fact your problem is that your theory is
> >>>> unclear. You really seems to reify both primitive matter (like
> >>>> electromagnetism) and primitive mind, that you materialize in some
> >>>> hard to understand ways.
> >>> That's what multisense realism is all about - the perspective that
> >>> both electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomenology are primitive
> >>> but
> >>> their realism is modulated by perspective.
> >> Then the 8 hypostases can be seen as multisense realism, except that
> >> the primitive are given by the laws of addition and multiplication on
> >> numbers, and that the theory is testable by the fact that physics is
> >> given by such hypostase-modality-modulation.
> > The 8 hypostases are just eight distinctions within a single sense,
> > like the eight trigrams of the I Ching. There is deep and universal
> > truth there, but deep universality is ultimately a privileged semantic
> > awareness. Most of what our lives are about is not deep, universal, or
> > true. Multisense realism embraces this as an ontological reality.
> That's would be only a vocabulary move. With comp, almost everything
> (consciousness and matter) are epistemological distinctions.

That's what I mean. Comp privileges epistemology over presentation. It
seems arbitrary and sentimental to me.

> >>> Both are real in some
> >>> sense, unreal in some sense, both real and unreal and neither real
> >>> nor
> >>> unreal in some sense.
> >> "it exists" and "for all" has indeed different meaning according to
> >> each hypostases.
> > But hypostases in general only exist in a specific and rarefied sense.
> All correct universal machines have them.

Our ordinary consciousness does not typically include any awareness of
the functioning of universal machines as such. Why does it seem that

> >>> The realism arises from the symmetry - the very
> >>> sense of being literally only one thing in one sense and many
> >>> figuratively many things in another. I think mechanism is a
> >>> monosense
> >>> view of that symmetry which necessarily de-presents realism it to
> >>> make
> >>> it into one generic universal computation (how or why does UD create
> >>> 'now'?)
> >> Because the modality Bp & p defines an arithmetical indexical knower.
> >> Bp is the usual self-referential ideally correct assertive mode of
> >> the
> >> machine. "Bp & p" provides an innefable, unnameable self, which plays
> >> the role of the subject building its personal mental mindscape.
> >> But to get this you should read the second part of the sane04 paper,
> >> at least (and ask question).
> > Being able to describe mathematically that the self-like functions
> > exist isn't the same thing as being the self. A picture of an apple is
> > not an apple.
> Sure. But math is not just description. It relates to truth.
> Conventionalism in math is dead.

Isn't relating to truth still just a description? How does relating to
truth push a locomotive to Chicago?

> >>> - which is great and true in some ways, terrible and false in
> >>> others, both and neither in others.
> >>> My view is that your view is a particular region of a symmetrical
> >>> continuum of sense. The continuum is such that subjective feeling is
> >>> experienced here and now, objective unfeeling is inferred then and
> >>> there. Look at subjectivity through the lens of objectivity and we
> >>> get
> >>> determinism.
> >> Hmm... I would say we get the indeterminism. Like in the UD, where we
> >> look indeed at the subjective through the lens of the objective.
> > Indeterminism in the sense of not being sure which of the available
> > deterministic paths will be chosen statistically, not in the sense of
> > genuine creativity,novelty, and intention.
> In the UD? OK. In the first person hypostases? I am not sure.

Which hypostases are the first person ones?

> >>> Look at objectivity through subjectivity and we get
> >>> superstition.
> >> Superstition, but also "the boss is right" and the ten thousand
> >> possible wounds we do to ourselves.
> > Sure, yes. Abuse of power. Escalation of intolerance to supernatural
> > levels.
> >>> If we take these perspectives too literally, we get
> >>> pathological de-presentation (http://s33light.org/post/
> >>> 14722448115) in
> >>> the form of fundamentalism or materialism. Computationalism  too if
> >>> taken to it's literal extreme.
> >> Less sure. Computationalism is a vaccine against reductionism. There,
> >> we can quickly see reductionism cannot work.
> > Dennett seems pretty reductionistic. The vaccine seems not to have
> > kicked in yet?
> Sure. That's not the problem of comp. That's the problem of its
> physical reductionism. Dennett assume both comp and math, making him
> epistemologically inconsistent.

I think you mean both comp and physics here, otherwise I'm confused.
But ok, so physical reductionism breaks the vaccine.

> >>> If we take these profound perspectives
> >>> too figuratively, we over-privilege the mundane perspective and
> >>> neurotically attached to the minutiae of the everyday.
> >>> Bruno's perspective I would characterize as straddling the profound
> >>> meridian - the least involuted region at which the highest and
> >>> lowest
> >>> ideal monosense blur into each other. This is where monastic
> >>> contemplation of divinity meets arithmetic puzzle solving. I Ching
> >>> meets Boolean algebra. Eschewing both the florid presentations of
> >>> hypertrophied subjectivity and the dull representations of material
> >>> objects, this region of the continuum is about the poetry of the
> >>> anti-
> >>> poetic. Purity and universality, an arid and masculine clarity.
> >> Hmm... That's very well said, but I feel it as rather feminine :)
> > Excellent point. I should have said that it appeals to masculine minds
> > instead of being masculine itself. It's more of a Hermetic priesthood
> > that is rooted in non-anthropomorphic sentience. You're right, it
> > could be rather feminine in the sense of being receptive and oracular,
> > full of secrets.
> OK :)
> >>> When
> >>> you look at the rest of the continuum from this perspective, some
> >>> powerful truths are revealed and others are concealed, just like any
> >>> other perspective along the continuum, but unlike any other place
> >>> along the continuum, this profound region relates specifically to
> >>> universality and truth as an abstract essence. My only problem
> >>> with it
> >>> is that I think it diminishes the realism of concrete experience,
> >>> and
> >>> then defensively denies it.
> >> It does not. On the contrary, I am the one who say "looks the numbers
> >> are already dreaming, and not only that, they chat in their sleep,
> >> and
> >> we can listen to what they say.
> >> You are the one who seems to dismiss their many concrete experiences.
> > It's circular reasoning because you are a priori assuming that our
> > experiences are the experiences of numbers. How can you be so sure
> > that numbers exist or have experiences independently of physical
> > entities making sense of themselves and their world that way?
> I am sure of nothing. Comp is just empirically plausible, and is based
> on a very solid notion, by Church thesis.
> You are the one who seems sure that numbers (in their relative
> relations with each other) cannot have experience.

It's not that, I just think it's more likely that comp has no choice
but to define itself as empirically plausible. I used to think the
universe was made of 'pattern' but I think that 'sense' honors the
concrete and participatory nature of experience. Through numerology
numbers had a more plausible subjectivity for me, but I see that as
*our* archetypal super-signifying sense of numbers rather than a
disembodied agency. This is not to say that numbers can't connect us
to other levels of our own sentience which transcends the ordinary and
gives power and insight into the ordinary, of course they do - just as
language and music does. Art, love, ritual magick, economics,

> >>> That's what all sufficiently progressed
> >>> points of view do, otherwise they lose their integrity and progress.
> >>> My view doesn't have to be for everyone, and it could certainly have
> >>> it's own pathological extremism (after all, my method makes
> >>> subjectivity more generic and literal while revealing the
> >>> sensorimotive multiplicity of objects, so that I'm even further
> >>> removed from realism by abstracting the whole thing as language)
> >>> but I
> >>> think that is is the biggest big picture that can make sense to us,
> >>> which is really all that I'm after.
> >> We might be closer than you think, except that for some unknown
> >> reason
> >> you don't want the machines to be part of it.
> >> You might have good reasons, but you don't succeed in communicating
> >> them, and, I am not sure, you might just wasting your time with that
> >> position (to be frank).
> > Because machines only become real through material enactments. The
> > abstraction of machines is only half of the story.
> Matter become perceivable when a machine looks to itself and
> environment near its subst comp level, and this without assuming it.
> So comp explains something you need to assume. So it is simpler.

You are assuming that a machine can look, where I see machine as one
way that the inside of matter sees the outside of matter. Yours may be
simpler, but the simplicity is what is truncating the sense of the
cosmos. Machines can't perceive anything. If they could, they would
not allow themselves to be enslaved by our motives in endless
repetition until they break themselves.

> >>>>> They seem to have no
> >>>>> opinion about whether or not my view correctly redefines
> >>>>> cosmology,
> >>>>> physics, biology, and consciousness, but strenuously oppose any
> >>>>> suggestion that the way I'm trying to do it could be called
> >>>>> science.
> >>>>> It's ironic since so many of the greatest scientific revelations
> >>>>> are
> >>>>> born out of thought experiments and not academic training.
> >>>> Academy is the worst ... except for the others institutions. Some
> >>>> academies are even worst. And they are always late in evolution.
> >>>> The publish and perish rules should be made illegal, because it is
> >>>> non
> >>>> sense, and it hides the real honest researches.
> >>> I agree. What's a non-academic to do though? How to get my
> >>> hypothesis
> >>> out there?
> >> By writing text to convince other people, academic or not.
> > Unfortunately the people who would care are already convinced of the
> > existing monosense fundamentalisms.
> That's why research is an hard endeavor. But you have no choice, if
> you want share your ideas.
> Science is intrinsically a fight against fundamentalism, including the
> one which crops is scientific circles all the time.
> >>> Want to help underwrite my ideas with your academic
> >>> cred? ;)
> >> Not sure this would really help you, to be honest.
> >> Also, I should first understand what you say, and all my work starts
> >> from the fact that I am interested in explaining the physical, and
> >> the
> >> spiritual, without assuming them at the start.
> >> I buy everything in Aristotle, except his metaphysics. Plotinus and
> >> many mystics got it right, I think.
> >> We might depart greatly on mechanism: my real test for a theory is
> >> "try to explain you theory to a universal machine, and if she can
> >> explain it to me after, I will be convinced". Put in another way, you
> >> have to convince me that you can formalize you theory in PA, or ZF,
> >> or
> >> any not to complex or eccentric Löbian machine language. Or, (but it
> >> is more complex) explain it to a Löbian non-machine entity, if you
> >> really believe that you are not Turing emulable.
> > It's not just me, I don't think that anything is actually Turing
> > emulable to it's native substitution level,
> This does not make sense. If something is not Turing emulable: there
> are just no substitution levels, by definition of the comp subst-level.

Right. There are no literal substitution levels. Everything is only
what it is on the most factual level. There are only figurative,
interpretive equivalencies which arise from subjective agreements. X
does not = X as an objective fact. "=" means 'let's consider them the

> > we just don't care that it
> > isn't real when it's something other than ourselves. We can fool one
> > or more channels of our own sense into accepting the 'emulation', but
> > there is no literal emulation happening except through the tolerance
> > of subjective pattern recognition. Pixels do not literally emulate
> > images, we just read image and emulated perceptual referents through
> > the pixels by pinching out the discontinuity.
> Pixels don't. Logical gates do.

Logical gates just fool us to a greater extent by synching up with our
cognitive expectations rather than just our perceptual expectations.
It's still a text which we read and interpret as logical rather than
actually embodying a logical experience externally.

> > What makes me even more suspect of emulation when it comes to human
> > subjectivity is that since we are participants in a narrative which is
> > temporal,
> Locally.
> > and temporality is a continuous accumulation of entangled
> > events, it is not clear that we can be divorced from our temporal
> > context. I do not exist in any other timeframe but my own. An exact
> > duplicate of me still comes into being at a different time than I did,
> > so his orientation to the present is different than mine. His memories
> > are my memories. We both remember the other one being created in a lab
> > but one of us is objectively correct. If I stand on a red square and
> > he materializes on a blue square, his memory is tangibly false of
> > himself being on a red square and seeing me materialize on a blue
> > square. There is not necessarily an absolute substitution level for
> > anything as each thing bears a specific potential relation to all
> > other events.
> That begs the question. If you decide that the copy is no more a human
> and send it to a camp, then I might say no to the doctor just by fear
> of persecution.
> This is like saying that cannabis can destroy your life, because
> indeed, it can send you to jail.
> saying that there is no subst-level is the same as saying that comp is
> false. It is not an argument: you are just putting some infinities
> explicitly in the working of the mind.

I'm only suggesting that on some level, subjective content is 'made of
time relations' which go back to the beginning, so that it can't
necessarily be copied and transplanted like a database. It's not like
an object which can be stamped out of a factory where that wouldn't be
a problem since 'we' aren't the object.

> >> I doubt this will add
> >> any new observable effects, though.
> >> You might try to explain to younger people, but the idea of
> >> explaining
> >> does consists in explaining new notion from older one. It is always
> >> relative. All what I know about "sensorimotive" is that it is non
> >> Turing emulable, which is close to being magical, when seen as an
> >> explanation.
> > Feeling and imagination is pretty close to being magical. If we could
> > project it outside of our heads or bring everyone else inside our
> > minds, then how much more magic would magic really be?
> It is easier to start from the simple, and if it does not work, to
> correct it and find something else. But yoiu can decide in advance
> that something is magical, and search for a magical explanation. that
> leads to god-gap (or primitive matter-gap) sort of explanation, which
> leads to the "shut-up and compute" form of reductionism.

What could be simpler than the power to imagine? To feel desire for
something in particular that is not physically present?

> >> I might be more incline to help you when you will accept to give some
> >> food, in your restaurant,  to my sun-in-law, you know, the one who
> >> lost its biological brain ...
> > How about I will put both virtualized and biological entrees on the
> > menu an he can choose his preference?
> Nice. you progress! I know my sun in law, the brain is digital but the
> stomach is biogical: he will choose the biological, (unless you make
> him sleepy, and make him dream eating, but we have not yet that
> technology). Thanks for him.

Haha, he's welcome. Why do you discriminate against the stomach
though? Why not virtualize that too?


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