On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> But once the central ontological distinction is made between "qua
> materia" and "qua computatio", a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
> either there are two "primitives" in play here or only one. If the
> former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
> duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
> distance from the other (as Kant shows us). Should one consequently
> lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
> of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
> terms of the other.
Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive. A single continuum
which is ontologically perpendicular to itself in one sense,
unambiguously unified in another, and explicated as a spectrum of
combinatorial sense channels at every point in between. It's the
possibility of topological symmetry and algebraic-sequential
progression that gives rise to realism. Each primitive can be
redefined in terms of the other figuratively but not literally.
Computation is not realism. It is an analytical extraction through
which our intellectual sense can model many common exterior behaviors
and experiences, but I think it is not a primitive and has no causal
efficacy independent of a physical mechanism. Computationalism is
seductive as a primitive because it's purpose is to transparently
model universality and in so doing becomes conflated with universality
in our minds, but this equivalence is figurative, not literal.
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