On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:49, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best answer to your concrete multiverse argument, is that such
multiverse has to be robust to handle the "universal
counterfactuals", but then it contains a UD*, and we are back at the
step 7, and *in that case* the step seven is enough for the reversal
physics/mathematical computer science (arithmetic).
It is true I was thinking in terms of a multiverse big enough to
contain a UD*, and I agree that steps 1-7 are sufficient for the
My problem, perhaps, is a lack of intuition of how to push through the
MGA when the multiverse is not big enough to support a universal
OK. That might be a remaining things to clarify.
Does that last sentence even make sense?
I am not sure. You should conceive a very weird sort of non universal
If not, then the
MGA only applies to a single universe, in which case my critique
simply doesn't apply.
That's ambiguous. The point is that the MGA applies to anything Turing
emulable on which consciousness can weakly supervene. Once it is
Turing emulable, it is, in theory (but that's enough) amenable to a
single physical computation, in a single universe, and given a role to
primitive matter force to associate again a physical activity to
something physically inactive.
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