On 26 Dec 2011, at 20:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word "neutral" supposed
to signify here? Can one distinguish it meaningfully from
"immaterial" (i.e. not material)?
You can distinguish computation from both material and consciousness.
At any rate, "organizing data" is
an implicit appeal to computation, so in so far as consciousness is
deemed to supervene on something, we still seem to be appealing to
some sort of computational organisation. That said, another question
obtrudes: if we are to think in terms of two "different ways of
organizing the same data" - perhaps "physical" ways and "mental" ways
- can either be considered as taking logical precedence over the
other?
ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the "physical" computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the "mental" ones.
He's often taken that way. But I think I now understand Bruno's
idea that consciousness still supervenes on (some kind of) physics.
It's just that neither is fundamental. They are both generated by
computation.
Including self-reference, yes.
Or
more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access
(and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these
are
embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither "physical" nor "mental". Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.
Right.
OK. Mechanism leads to a neutral monism of numbers and computations
(or just numbers+addition+multiplication), and physics + consciousness
arise from the internal points of view of some (relative) universal
numbers.
Bruno
Brent
David
On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell
Standish<li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-
PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument.
Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.
The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind:
it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is
supposed to
supervene on a physical system - "qua materia" - or on the abstract
computation it implements - "qua computatio". Maudlin's argument
is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.
But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the "qua materia"
option is
surely empty of content from the outset. If "primitive" physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as "computation" must be, in the
final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses. The behaviour of any physical system can always be
shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect). The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes
an
appeal to "computation" without making the explicit ontological
distinction between "qua computatio" and "qua materia" that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim. On
reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or
they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick). That's it, in a
nutshell.
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.
Brent
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