On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted.  Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed
(i.e. in the relevant theory) to *supervene on* computation, not to be identical with it. Any theory in this domain aspires to give detailed
and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms
of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have beliefs, possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and their
environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth.  This
is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in
the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable
inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic.

It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to
give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of
consciousness per se.  We don't even know what it would be like to
have such an idea.  I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of
any theory we possess.

David


As I have remarked before, I don't think "the problem of consciousness" will be solved, it will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question.

I disagree. It can be "meta-solved", and consciousness is what makes our value valuable, so it is a sort of most fundamental value making all the others possible. It makes a person being a person.



Instead we will talk about how to design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.

This is the usual slavery problem. I am not sure we can program intelligence, but we can try to control it when it develops, but machine developing it will develop their own intentions. At that point, it is no more programming but respect, education and culture.

Bruno




Brent

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