On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or
they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).
Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete
primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to
see that
such an option cannot work.
But then they are dualists, even if they can't or won't admit it.
The
fact that they go on thinking and talking in a dualist way but won't
confess to it is why I say the ambiguity is "studied". Dennett, for
example, winks at it when he describes himself as a "third-person
absolutist", revealing in the process perhaps a stronger
commitment to
doctrine than truth; and consequently, despite his analytical
rigour,
he is often led to use bullying and sophistry to defend absolutism
where truthfulness does not serve his purpose.
But once the central ontological distinction is made between "qua
materia" and "qua computatio", a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing
that
either there are two "primitives" in play here or only one. If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us). Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.
If we attempt to collapse computation into the "primitive" physics
that implements it, then we are left just with physics; everything
must in the end be accounted for qua materia. But in the presence
of
consciousness, this is frankly incoherent, or more simply,
impossible.
In the light of this, as Sherlock Holmes sagaciously observed, the
alternative, however improbable, must be true: if computation is
to be
the chosen supervention base for consciousness, there can be no
sense
in further appeal to any more "primitive" ontology. Quod erat
demonstrandum.
I agree with some use of Occam, but this might not follow from a pure
logical point of view (if you let me play the role of the devil
advocate).
The reason is that, without MGA or Maudlin, we might single out a
universal
machine which would be a primitive material system, and decide that
consciousness is related to the computations appearing in that
primitive
physical frame, and defined by the organization of matter in that
frame).
This entails a property form of dualism, which is not obviously
contradictory. The physical universe becomes a sort of primitive
programming
language, as it can be indeed, and consciousness would supervene on
the
physical computation only. The fact that, without MGA, we can
conceive this
explains the success of the mechanist idea among materialist: there
is
matter obeying some laws, and from those laws we can explain layers
of
different organizations.
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we
can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey,
and
without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of the "frank
incoherence". The materialist move might seems ad hoc, but to prove
that it
is incoherent is not easy. At first it seems to provide an ability of
distinguishing real from fictive, by universal machine, but the
problem is
that, like Peter Jones defended, the materialist will just consider
the non
material computation has having no consciousness at all: so that the
universal machine can still not make the difference between real from
fictive, but not because its consciousness does not change, but
because it
disappears in the fictive frame. They accept the idea that
arithmetic is
full of zombie, because they believe that mathematics is essentially
fictive, which makes sense with their singling out a particular
universal
and material (for them) machine. The only problem I can see is that
they
have to attribute some physical activity to inactive (here and now)
piece of
matter and to violate the 323 principle.
Bruno
On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish
<li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-
PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.
The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in
the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind:
it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is
supposed to
supervene on a physical system - "qua materia" - or on the
abstract
computation it implements - "qua computatio". Maudlin's
argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.
Yet, it never occurs to Maudlin that we might just abandon the
supervenience
of mind or computation on matter.
In his book on quantum mechanics, he seems reluctant to accept
the MW,
for
similar reason.
But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the "qua materia"
option is
surely empty of content from the outset. If "primitive" physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is
real,
then second-order notions such as "computation" must be, in the
final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.
This is not entirely obvious. Many people, like Peter Jones on
this list,
will define "real" by "primitively material", and will believe
that a
computation can bring consciousness only if that computation is
implemented
in some primitively material set up.
The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).
For a reductionist materialist only, not for a dualist. We do
explain
complex program behavior from a higher level description of a
program,
but
most people will think that what makes Deep Blue (say) real is
provided
by
its "real" (physical) implementation.
The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to "computation" without making the explicit ontological
distinction between "qua computatio" and "qua materia" that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.
Because they take the very idea of "qua materia" for granted. Of
course
we
know better, I guess.
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or
they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).
Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete
primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to
see that
such an option cannot work.
That's it, in a
nutshell.
Good summary, but I am not sure it can convince some die hard
atheists,
believing in both primitive matter and abstract computation,
which does
not
really exists for them, unless they are "concretely" implemented.
Bruno
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the
concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses "supervenience" for "physical supervenience",
like Kim
and most "expert" on supervenience.
I use "physical supervenience", because in the dilemma
mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-
supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs
at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve
the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which
motivates
for AUDA.
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely
phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-
phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-
PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
"primitiveness" is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.
Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's.
But the
classroom does not change!
Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the
classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning,
nor the
relevance.
No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains. First consider
whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In
that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
"hardware", which contradicts the definition of supervenience.
Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the
classroom.
So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only
(possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.
They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
entails some change in the classroom.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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