On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
> matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
> is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
> theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others,
> it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.
>
> Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects (number,
> particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/multiplication,
> forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being able to
> develop self-reference and first person views.
>
> But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce physics as a
> mathematical theory, but as a precise "machine's theological phenomenon".

Yes, I have always had the strong feeling that the self-reference of
experience to a "localised" point-of-view must somehow be fundamental,
or at least very deep, not circumstantial or trivial.  Since
childhood, I've always been puzzled by questions like "why am I me and
not you?", which just made most other people smile or frown.  Usually
they would point at two objects (my body and theirs) and say with
finality "well, that's you and this is me".

However even then I felt - and more so now - that the real "subject"
of personal identity was not to be so easily characterised.  ISTM that
a straightforward physicalist approach - even a mathematical one - can
provide no real insight into this question of "who or what am I?" and
in effect must either assume, trivialise, ignore or deny it.  In
contrast to this, assuming CTM, the UDA gives a step-wise
demonstration of the way the indispensable role played by observation
leads inexorably to indeterminism in the localisation of the
first-person, independent (until the MGA) of issues of ultimate
ontological primitivity.  This is already a powerful indication that
there is something "computationally real" in play over and above the
structures of matter that characterise an observer's point-of-view.

So I believe you are right that computational reality must be
characterised primarily in such a way as to account for the
localisation of observers and the emergence of appearances, as opposed
to merely substituting an imaginary god's-eye description of
materiality.  Unfortunately (?) this also implies that reality must
then be Vastly larger and perhaps even more daunting than we could
have imagined.

> PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.

D'accord.  J'attend avec un grand plaisir vos observations.

David

>
> On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>> Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
>>>> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
>>>> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
>>>> "epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute"
>>>> anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
>>> created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
>>> ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
>>> them.  The model defines our ontology.
>>
>>
>> My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
>> sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
>> "primitive materiality".  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
>> least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
>> can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
>> in terms of its "epistemological properties", because the very
>> object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
>> of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
>> themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
>> abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
>> practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
>> of the "reversal" of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
>> mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
>> is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
>> motivation to appeal to inconsequential "primitively-material"
>> properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.
>>
>> Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
>> really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.
>
>
>
> This is correct as an argument against "primitive matter". At least it makes
> sense.
>
> But I am not sure it will address the case of the immaterialist physicalist,
> on a type close to Tegmark.
>
> What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
> matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
> is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
> theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others,
> it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.
>
> Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects (number,
> particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/multiplication,
> forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being able to
> develop self-reference and first person views.
>
> But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce physics as a
> mathematical theory, but as a precise "machine's theological phenomenon".
>
> It explains, perhaps wrongly, the origin of observables and its invariants.
> The physical supervenes on the border of numbers' consciousness. So the
> reversal is both ontological (switch particles ---> numbers/programs) and
> epistemological (physics = science of the universal numbers multiplying and
> fusing dreams).
>
> *
>
> I don't think the model defines the ontology, like Brent says. Our models
> define our belief about what we are searching.
>
> Bruno
>
> PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>> On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "frank incoherence" comment was directed towards the case where,
>>>> rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the "single primitive" horn
>>>> of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
>>>> than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
>>>> contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
>>>> explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction.
>>>>
>>>> My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned
>>>> acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
>>>> the notion of a "primitively physical machine".  As you once put it
>>>> "ontological reduction entails ontological elimination".  IOW, the
>>>> reduction of "materiality" to a causally-complete micro-physical
>>>> "mechanism" automatically entails that macro-physical composites must
>>>> be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
>>>> realities. Micro-physics "qua materia" entails no such additional
>>>> ontological levels of organisation.
>>>>
>>>> Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
>>>> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
>>>> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
>>>> "epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute"
>>>> anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
>>> created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
>>> ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
>>> them.  The model defines our ontology.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>> It might
>>>> even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
>>>> computational supervenience.
>>>>
>>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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