On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.
We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)
It might be the same consciousness, with different content.
The personal experience are disconnected.
They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.
In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.
by the definition of supervenience.
The intuitive definition of supervenience is that A supervenes on B if
we cannot have an A-difference without a B-difference.
If A supervenes on B, it supervene trivially on a disjoint union of B
and C, because we still cannot have an A-difference without a (B union
Therefore they both cannot
supervene on the same classroom.
In that case I would have said that Tommy's consciousness supervenes
*only* on Tommy's brain (but I avoid this because we don't know and
cannot know what is our real "generalized brain").
Perhaps the word swapping is misleading to you - I didn't mean
anything particularly profound by it.
I have still no idea of what you mean by that. Suppose that you tell
me that Bruno and Russell's consciousness swap every minutes, since
six months. What would that mean? I don't see how we could be aware of
such things, nor how we could verify this in any third (and first)
person way. And this makes your argument (physicalist, for the sake of
the reasoning) against the consciousness instantiated by the
(concrete) UD dubious. I think. I mean that this critics on MGA fails,
at least by lack of clarity (for me).
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