>As I have remarked before, I don't think "the problem of consciousness" will >be solved, it >will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question. Instead we will talk >about how to >design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.
Well, I utterly disagree with that. The problem of consciousness is already an 'uninteresting problem' to many people (seemingly you are one such person), but so long as it remains unsolved it will be interesting to some conscious beings! And the notion of programming the internal perceptions of a robot (as opposed to mere input-output relations) is ludicrous without a solution to the problem. On Dec 27, 9:00 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> > Not if the sense of dualism*is* the primitive. > > My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the > > computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is > > generally interpreted. Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed > > (i.e. in the relevant theory) to*supervene on* computation, not to be > > identical with it. Any theory in this domain aspires to give detailed > > and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms > > of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have beliefs, > > possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and their > > environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth. This > > is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in > > the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable > > inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic. > > > It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to > > give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of > > consciousness per se. We don't even know what it would be like to > > have such an idea. I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of > > any theory we possess. > > > David > > As I have remarked before, I don't think "the problem of consciousness" will > be solved, it > will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question. Instead we will talk > about how to > design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide. > > Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.