On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> What is a consciousness apart from its content?
>
> That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
> consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
> the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification criterium
> for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative, in the
> frame of "MGA's alleged refutations". I hope this will be clarified in my
> answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I
> might answer this next year.

This interesting comment resonates with today's early morning
ruminations (a pernicious habit I apparently share with Descartes!).
I've been wondering again about the distinction between your view of
computationalism and something like Zuse's or Schmidhuber's.  If I
have understood these latter ideas, they postulate a particular
digital machine as somehow ontologically privileged, this UM then
providing a unique basis for all subsequent computational development.
 In the process the primitive UM must emulate infinities of other UMs,
but as all this computation ultimately supervenes on the activity of
the primitive UM, ontologically speaking it is "solus ipse", and all
points of view must therefore be referenced to it.

This idea seems to possess some nice features (for example with
respect to an ultimate reference point for "who am I?" questions), but
one might object that it originates too late in the computational
"food chain".  After all, computation is itself reducible to more
fundamental combinatorial relations, so by what principle is some
particular UM - itself a complex combinatorial entity - supposed to
bootstrap itself into primitive existence?  Perhaps such an idea puts
the computational cart before the arithmetical horse.  And is the
primitive UM itself supposed to supervene on (i.e. be uniquely
anchored to) a "primitively-physical" machine?  If so, would this
supervenience claim be vulnerable to an MGA-type of refutation?

But in any case your comment above about "the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine" is intriguing.  ISTM that in the end
epistemology and ontology must come to one thing: whatever we know is
ultimately a self-reflection of whatever we are.  Whatever we are is
both unique and multitudinous, a "One" that through
self-differentiation and self-combination explodes into combinatorial
universality.  And from that explosion the "many" are born and suffer.

Je vous souhaite une très heureuse nouvelle année.

David

>
> On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
>>>>> In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
>>>>> supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
>>>>> change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
>>>>> in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
>>>>> supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
>>>>> is used in the argument.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It might be the same consciousness, with different content.
>>
>>
>> ???  That would be two different conscious states.  What is a
>> consciousness apart from its content?
>
>
>
> That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
> consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
> the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification criterium
> for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative, in the
> frame of "MGA's alleged refutations". I hope this will be clarified in my
> answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I
> might answer this next year.
>
> Happy new year, Brent.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to