On 30 Dec 2011, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:

Another thought I had whilst mowing the lawn (we've had a lot of rain
recently, and the grass has gone beserk, so lots of time to think
whilst mowing. Kim Jones would know what I'm talking about!).

Mowing, taking bath, ... are good for deep thinking.

Lets imagine that consciousness supervenes on the quantum state of
some physical system. Call this SUP-QPHYS for short.

All right. Note that this is not excluded from comp. Just that if it is true, we have to justify it from sup-comp.

Now my
interpretation of QM which I present in my book, this is pretty much
implied by the identification of observer moment with the quantum
state, (page 118 of ToN). But this is probably uninteresting, as it is
inherently an immaterial interpretation of QM.

What about we consider SUP-QPHYS in David Deutsch's framework, which
is intrinsically a naive physicalist interpretation, with "real"
differentiation waves travelling through the universe at the speed of

Supervenience in this case would be across all fungible instances of a
conscious entity. Observers will be distinct once differentiated,
presumably, so supervenience will not extend across multiple
differentiated branches.

Except that differentiation are contagious. If I look in the base {up down} a particle in the state up+down, on the moon, my state of mind will multiply by 2 (or by 2*2^aleph_zero) all object in my neighborhood, and that can play a role in their expectation.

How can we unfurl undifferentiated fungible particles into a single
universe instantiation that preserves supervenience so as to apply the MGA?

By dovetailing, together with the Y = II idea. That is: if I bifurcate in the future, my past is duplicated too. The "real" answer needs of course progress in the extraction of the correct relative "measure" on the computations.

The MGA (and UDA) reasoning is physics independent. It assumes only that I would survive with even just one singular physical (a priori) implementation of some computation.



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