On 31 Dec 2011, at 01:44, Joseph Knight wrote:



On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Which computation? I don't see any computation in the projection of the computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light patterns is exactly the same, with the boolean graph turned, or not, upside down. You argument seems to rely on non relevant (with respect to the possible computation) idiosyncracies of this thought experience implementation. I will think about a version of MGA making this more obvious.

OK, I think I see where my error lies. I thought the absurdity arose later in the argument than it actually does. I see that by my reasoning we would have conscious supervening on the particular physical system and not the "computation" itself, which would contradict comp. If we "extract" the computation from the glass/node system in the form of the film, then by comp consciousness should supervene on the film, when clearly it cannot. Is that roughly what you are saying?

I think so.






It does matter for the computation what the light lands on.

But what is the computation in this case?



This doesn't violate 323, or comp. It means that the whole system (crystal/glass+film) must be taken into account in your analysis.

The whole system is considered, and then changed in a way which does not change the physical activity, except for operating nodes which are retreived, and this to show that the physical activity does not implement the computation, but is only a mimicking of non relevant appearances associated accidentally with the "original computation".



It is no better than taking half of the brain and ignoring the other half. It isn't a matter of substitution level.

OK. But you have to explain me the role of the broken node, in the computation, or even in the light patterns. You might try, as an exercise to refute your own argument by changing the original device.

I will think about it.

OK. I will think about it too.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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