On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
> myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
> measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
> a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

Yes, and the sense in which there is "a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state" is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences "occur"
indifferently or even "simultaneously", but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

As Schrödinger remarked:

"This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance."

David


>
>> When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think 
>> one's
>> consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of 
>> computation so there
>> are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you 
>> "jumped to them".
>>
>
> Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
> myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
> measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
> a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.
>
> As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
> avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
> qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
> the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
> arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
> the result is unedifying.
>
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