On 1/1/2012 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  "I" is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different "I"s can be
constructed.     But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one "I" or to say that "I" can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the "I", is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.
This is a tricky one.  Pierz says above that "from 3-p, all branches
are conscious".  But perhaps it might be more accurate to say
something more like "from 3-p, all branches are in some measure
accessible to consciousness".  Consciousness indeed supervenes on all
branches, but never "all at the same time".

I don't understand that? Are you saying all the experiences are at different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the experiences in sequence? I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

  Supervenience is not an
identity claim.  The putative supervenience base is an inclusive
category embracing all 3-p descriptions indifferently, whereas 1-p
experiences are characterised precisely by their mutual exclusivity.

I agree with you that ""I" is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different "I"s can be
constructed". "I" in this objective sense can be coherently understood
as an ensemble of co-existing 3-p descriptions.  But any conscious
experience, by contrast, is always a singular occasion - a unique
"moment in time", if you like.  So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there "all together" in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so? The uniqueness is inherent in the experience. It doesn't depend on being embedded in spacetime. Spacetime is a model inferred from intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Brent


It is this very "numerical  problem" - the fact that there are many
bodies but only one conscious experience - that led Schrödinger to
make his remark about our consciousness being "not merely a piece of
this entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole".  Because
whenever we try to think of it as merely a "piece", the question will
always obtrude "but why only THIS piece right NOW?".  A criterion of
selection is implied which would be capable of transforming the
totality of 3-p indifferent co-existence into a unique 1-p
manifestation.  And this in turn entails, as Schrödinger observed,
that in some sense (to be resolved!) each individual conscious
"fragment of the present" must be a unique summation, by the system as
a whole, of itself.

David


On 12/31/2011 5:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz<pier...@gmail.com>    wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  "I" is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different "I"s can be
constructed.     But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one "I" or to say that "I" can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the "I", is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

Brent

Yes, and the sense in which there is "a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state" is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences "occur"
indifferently or even "simultaneously", but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

As Schrödinger remarked:

"This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance."

David


When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you
think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
"jumped to them".

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

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