On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time and the state of the
multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This evolution entails the evolution of the state
of different observers which are simultaneous.
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1->>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience>>> myself on one
branch at a time, probabilistically according to the>>> measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense>>> a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state.> That seems incoherent to me. How is it different from there are many> experiences? "I" is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there> can be many different subsets from which many different "I"s can be> constructed. But I don't know what it would mean to say there is
just> one "I" or to say that "I" can jump from one thread of experience to> another. That would presuppose that consciousness, the "I", is
something> apart from the experiences it jumps to.
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say "I" that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.
There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at