On 02 Jan 2012, at 01:59, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1- >>> p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I
only experience >>> myself on one branch at a time,
probabilistically according to the >>> measure of computations.
There's no individual soul, just in one sense >>> a single
consciousness that experiences every possible state. > That seems
incoherent to me. How is it different from there are many >
experiences? "I" is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there > can be many different subsets from which
many different "I"s can be > constructed. But I don't know
what it would mean to say there is just > one "I" or to say that
"I" can jump from one thread of experience to > another. That
would presuppose that consciousness, the "I", is something >
apart from the experiences it jumps to.
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say "I" that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.
All right. I will call that the 1-self (or the first person, the inner
God, the third hypostase Bp & p (in AUDA)).
There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology).
With comp, just arithmetical truth is enough. Please note that such a
thing, despite our intuition, does escape all effective theories. It
is a non constructive notion. We cannot define it at all. Well, some
will say that we can define it in set theory, but then we have to rely
on set-theoretical truth which is an even much more fuzzy notion.
Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
Absolutely so. Comp can be seen as an extension of Everett, in which
the Schroedinger equation becomes a theorem. A priori we might get too
much "worlds/dreams", but the computer science self-referential
constraints shows that this is not obvious at all.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at