# Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 1/2/2012 12:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
```
`On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:`
```
```
```You mean "confused" or "confounded"...not "elided"?
```
```Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: "the two things elided in his mind".
```
```
```
"Elide" only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in between them. Its basic meaning is to leave out. That's why I questioned it.
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```If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case "time " would never be "inferred", or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.
```
```You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.
```
```No, that wasn't my point.  I agree that time "can be inferred" from an
ordered sequence, for example a coexistent ordered sequence of 3-p
states. But the 1-p observation, on which the relevant notion of
"inference" depends, supervenes on - without being identical with -
only a restricted *selection* from the 3-p ensemble.  Moreover,
selection in this 1-p sense - as in "what is exclusively present at
any moment to a conscious observer" - must be distinguished from a
weaker sense which we use merely to isolate, in principle, specific
members of a 3-p ensemble.
```
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If we distinguish these two then we've lost the explanatory power because now we have to postulate some different kind of "selection" that depends on "consciousness", which was the concept we hoped to explain.
```
Brent

```
```Unless, that is, we mean to say that
specific conscious moments, as experienced 1-personally, are uniquely
present only "in principle".

ISTM inevitable that, short of outright denial of the singularly
present and selective nature of all 1-p experiences, contextualised by
a "history" of successive such moments, we are led to the intuition
that there is something else at work here, though what it is cannot
perhaps be captured more precisely than Bruno's hmm...

David

```
```On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:
```
```On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>    wrote:

```
```I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing
the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.
```
```I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter "experiences", it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they "all exist
timelessly" from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which "time is
inferred" from the content of each unique moment.

```
```So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there "all together" in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.
```
```How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend
on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.
```
```Again, I agree, but with the same distinction.  There is indeed the
3-p sense of inherently distinguishable subsets of some co-existent
supervenience base.  But this mustn't be elided with the distinct 1-p
experiential sense of the "unique presence" of each conscious moment.
```
```
You mean "confused" or "confounded"...not "elided"?

```
```If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case "time " would never be "inferred", or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.
```
```
You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

Brent

```
```David
```
```
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