On 07 Jan 2012, at 18:07, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Jan 6, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


Assuming all possible (consistent mathematical) structures is the
simplest possible hypothesis. The problem with this is that this
'whole' might be a bit too large or inconsistent in itself (like
Russell's Paradox), and like I've said before, there is no way for us
finite humans to know an oracle when we see it. If we're a bit more
modest, we can use the only mathematical notion that we know to be
truly universal - computation as by CTT.

OK. The main problem also is in the self-localization in the possible math structure. Comp entails a first person indeterminacy which distribute us in the mathematical reality, and what we perceive might NOT be a purely mathematical structure, but something "supervening" on it from the inside view. This is a point missed by people like Chalmers, Tegmark, Schmidhuber, etc.



Bruno, would you say that Tegmark has still missed the point, given this article he co-authored:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/
http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

Thanks,




Tegmark uses comp +swe, when comp makes it necessary to derive swe from universal number self-reference (which then gives both the quanta and the qualia (frely from the classical theory of knowledge).

For the physical reality you can say that he is very close to comp, with Everett and Deutsch, but he missed the comp reversal between physics and number's 'theology'. He does not address the mind body problem, and seems unaware that comp reduces it in justifying swe (or the 'correct physical laws') from the math of self-observing universal machine. It is still an Aristotelian. He still infer (from observation) the unitary evolution. But he uses comp, so by UDA the unitary evolution must be derived from elementary arithmetic. From a platonist view, he is still cheating. He is still trying to copy on nature.

He missed, following a long tradition, the mind-body problem, despite his physics, and even his metaphysics (mathematicalism) is very close to the comp needed physics. Yet UDA explains (or is supposed to explain) that physics *has to* be justified by universal introspection (and so based on G, G* and the intensional variants, to get that measure on the UD*, or on the sigma_1 propositions).

It is very good physics, from a comp view. But he misses that physical realities are a first person sharable numbers' dreams. Like Everett explains the phenomenology of the collapse, comp asks for a phenomenological account of the swe in arithmetic.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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