On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities
implement themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be
thinking that this is a solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I
argue that we cannot use the argument of reduction to solve it. We
must have both the physical and the mental, not at the primitive
level of existence to be sure, but at the level where they have meaning.
Suppose there are characters in a computer game that have very
sophisticated AI. Don't events in the game have meaning for them? The
meaning is implicit in the actions and reactions.
Let us consider your idea carefully as you are asking an important
question, I think. Those NPC (non-player characters), is their behavior
the result of a finite list of if X then Y statements or equivalents?
Where does the possibility of "to whom-ness" lie for that list of if
then statements? How does a per-specified list of properties encode a
"sense of self"? Forget the anthropomorphic stuff, lets focus on the 1p
stuff here. How do we bridge between the per-specified list of if then's
to a coherent notion of 1p?
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