On 1/14/2012 6:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/14/2012 4:05 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/14/2012 10:41 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
I suppose that that is the case, but how do mathematical entities implement themselves other than via physical processes? We seem to be thinking that this is a solvable "Chicken and Egg" problem and I argue that we cannot use the argument of reduction to solve it. We must have both the physical and the mental, not at the primitive level of existence to be sure, but at the level where they have meaning.

Suppose there are characters in a computer game that have very sophisticated AI. Don't events in the game have meaning for them? The meaning is implicit in the actions and reactions.

Hi Brent,

Let us consider your idea carefully as you are asking an important question, I think. Those NPC (non-player characters), is their behavior the result of a finite list of if X then Y statements or equivalents?

Dunno. If I were writing it I'd probably throw in a little randomness as well as functions with self-modification to allow learning.

Where does the possibility of "to whom-ness" lie for that list of if then statements?

I don't know what "to whom-ness" means.

How does a per-specified list of properties encode a "sense of self"?

I'm not sure what you mean by "sense of self". The AI would encode the position and state of the character, including values, plans, self evaluation, etc.

Forget the anthropomorphic stuff, lets focus on the 1p stuff here. How do we bridge between the per-specified list of if then's to a coherent notion of 1p?

By making the AI behave like a person.  How do you know there's a gap to be 


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