On 14 January 2012 18:56, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> But the Turing Test is a bit of an oxymoron because it > is impossible to prove the existence of something that is solely 1p. There > is no 3p of consciousness. I agree, and in a sense this implies the futility of all attempts to argue from 3p to 1p. But there may be other ways to get there. For example, I've always tended towards the view that Bruno often calls a "universal mind" (cf. Schopenhauer, Schrödinger, Hoyle, Dyson, et.al.). Think of this as a universal 1p. The argument from this point of departure begins in such uniquely present conscious instances, whose internal logic implies the possibility of other, mutually exclusive, such instances. As a first approximation, this internal logic might imply that the present instance is a selection from a uniquely "personal" serialisation of such instances (i.e. the RSSA). However the same logic is consistent with all possible such instances, the implied personal serialisation now playing a secondary role to some transcendental, "impersonal" selection (i.e. the ASSA). This insight offers an escape route from solipsism. Can one apply a view like this to the problem in hand? 3p is the label applied to our theoretical proxies for the regularities of 1p phenomena. These regularities are so compelling that for most purposes we treat them perfectly naturally as realities independent of the 1p context in which they manifest. We situate them in an ever more general explanatory framework, in terms of which we hope to trap even the 1p localisation to which all such explanation is ultimately referred. But frustratingly, attempts to achieve this by the direct 3p route seem always to rely in the end on some sort of unsatisfactory bait-and-switch. Nonetheless we cannot deny that there are subsets of the 3p schema which correlate strongly with the implied serialisation of 1p moments: those subsets we accept as our local physical embodiments. Consequently, it seems reasonable to postulate the tightest of inter-relations, short of identity, between these two domains, at least locally. Returning to the original point of departure with the inference of a tight local correlation between some appropriate 3p physical embodiment and the presently selected 1p instance, it might seem a reasonable experiment to reverse the logic. If we could but identify the relevant species of 3p embodiment - given the anti-solipsism argument derivable from a strictly 1p point of departure - we could reasonably infer its correlation with an instance of consciousness mutually exclusive of the present one, entangled with its own coherent personal serialisation (or more baldly, another person). But how to identify the "relevant species"? Ordinarily, we do not hesitate to ascribe this status to other human embodiments, because it seems reasonable to suppose that if our own 3p constitution is of the relevant species, so is theirs. But as we have no widely-accepted definitive account of what this entails specifically, we must rely essentially on the behavioural manifestations of intelligence. Accordingly, we have little option but to ascribe the "definitively conscious" 1p-3p correlation to any embodiment that displays sufficiently intelligent behaviour, by some agreed criterion such as the TT. The critical exception to the foregoing is that we would clearly wish to withdraw this ascription where there is demonstrable evidence of fraud or pretence. Hence the vanishing point for controversy may well be FAPP when the pretence of intelligence has become practically indistinguishable, by any available criterion, from its actuality. David > On 1/14/2012 1:15 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > On 14.01.2012 18:12 John Clark said the following: > > On Fri, Jan 13, 2012 meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > There is no way consciousness can have a direct Darwinian > advantage > > so it must be a byproduct of something that does have that virtue, > and the obvious candidate is intelligence.\ > > > > That's not so clear since we don't know exactly what is the > relation of consciousness to intelligence. For a social animal > having an internal model of ones self and being able to model the > thought processes of others has obvious reproductive advantage. > > > To do any one of the things you suggest would require intelligence, > and indeed there is some evidence that in general social animals tend > to have a larger brain than similar species that are not social. But > at any rate we both seem to agree that Evolution can only see > behavior, so consciousness must be a byproduct of some sort of > complex behavior. Thus the Turing Test must be valid not only for > intelligence but for consciousness too. > > > How would you generalize the Turing Test for consciousness? > > Evgenii > > John K Clark > > > Hi, > > Perhaps we can generalize the Turing test by insisting on questions that > would require for their answer computational resources in excess of that > would be available to a computer + power suply in a small room. Think of the > Berkenstein bound.... But the Turing Test is a bit of an oxymoron because it > is impossible to prove the existence of something that is solely 1p. There > is no 3p of consciousness. I recall Leibniz' discussion of this... > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.