On 17 January 2012 14:51, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > I think we are very close. And very close to Schroedinger intuition indeed.

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I think we are. However, I'm still uncomfortable about the "single glance". I can see how one can talk about points of view in a 3p sense by, in effect, pointing to 3p entities and attributing 1p views to them. However, as soon as one actually *adopts* the 1p stance, one becomes restricted to what we experience as a *succession* of personally-selected instances, mutually-exclusive of all other such instances. It is tempting to go on thinking of this serialisation of 1p-as-experienced instances as though it was just the natural outcome of their continuing to co-exist all together, as in the 3p situation. But the trouble then is the lack of a rationale for recovering just this instance NOW, whilst simultaneously retaining the credible belief in its *substitution* by other such moments. To put it another way, a single uniquely-experienced point of view can't intelligibly be both somewhere and everywhere. Do you see my difficulty? David > > On 17 Jan 2012, at 13:51, David Nyman wrote: > > On 17 January 2012 09:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > Now the 1p are related, not on any particular computations in the UD (or in > > arithmetic), but to all of them, making both matter and consciousness not > > Turing emulable, but still recoverable from the entire work of the UD (UD*) > > or from the whole arithmetical truth. The point of view of some numbers will > > not differ from yours, given that yours is given by infinitely many such > > numbers relations. OK? > > > I think so. Here's what we seem to be saying, in brief: > > 1) Start with the presupposition that consciousness supervenes on the > point of view of a "digital machine" (i.e. CTM). > > > OK (with some nuances, due to the fact that we don't know and eventually > cannot know which machine we are, so that there are some difficulties needed > to be met in relation with the notion of comp substitution level, usually > implicit in most version of CTM). > > > > 2) Demonstrate how such machinery can logically encapsulate a point of view. > > > OK. At least in the 3p sense. That's a consequence of Gödel's construction > (arithmetization), mainly. > > > > 3) Argue that an infinity of such machinery emerges from arithmetic as > a consequence of UD*. > > > Yes. That is the first person global indeterminacy. The one you face in case > a UD is running integrally in the physical universe, or the one you face if > you accept that elementary arithmetic is independent of you (by MGA). > > > > > 4) Show that 2) and 3) therefore entails an infinity of such points of view. > > > Yes. But note the ambiguity. Here it means that we have to take into account > all the non distinguishable (identical) 3p views appearing in arithmetic (or > UD*). They will define the lasting, persisting, 1p observation. > > > > > 5) Show that the conjunction of "I am conscious now" and assumptions > 1), 2), 3) and 4) entails that consciousness supervenes on an infinity > of points of view. > > > OK. Note that without MGA, we could still believe that some primary physical > universe is needed, but in a "robust universe" the reversal is already > proved. > > > > From the above, given that I am conscious in the present moment, my > current state is "computationally entangled" with other states > comprising "the memoires of DN", and is associated in a weaker sense, > by 5), to all other such memoires. > > > Yes. > > > This seems to give us something > like Schrödinger's association of consciousness with the whole that > cannot be surveyed in a single glance. > > > That might be possible. What might be possible is that such a consciousness > is the atemporal consciousness of the "universal person", which is the UM, > or the LUM (for strong self-consciousness). Basically a LUM is a UM with a > rich self (the UM have already a self, but cannot prove a lot about it). > > > > > Of course, this selfsame narrowing of attention - i.e. the temporal, > and temporary, isolation of one mutually-exclusive moment - is one of > the givens and hence transcends the explanation. > > > But it seems clear to me already be explained by the 3p self-description (by > Bp, that is Gödel's provability predicate). What is really transcendent is > nothing but the "whole (arithmetical) truth", which provably transcend PA. > Now we are richer than PA, and this concerns thus a non definable > transcendental notion of truth. > > > > But it is only by > means of such interpretative glances that number-epistemology can be > elevated into the "strong emergence" of personal knowledge. > > > Hmm... OK. But such interpretative glance is not much more than what you > need to believe to accept that the excluded middle principle is correct for > the intuitive arithmetical propositions (such an intuition is > transcendental, but fully formalized, at the meta-level, for any *correct* > machine, by Bp & p. The "& p" is definable by a LUM for a simpler LUM known > to be correct by the first one. It is transcendental only when the LUM > applies this on itself. Basically, this is due to the fact that no LUM can > know that she is correct. > > I think we are very close. And very close to Schroedinger intuition indeed. > > Bruno > > > > > > On 16 Jan 2012, at 20:42, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to > > interpret > > some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to > > each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we > > need > > some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain > > is > > not observed by someone, it would not be conscious. > > > > I'm unclear from the above - and indeed from the rest of your comments > > - whether you are defining interpretation in a purely 3p way, or > > whether you are implicitly placing it in a 1-p framework - e.g. where > > you say above "From their view". If you do indeed assume that numbers > > can have such views, then I see why you would say that they "interpret > > themselves", because adopting the 1p view is already to invoke a kind > > of "emergence" of number-epistemology. But such an emergence is still > > only a manner of speaking from OUR point of view, in that I can > > rephrase what you say above thus: "From their view, to believe that > > THEY need some extra-interpreter..." without taking such a point of > > view in any literal sense. Are you saying that consciousness somehow > > elevates number-epistemology into "strong emergence", such that their > > point of view and self-interpretation become indistinguishable from my > > own? > > > > It seems to me that this follows from UDA1-8. If not, then arithmetic if > > full of immaterial zombies, given that those computations does exist in > > arithmetic, in the usual sense of "17 is prime" independently of me. Or you > > need to reify matter to singularize consciousness, but this is shown by the > > movie graph (UDA-8, MGA) to be a red herring type of move. > > Number relations does implement computations, in the same sense that brains' > > physics implement computations, by MGA. > > Now the 1p are related, not on any particular computations in the UD (or in > > arithmetic), but to all of them, making both matter and consciousness not > > Turing emulable, but still recoverable from the entire work of the UD (UD*) > > or from the whole arithmetical truth. The point of view of some numbers will > > not differ from yours, given that yours is given by infinitely many such > > numbers relations. OK? > > > Bruno > > > Bruno > > > > > > David > > > > On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using > > only > > addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary > > arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. > > > > > That may be, but we were discussing interpretation. As you say above: > > "YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only > > addition and multiplication" (my emphasis). > > > > > Not just ME. A tiny part of arithmetic can too. All universal numbers can > > do > > that. No need of first person notion. All this can be shown in a 3p way. > > Indeed, in arithmetic. Even without the induction axioms, so that we > > don't > > need Löbian machine. > > The existence of the UD for example, is a theorem of (Robinson) > > arithmetic. > > Now, that kinds of truth are rather long and tedious to show. This was > > shown > > mainly by Gödel in his 1931 paper (for rich Löbian theories). It is > > called > > "arithmetization of meta-mathematics". I will try to explain the salt of > > it > > without being too much technical below. > > > > > > But this is surely, as you > > are wont to say, too quick. Firstly, in what sense can numbers in > > simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or > > indeed as anything else than what they simply are? > > > > > Here you ask a more difficult question. Nevertheless it admits a positive > > answer. > > > > > > I think that the > > ascription of "self-interpretation" to a bare ontology is superficial; > > it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and > > indeed to a self. > > > > > But can define a notion of 3-self in arithmetic. Then to get the 1-self, > > we > > go at the meta-level and combine it with the notion of arithmetical > > truth. > > That notion is NOT definable in arithmetic, but that is a good thing, > > because it will explain why the notion of first person, and of > > consciousness, will not be definable by machine. > > > > > > > Hence it appears that some perspectival union of > > epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation. > > > > > OK. But the whole force of comp comes from the fact that you can define a > > big part of that epistemology using only the elementary ontology. > > > Let us agree on what we mean by defining something in arithmetic (or in > > the > > arithmetical language). > > > The arithmetical language is the first order (predicate) logic with > > equality(=), so that it has the usual logical connectives (&, V, ->, ~ > > (and, > > or, implies, not), and the quantifiers "E" and "A", (it exists and for > > all), > > together with the special arithmetical symbols "0", "s" "+" and "*". > > > To illustrate an arithmetical definition, let me give you some > > definitions > > of simple concepts. > > > We can define the arithmetical relation " x =< y" (x is less than or > > equal > > to y). > > > Indeed x =< y if and only if > > Ez(x+z = y) > > > We can define x < y (x is strictly less than y) by > > Ez((x+z) + s(0) = y) > > > We can define (x divide y) by > > Ez(x*z = y) > > > Now we can define (x is a prime number) by > > > Az[ (x ≠ 1) and ((z divide x) -> ((z = 1) or (z = x))] > > > Which should be seen as a "macro" abbreviation of > > > Az(~(x = s(0)) & ((Ey(x*y = x) -> (z = 1) V (z = x)). > > > Now I tell you that we can define, exactly in that manner, the notion of > > universal number, computations, proofs, etc. > > > In particular any proposition of the form phi_i(j) = k can be translated > > in > > arithmetic. A famous predicate due to Kleene is used for that effect . A > > universal number u can be defined by the relation > > AxAy(phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y)), with <x,y> being a computable bijection > > from > > NXN to N. > > > Like metamathematics can be arithmetized, theoretical computer science > > can > > be arithmetized. > > > The interpretation is not done by me, but by the true relation between > > the > > numbers. 4 < 6 because it is true that Ez(s(s(s(s(0))))+z + s(0) = > > s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))) ). That is true. Such a z exists, notably z = s(0). > > > Likewize, assuming comp, the reason why you are conscious "here and now" > > is > > that your relative computational state exists, together with the > > infinitely > > many computations going through it. > > Your consciousness is harder to tackle, because it will refer more > > explicitly on that truth, like in the Bp & p Theatetical trick. > > > I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to > > interpret > > some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to > > each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we > > need > > some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain > > is > > not observed by someone, it would not be conscious. > > > Let me say two or three words on the SELF. Basically, it is very simple. > > You don't need universal numbers, nor super rich environment. You need an > > environment (machine, number) capable of duplicating, or concatenating > > piece > > of code. I usually sing this: If D(x) gives the description of x(x), then > > D(D) gives the description of DD. This belongs to the diagonalization > > family, and can be used to proves the existence of programs (relative > > numbers) capable of self-reproduction and self-reference with respect to > > universal (or not) numbers. So, some numbers can interpret by themselves > > some relative number relations (relative to some probable local universal > > number) as a self-referential statement (like "I have two hands"), or > > even > > "I am hungry", making them hope some action in the environment will lead > > them in most satisfying relation with that possible environment. Such > > numbers can understand UDA like you and me, and realize that the only way > > that is possible, is by its local reality being stable relatively to the > > infinity of computations going through its computational states at its > > correct comp level and below. > > > Tell me if this helps. I use comp throughout, 'course. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > David > > > > On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > > wrote: > > > The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by > > invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. > > > > > > Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical? I > > don't see why. And yet, as you say, the need for interpretation is > > unavoidable. Now, my understanding of Bruno, after some fairly close > > questioning (which may still leave me confused, of course) is that the > > elements of his arithmetical ontology are strictly limited to numbers > > (or their equivalent) + addition and multiplication. This emerged > > during discussion of macroscopic compositional principles implicit in > > the interpretation of micro-physical schemas; principles which are > > rarely understood as being epistemological in nature. Hence, strictly > > speaking, even the ascription of the notion of computation to > > arrangements of these bare arithmetical elements assumes further > > compositional principles and therefore appeals to some supplementary > > epistemological "interpretation". > > > In other words, any bare ontological schema, uninterpreted, is unable, > > from its own unsupplemented resources, to actualise whatever > > higher-level emergents may be implicit within it. But what else could > > deliver that interpretation/actualisation? What could embody the > > collapse of ontology and epistemology into a single actuality? Could > > it be that interpretation is finally revealed only in the "conscious > > merger" of these two polarities? > > > > > > > Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using > > only > > addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary > > arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. All > > the > > "Bp " and "Dp" are pure arithmetical sentences. What cannot be defined > > is > > Bp > > & p, and we need to go out of the mind of the machine, and out of > > arithmetic, to provide the meaning, and machines can do that too. So, > > in > > arithmetic, you can find true statement about machine going outside of > > arithmetic. It is here that we have to be careful of not doing Searle's > > error of confusing levels, and that's why the epistemology internal in > > arithmetic can be bigger than arithmetic. Arithmetic itself does not > > "believe" in that epistemology, but it believes in numbers believing in > > them. Whatever you believe in will not been automatically believed by > > God, > > but God will always believe that you do believe in them. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > David > > > Hi Bruno, > > > You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all! > > This > > reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the > > way > > that > > math is "abstract" and have to work very hard to understand notions > > like > > "in > > principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut". > > > > On 1/14/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 13 Jan 2012, at 18:24, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > Hi Bruno, > > > On 1/13/2012 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Hi Stephen, > > > On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > Hi Bruno, > > > On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote: > > > On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > Hi, > > > I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the > > concept > > of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems > > to > > makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies > > of > > PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an > > equivalence class. It seems to me that the concept of plurality of 1p > > requires a 3p to be coherent, but how does a 3p exist unless it is a > > 1p > > in the PA sense? > > > Onward! > > > Stephen > > > > My understanding of 1p plural is merely many 1p's sharing an apparent > > 3p > > world. That 3p world may or may not be globally coherent (it is most > > certainly locally coherent), and may or may not be computable, > > typically > > I > > imagine it as being locally computed by an infinity of TMs, from the > > 1p. > > At > > least one coherent 3p foundation exists as the UD, but that's > > something > > very > > different from the universe a structural realist would believe in > > (for > > example, 'this universe', or the MWI multiverse). So a coherent 3p > > foundation always exists, possibly an infinity of them. The parts (or > > even > > the whole) of the 3p foundation should be found within the UD. > > > As for PA's consciousness, I don't know, maybe Bruno can say a lot > > more > > about this. My understanding of consciousness in Bruno's theory is > > that > > an > > OM(Observer Moment) corresponds to a Sigma-1 sentence. > > > > You can ascribe a sort of local consciousness to the person living, > > relatively to you, that Sigma_1 truth, but the person itself is > > really > > related to all the proofs (in Platonia) of that sentences (roughly > > speaking). > > > > OK, but that requires that I have a justification for a belief in > > Platonia. > > The closest that I can get to Platonia is something like the class of > > all > > verified proofs (which supervenes on some form of physical process.) > > > > You need just to believe that in the standard model of PA a sentence > > is > > true > > or false. I have not yet seen any book in math mentioning anything > > physical > > to define what that means. > > *All* math papers you cited assume no less. > > > > I cannot understand how such an obvious concept is not understood, > > even > > the notion of universality assumes it. The point is that mathematical > > statements require some form of physicality to be known and > > communicated, > > > > OK. But they does not need phyicality to be just true. That's the > > point. > > > > Surely, but the truthfulness of a mathematical statement is > > meaningless > > without the possibility of physical implementation. One cannot even > > know > > of > > it absent the possibility of the physical. > > > > > it just is the case that the sentence, model, recursive algorithm, > > whatever > > concept, etc. is independent of any particular form of physical > > implementation but is not independent of all physical > > representations. > > > > Of course it is. When you reason in PA you don't use any axiom > > referring > > to > > physics. To say that you need a physical brain begs the question > > *and* > > is > > a > > level-of-reasoning error. > > > > PA does need to have any axioms that refer to physics. The fact that > > PA > > is inferred from patterns of chalk on a chalk board or patterns of > > ink > > on > > a > > whiteboard or patterns of pixels on a computer monitor or patterns of > > scratches in the dust or ... is sufficient to establish the truth of > > what > > I > > am saying. If you remove the possibility of physical implementation > > you > > also > > remove the possibility of meaningfulness. > > > > > We cannot completely abstract away the role played by the physical > > world. > > > > That's what we do in math. > > > > Yes, but all the while the physical world is the substrate for our > > patterns without which there is meaninglessness. > > > > > > > > I simply cannot see how Sigma_1 sentences can interface with each > > other > > such > > that one can "know" anything about another absent some form of > > physicality. > > > > The "interfaces" and the relative implementations are defined using > > addition > > and multiplication only, like in Gödel's original paper. Then UDA > > shows > > why > > physicality is an emergent pattern in the mind of number, and why it > > has > > to > > be like that if comp is true. AUDA shows how to make the derivation. > > > > No, you have only proven that the idea that the physicalist idea > > that > > "mind is an epiphenomena" is false, > > > > No. I show that the physical reality is not an ontological reality, > > once > > we > > assume we are (even material) machine. > > > > And I agree, the physical is not a primitive in the existential > > sense, > > but neither is the information. Idealism would have us believe that > > differences can somehow obtain without a means to make the > > distinction. > > > > > i.e. that material monism is false. > > > > I insist everywhere that this is not what I showed. I show that all > > form > > of > > weak materialism is incompatible with mechanism. All. The monist one, > > the > > dualist one, etc. > > > > How weak does materialism get when its primary quality is removed? > > This > > is a case of "vanishing in the limit", something similar to the heap > > that > > vanishes when we remove the last grain. > > > > > > A proof that I understand and agree with. > > > > Clearly you did not. You even miss the enunciation of the result. > > Mechanism > > is incompatible with WEAK materialism, that is the idea that > > primitive > > matter exist, or the idea that physics is the fundamental science. > > > > Can you not understand these words? How is materialism any weaker > > than > > the case of no material at all? My argument is that the possibility > > of > > physical implementation cannot be removed without removing the > > possibility > > of meaningfulness. It is not an argument for a primitive ontological > > status > > for matter. You even seem to follow this reasoning when I ask you > > where > > does > > the computation occur then there is not paper tape for the TM and you > > say > > "on the walls of Platonia". > > > > > Your arguments and discussions in support of ideal monism and, > > > > I prove that ideal monism is the only option, once you believe that > > consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitution done > > at > > some > > level. > > > > No, you did not. Your result cannot do such a thing because you > > cannot > > have your cake (a meaningful set of expressions) and eat it too. > > Digital > > functional substitution is the substitution of one physical > > implementation > > for another, it shows that the fact of universality does not depend > > on > > any > > particular physical implementation but DOES NOT eliminate the need > > for > > at > > least one form of physical implementation. Digital substitutability > > is > > an > > invariance over the class of physical implementations, but what > > happens > > then > > you remove all members of a class? It vanishes! > > > > > > like Berkeley's, still fail because while the physical is not > > primitive, > > it > > is not merely the epiphenomena of the mind either. > > > > It has to be by the UDA. > > > > And the UDA (like the UD) must have some implementation, even though > > the > > particulars of that implementation are irrelevant. > > > > You are perhaps confused by the fact that unlike the physical, ideas > > can > > represent themselves. > > > > I believe that comp makes the "physical" into an aspect of number's > > self-reference. > > > > There we agree but I would say that a number's self-reference is its > > connection to some physical representation. My point is that there > > cannot > > be > > a self-reference without an implementation even if the particulars of > > the > > implementation do not matter. > > > > > > > > > If I take away all forms of physical means of communicating ideas, no > > chalkboards, paper, computer screens, etc., how can ideas be possibly > > communicated? > > > > Because arithmetical truth contains all machine 'dreams", including > > dreams > > of chalkboards, papers, screens, etc. UDA has shown that a "real > > paper", > > or > > & "real screen" is an emergent stable pattern supervening on > > infinities > > of > > computation, through a competition between all universal numbers > > occurring > > below our substitution level. You might try to tell me where in the > > proof > > you lost the arguement. > > > > When these "infinities of computations" are taken to have specific > > properties merely because of their existence. You are conflating > > existence > > with property definiteness. Most people have this problem. > > > > This does not make sense. I assume not just O, s(0), etc. I assume > > also > > addition and multiplication. That's enough to get the properties. > > > > There is an "I" in that statement! What is this "I"? What is its > > function? What class is it an invariant upon? Exactly how is it that > > you > > know of these properties? Absent the possibility of some form of > > implementation in the physical, there is no distinction between you > > and > > anything. Meaning requires distinction. Some even say that meaning > > *is* > > distinction. What other than the persistence of pattern that the > > physical > > offers acts to allow for the ability to know differences? > > > > > > Mere existence does not specify properties. > > > > That's not correct. We can explain the property "being prime" from > > the > > mere > > existence of 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition > > and > > multiplication. > > > > > No, existence does not specify anything, much less that "0, s(0), > > s(s(0)), ..." is distinct from any other string, nor does it specify > > the > > laws of addition or multiplication. Existence is not a property that > > an > > object has. > > > > Exactly. that's the point. You seem to contradict it. > > > > But existence is thus independent of properties and thus > > distinctions. > > So your claim that " "being prime" from the mere existence of 0, > > s(0), > > s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition and multiplication" > > requires > > a substrate that allows form representative patterns to obtain. > > Universality > > allows us to substitute one form of substrate for another so long as > > the > > function is the same. But universality and existence alone are > > insufficient > > for your claim that "I prove that ideal monism is the only option". > > You > > also > > have to show how the properties are both definite and invariant. This > > requires implementation in a form that is invariant (to some degree) > > with > > respect to time. There is not time in Platonia therefore there in no > > invariance with respect to time for the patterns of difference to > > occur > > for > > implementation to be said to obtain. > > > > > > > You need to study the "problem of universals" in philosophy, it is > > well > > known and has been debated for even thousands of years. For example > > see > > 1 > > or > > 2. > > > > This is a red herring. > > > > In a way, surely, but the essence of the problem is not. The paper > > that > > is reference 1 explains this well. > > > > > > > I go so far as considering that the wavefunction and its unitary > > evolution > > exists and it is a sufficiently universal "physical" process to > > implement > > the UD, but the UD as just the equivalent to Integers, nay, that I > > cannot > > believe in. “One cannot speak about whatever one cannot talk.” ~ > > Maturana > > (1978, p. 49) > > > > I think Maturana was alluding to Wittgenstein, and that sentence is > > almost > > as ridiculous as Damascius saying "one sentence about the ineffable > > is > > one > > sentence too much". But it is a deep meta-truth playing some role in > > number's theology. > > > > OK, I deeply appreciate your erudition, you are much more educated > > than > > I am, but nevertheless, I submit to you that you cannot just ignore > > the > > universals vs. nominal problem and posit by fiat that just because > > one > > can > > proof the truth of some statement that that statement's existence > > determines > > its properties. Our ability to communicate ideas follows from their > > universality, that they do not require *some particular* physical > > implementation, but that is not the same as requiring *no* physical > > implementation. You argue that *no* physical implementation is > > necessary; > > I > > disagree. > > > > It is the result of the proof. It is up to you to show the flaw, or > > to > > abandon comp. > > > > The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than > > by > > invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. What you > > seem > > to think is that mathematics can prove things to itself in a manner > > consistent with how I might be able to write out a set of symbols on > > your > > chalkboard that represent a proof of some theorem. You reject David > > Deutsch's discussion of how this is wrongheaded out of hand, that is > > unfortunate since it would greatly strengthen your case if you could > > show > > exactly where Deutsch is going wrong, if he is... > > > > > > But I think that you cannot define the universal wave without > > postulating > > arithmetical realism. In fact real number+trigonometrical function is > > a > > stronger form of realism than arithmetical realism. Adding "physical" > > in > > front of it adds nothing but a magical notion of primary substance. > > Epistemologically it is a form of treachery, by UDA, it singles out a > > universal number and postulate it is real, when comp explains > > precisely > > that > > such a move cannot work. > > > > I am allowing for realism, it is a belief that may be true, but it > > is > > not a unique singleton in the universe of models. I am arguing > > against > > the > > idea that the physical is primitive, against substantivalism > > especially > > as > > it is occurring in physics, for example see: > > www.dur.ac.uk/nick.zangwill/Haeccieties.doc or 4. > > In physics there is a huge debate over the haecceity of space-time > > and > > your result is important in this, but your attempt to argue from the > > other > > side is as treacherous because it ignores the necessity of the > > physical. > > > > Comp makes necessary that there is no *primitive* physicalness. But > > as > > David > > points in his reply, you cannot say that I ignore the physical. The > > whole > > work is an explanation of why we believe in the physical, why and how > > such > > belief emerges and are persistent, etc. Physics is entirely given by > > the > > material hypostases, which are defined by number's self-reference, as > > UDA > > shows it to be the case necessarily so. > > > > This is insufficient. Merely postulating a property does not make it > > so. > > You continued intransigence on the non-existence of the physical > > world > > with > > statements that is shown to not be primitive is an avoidance of the > > problem > > by ignoring it, not a solution to it. The fact that is removing all > > possibility of physical implementation by a theory of Everything > > makes > > it > > worse than mute, it eliminates itself as a meaningful theory simply > > because, > > to be consistent, it cannot be communicated. > > > Onward! > > > Stephen > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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