On 17 January 2012 14:51, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I think we are very close. And very close to Schroedinger intuition indeed.

I think we are.  However, I'm still uncomfortable about the "single
glance".  I can see how one can talk about points of view in a 3p
sense by, in effect, pointing to 3p entities and attributing 1p views
to them.  However, as soon as one actually *adopts* the 1p stance, one
becomes restricted to what we experience as a *succession* of
personally-selected instances, mutually-exclusive of all other such
instances.  It is tempting to go on thinking of this serialisation of
1p-as-experienced instances as though it was just the natural outcome
of their continuing to co-exist all together, as in the 3p situation.
But the trouble then is the lack of a rationale for recovering just
this instance NOW, whilst simultaneously retaining the credible belief
in its *substitution* by other such moments.  To put it another way, a
single uniquely-experienced point of view can't intelligibly be both
somewhere and everywhere.

Do you see my difficulty?

David


>
> On 17 Jan 2012, at 13:51, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 17 January 2012 09:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> Now the 1p are related, not on any particular computations in the UD (or in
>
> arithmetic), but to all of them, making both matter and consciousness not
>
> Turing emulable, but still recoverable from the entire work of the UD (UD*)
>
> or from the whole arithmetical truth. The point of view of some numbers will
>
> not differ from yours, given that yours is given by infinitely many such
>
> numbers relations. OK?
>
>
> I think so.  Here's what we seem to be saying, in brief:
>
> 1) Start with the presupposition that consciousness supervenes on the
> point of view of a "digital machine" (i.e. CTM).
>
>
> OK (with some nuances, due to the fact that we don't know and eventually
> cannot know which machine we are, so that there are some difficulties needed
> to be met in relation with the notion of comp substitution level, usually
> implicit in most version of CTM).
>
>
>
> 2) Demonstrate how such machinery can logically encapsulate a point of view.
>
>
> OK. At least in the 3p sense. That's a consequence of Gödel's construction
> (arithmetization), mainly.
>
>
>
> 3) Argue that an infinity of such machinery emerges from arithmetic as
> a consequence of UD*.
>
>
> Yes. That is the first person global indeterminacy. The one you face in case
> a UD is running integrally in the physical universe, or the one you face if
> you accept that elementary arithmetic is independent of you (by MGA).
>
>
>
>
> 4) Show that 2) and 3) therefore entails an infinity of such points of view.
>
>
> Yes. But note the ambiguity. Here it means that we have to take into account
> all the non distinguishable (identical) 3p views appearing in arithmetic (or
> UD*). They will define the lasting, persisting, 1p observation.
>
>
>
>
> 5) Show that the conjunction of "I am conscious now" and assumptions
> 1), 2), 3) and 4) entails that consciousness supervenes on an infinity
> of points of view.
>
>
> OK. Note that without MGA, we could still believe that some primary physical
> universe is needed, but in a "robust universe" the reversal is already
> proved.
>
>
>
> From the above, given that I am conscious in the present moment, my
> current state is "computationally entangled" with other states
> comprising "the memoires of DN", and is associated in a weaker sense,
> by 5), to all other such memoires.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
> This seems to give us something
> like Schrödinger's association of consciousness with the whole that
> cannot be surveyed in a single glance.
>
>
> That might be possible. What might be possible is that such a consciousness
> is the atemporal consciousness of the "universal person", which is the UM,
> or the LUM (for strong self-consciousness). Basically a LUM is a UM with a
> rich self (the UM have already a self, but cannot prove a lot about it).
>
>
>
>
> Of course, this selfsame narrowing of attention - i.e. the temporal,
> and temporary, isolation of one mutually-exclusive moment - is one of
> the givens and hence transcends the explanation.
>
>
> But it seems clear to me already be explained by the 3p self-description (by
> Bp, that is Gödel's provability predicate). What is really transcendent is
> nothing but the "whole (arithmetical) truth", which provably transcend PA.
> Now we are richer than PA, and this concerns thus a non definable
> transcendental notion of truth.
>
>
>
> But it is only by
> means of such interpretative glances that number-epistemology can be
> elevated into the "strong emergence" of personal knowledge.
>
>
> Hmm... OK. But such interpretative glance is not much more than what you
> need to believe to accept that the excluded middle principle is correct for
> the intuitive arithmetical propositions (such an intuition is
> transcendental, but fully formalized, at the meta-level, for any *correct*
> machine, by Bp & p. The "& p" is definable by a LUM for a simpler LUM known
> to be correct by the first one. It is transcendental only when the LUM
> applies this on itself. Basically, this is due to the fact that no LUM can
> know that she is correct.
>
> I think we are very close. And very close to Schroedinger intuition indeed.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On 16 Jan 2012, at 20:42, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
> I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to
>
> interpret
>
> some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to
>
> each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we
>
> need
>
> some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain
>
> is
>
> not observed by someone, it would not be conscious.
>
>
>
> I'm unclear from the above - and indeed from the rest of your comments
>
> - whether you are defining interpretation in a purely 3p way, or
>
> whether you are implicitly placing it in a 1-p framework - e.g. where
>
> you say above "From their view".  If you do indeed assume that numbers
>
> can have such views, then I see why you would say that they "interpret
>
> themselves", because adopting the 1p view is already to invoke a kind
>
> of "emergence" of number-epistemology.  But such an emergence is still
>
> only a manner of speaking from OUR point of view, in that I can
>
> rephrase what you say above thus: "From their view, to believe that
>
> THEY need some extra-interpreter..." without taking such a point of
>
> view in any literal sense.  Are you saying that consciousness somehow
>
> elevates number-epistemology into "strong emergence", such that their
>
> point of view and self-interpretation become indistinguishable from my
>
> own?
>
>
>
> It seems to me that this follows from UDA1-8. If not, then arithmetic if
>
> full of immaterial zombies, given that those computations does exist in
>
> arithmetic, in the usual sense of "17 is prime" independently of me. Or you
>
> need to reify matter to singularize consciousness, but this is shown by the
>
> movie graph (UDA-8, MGA) to be a red herring type of move.
>
> Number relations does implement computations, in the same sense that brains'
>
> physics implement computations, by MGA.
>
> Now the 1p are related, not on any particular computations in the UD (or in
>
> arithmetic), but to all of them, making both matter and consciousness not
>
> Turing emulable, but still recoverable from the entire work of the UD (UD*)
>
> or from the whole arithmetical truth. The point of view of some numbers will
>
> not differ from yours, given that yours is given by infinitely many such
>
> numbers relations. OK?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
> On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using
>
> only
>
> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary
>
> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number.
>
>
>
>
> That may be, but we were discussing interpretation.  As you say above:
>
> "YOU can define computation, even universal machine, by using only
>
> addition and multiplication" (my emphasis).
>
>
>
>
> Not just ME. A tiny part of arithmetic can too. All universal numbers can
>
> do
>
> that. No need of first person notion. All this can be shown in a 3p way.
>
> Indeed, in arithmetic. Even without the induction axioms, so that we
>
> don't
>
> need Löbian machine.
>
> The existence of the UD for example, is a theorem of (Robinson)
>
> arithmetic.
>
> Now, that kinds of truth are rather long and tedious to show. This was
>
> shown
>
> mainly by Gödel in his 1931 paper (for rich Löbian theories). It is
>
> called
>
> "arithmetization of meta-mathematics". I will try to explain the salt of
>
> it
>
> without being too much technical below.
>
>
>
>
>
> But this is surely, as you
>
> are wont to say, too quick.  Firstly, in what sense can numbers in
>
> simple arithmetical relation define THEMSELVES as computation, or
>
> indeed as anything else than what they simply are?
>
>
>
>
> Here you ask a more difficult question. Nevertheless it admits a positive
>
> answer.
>
>
>
>
>
> I think that the
>
> ascription of "self-interpretation" to a bare ontology is superficial;
>
> it conceals an implicit supplementary appeal to epistemology, and
>
> indeed to a self.
>
>
>
>
> But can define a notion of 3-self in arithmetic. Then to get the 1-self,
>
> we
>
> go at the meta-level and combine it with the notion of arithmetical
>
> truth.
>
> That notion is NOT definable in arithmetic, but that is a good thing,
>
> because it will explain why the notion of first person, and of
>
> consciousness, will not be definable by machine.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Hence it appears that some perspectival union of
>
> epistemology and ontology is a prerequisite of interpretation.
>
>
>
>
> OK. But the whole force of comp comes from the fact that you can define a
>
> big part of that epistemology using only the elementary ontology.
>
>
> Let us agree on what we mean by defining something in arithmetic (or in
>
> the
>
> arithmetical language).
>
>
> The arithmetical language is the first order (predicate) logic with
>
> equality(=), so that it has the usual logical connectives (&, V, ->, ~
>
> (and,
>
> or, implies, not), and the quantifiers "E" and "A", (it exists and for
>
> all),
>
> together with the special arithmetical symbols "0", "s" "+" and "*".
>
>
> To illustrate an arithmetical definition, let me give you some
>
> definitions
>
> of simple concepts.
>
>
> We can define the arithmetical relation " x =< y" (x is less than or
>
> equal
>
> to y).
>
>
> Indeed x =< y if and only if
>
> Ez(x+z = y)
>
>
> We can define x < y (x is strictly less than y) by
>
> Ez((x+z) + s(0) = y)
>
>
> We can define (x divide y) by
>
> Ez(x*z = y)
>
>
> Now we can define (x is a prime number) by
>
>
>  Az[ (x ≠ 1) and ((z divide x) -> ((z = 1) or (z = x))]
>
>
> Which should be seen as a "macro" abbreviation of
>
>
> Az(~(x = s(0)) & ((Ey(x*y = x) -> (z = 1) V (z = x)).
>
>
> Now I tell you that we can define, exactly in that manner, the notion of
>
> universal number, computations, proofs, etc.
>
>
> In particular any proposition of the form phi_i(j) = k can be translated
>
> in
>
> arithmetic. A famous predicate due to Kleene is used for that effect . A
>
> universal number u can be defined by the relation
>
> AxAy(phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y)), with <x,y> being a computable bijection
>
> from
>
> NXN to N.
>
>
> Like metamathematics can be arithmetized, theoretical computer science
>
> can
>
> be arithmetized.
>
>
> The interpretation is not done by me, but by the true relation between
>
> the
>
> numbers. 4 < 6 because it is true that Ez(s(s(s(s(0))))+z + s(0) =
>
> s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))) ). That is true.  Such a z exists, notably  z = s(0).
>
>
> Likewize, assuming comp, the reason why you are conscious "here and now"
>
> is
>
> that your relative computational state exists, together with the
>
> infinitely
>
> many computations going through it.
>
> Your consciousness is harder to tackle, because it will refer more
>
> explicitly on that truth, like in the Bp & p Theatetical trick.
>
>
> I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to
>
> interpret
>
> some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to
>
> each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we
>
> need
>
> some extra-interpreter, would be like to believe that if your own brain
>
> is
>
> not observed by someone, it would not be conscious.
>
>
> Let me say two or three words on the SELF.  Basically, it is very simple.
>
> You don't need universal numbers, nor super rich environment. You need an
>
> environment (machine, number) capable of duplicating, or concatenating
>
> piece
>
> of code. I usually sing this: If D(x) gives the description of x(x), then
>
> D(D) gives the description of DD. This belongs to the diagonalization
>
> family, and can be used to proves the existence of programs (relative
>
> numbers) capable of self-reproduction and self-reference with respect to
>
> universal (or not) numbers. So, some numbers can interpret by themselves
>
> some relative number relations (relative to some probable local universal
>
> number) as a self-referential statement (like "I have two hands"), or
>
> even
>
> "I am hungry", making them hope some action in the environment will lead
>
> them in most satisfying relation with that possible environment. Such
>
> numbers can understand UDA like you and me, and realize that the only way
>
> that is possible, is by its local reality being stable relatively to the
>
> infinity of computations going through its computational states at its
>
> correct comp level and below.
>
>
> Tell me if this helps. I use comp throughout, 'course.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
>
> On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>
> wrote:
>
>
> The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
>
> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
>
>
>
>
>
> Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physical?  I
>
> don't see why.  And yet, as you say, the need for interpretation is
>
> unavoidable.  Now, my understanding of Bruno, after some fairly close
>
> questioning (which may still leave me confused, of course) is that the
>
> elements of his arithmetical ontology are strictly limited to numbers
>
> (or their equivalent) + addition and multiplication.  This emerged
>
> during discussion of macroscopic compositional principles implicit in
>
> the interpretation of micro-physical schemas; principles which are
>
> rarely understood as being epistemological in nature.  Hence, strictly
>
> speaking, even the ascription of the notion of computation to
>
> arrangements of these bare arithmetical elements assumes further
>
> compositional principles and therefore appeals to some supplementary
>
> epistemological "interpretation".
>
>
> In other words, any bare ontological schema, uninterpreted, is unable,
>
> from its own unsupplemented resources, to actualise whatever
>
> higher-level emergents may be implicit within it.  But what else could
>
> deliver that interpretation/actualisation?  What could embody the
>
> collapse of ontology and epistemology into a single actuality?  Could
>
> it be that interpretation is finally revealed only in the "conscious
>
> merger" of these two polarities?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using
>
> only
>
> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary
>
> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number. All
>
> the
>
> "Bp " and "Dp" are pure arithmetical sentences. What cannot be defined
>
> is
>
> Bp
>
> & p, and we need to go out of the mind of the machine, and out of
>
> arithmetic, to provide the meaning, and machines can do that too. So,
>
> in
>
> arithmetic, you can find true statement about machine going outside of
>
> arithmetic. It is here that we have to be careful of not doing Searle's
>
> error of confusing levels, and that's why the epistemology internal in
>
> arithmetic can be bigger than arithmetic. Arithmetic itself does not
>
> "believe" in that epistemology, but it believes in numbers believing in
>
> them. Whatever you believe in will not been automatically believed by
>
> God,
>
> but God will always believe that you do believe in them.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>
>  You seem to not understand the role that the physical plays at all!
>
> This
>
> reminds me of an inversion of how most people cannot understand the
>
> way
>
> that
>
> math is "abstract" and have to work very hard to understand notions
>
> like
>
> "in
>
> principle a coffee cup is the same as a doughnut".
>
>
>
> On 1/14/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 13 Jan 2012, at 18:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>
> On 1/13/2012 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
>
> On 13 Jan 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>
> On 1/12/2012 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2012, at 19:35, acw wrote:
>
>
> On 1/11/2012 19:22, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> Hi,
>
>
> I have a question. Does not the Tennenbaum Theorem prevent the
>
> concept
>
> of first person plural from having a coherent meaning, since it seems
>
> to
>
> makes PA unique and singular? In other words, how can multiple copies
>
> of
>
> PA generate a plurality of first person since they would be an
>
> equivalence class. It seems to me that the concept of plurality of 1p
>
> requires a 3p to be coherent, but how does a 3p exist unless it is a
>
> 1p
>
> in the PA sense?
>
>
> Onward!
>
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
> My understanding of 1p plural is merely many 1p's sharing an apparent
>
> 3p
>
> world. That 3p world may or may not be globally coherent (it is most
>
> certainly locally coherent), and may or may not be computable,
>
> typically
>
> I
>
> imagine it as being locally computed by an infinity of TMs, from the
>
> 1p.
>
> At
>
> least one coherent 3p foundation exists as the UD, but that's
>
> something
>
> very
>
> different from the universe a structural realist would believe in
>
> (for
>
> example, 'this universe', or the MWI multiverse). So a coherent 3p
>
> foundation always exists, possibly an infinity of them. The parts (or
>
> even
>
> the whole) of the 3p foundation should be found within the UD.
>
>
> As for PA's consciousness, I don't know, maybe Bruno can say a lot
>
> more
>
> about this. My understanding of consciousness in Bruno's theory is
>
> that
>
> an
>
> OM(Observer Moment) corresponds to a Sigma-1 sentence.
>
>
>
> You can ascribe a sort of local consciousness to the person living,
>
> relatively to you, that Sigma_1 truth, but the person itself is
>
> really
>
> related to all the proofs (in Platonia) of that sentences (roughly
>
> speaking).
>
>
>
> OK, but that requires that I have a justification for a belief in
>
> Platonia.
>
> The closest that I can get to Platonia is something like the class of
>
> all
>
> verified proofs (which supervenes on some form of physical process.)
>
>
>
> You need just to believe that in the standard model of PA a sentence
>
> is
>
> true
>
> or false. I have not yet seen any book in math mentioning anything
>
> physical
>
> to define what that means.
>
> *All* math papers you cited assume no less.
>
>
>
>  I cannot understand how such an obvious concept is not understood,
>
> even
>
> the notion of universality assumes it. The point is that mathematical
>
> statements require some form of physicality to be known and
>
> communicated,
>
>
>
> OK. But they does not need phyicality to be just true. That's the
>
> point.
>
>
>
>  Surely, but the truthfulness of a mathematical statement is
>
> meaningless
>
> without the possibility of physical implementation. One cannot even
>
> know
>
> of
>
> it absent the possibility of the physical.
>
>
>
>
> it just is the case that the sentence, model, recursive algorithm,
>
> whatever
>
> concept, etc. is independent of any particular form of physical
>
> implementation but is not independent of all physical
>
> representations.
>
>
>
> Of course it is. When you reason in PA you don't use any axiom
>
> referring
>
> to
>
> physics. To say that you need a physical brain begs the question
>
> *and*
>
> is
>
> a
>
> level-of-reasoning error.
>
>
>
>  PA does need to have any axioms that refer to physics. The fact that
>
> PA
>
> is inferred from patterns of chalk on a chalk board or patterns of
>
> ink
>
> on
>
> a
>
> whiteboard or patterns of pixels on a computer monitor or patterns of
>
> scratches in the dust or ... is sufficient to establish the truth of
>
> what
>
> I
>
> am saying. If you remove the possibility of physical implementation
>
> you
>
> also
>
> remove the possibility of meaningfulness.
>
>
>
>
> We cannot completely abstract away the role played by the physical
>
> world.
>
>
>
> That's what we do in math.
>
>
>
>  Yes, but all the while the physical world is the substrate for our
>
> patterns without which there is meaninglessness.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I simply cannot see how Sigma_1 sentences can interface with each
>
> other
>
> such
>
> that one can "know" anything about another absent some form of
>
> physicality.
>
>
>
> The "interfaces" and the relative implementations are defined using
>
> addition
>
> and multiplication only, like in Gödel's original paper. Then UDA
>
> shows
>
> why
>
> physicality is an emergent pattern in the mind of number, and why it
>
> has
>
> to
>
> be like that if comp is true. AUDA shows how to make the derivation.
>
>
>
>  No, you have only proven that the idea that the physicalist idea
>
> that
>
> "mind is an epiphenomena" is false,
>
>
>
> No. I show that the physical reality is not an ontological reality,
>
> once
>
> we
>
> assume we are (even material) machine.
>
>
>
>  And I agree, the physical is not a primitive in the existential
>
> sense,
>
> but neither is the information. Idealism would have us believe that
>
> differences can somehow obtain without a means to make the
>
> distinction.
>
>
>
>
> i.e. that material monism is false.
>
>
>
> I insist everywhere that this is not what I showed. I show that all
>
> form
>
> of
>
> weak materialism is incompatible with mechanism. All. The monist one,
>
> the
>
> dualist one, etc.
>
>
>
>  How weak does materialism get when its primary quality is removed?
>
> This
>
> is a case of  "vanishing in the limit", something similar to the heap
>
> that
>
> vanishes when we remove the last grain.
>
>
>
>
>
> A proof that I understand and agree with.
>
>
>
> Clearly you did not. You even miss the enunciation of the result.
>
> Mechanism
>
> is incompatible with WEAK materialism, that is the idea that
>
> primitive
>
> matter exist, or the idea that physics is the fundamental science.
>
>
>
>  Can you not understand these words? How is materialism any weaker
>
> than
>
> the case of no material at all? My argument is that the possibility
>
> of
>
> physical implementation cannot be removed without removing the
>
> possibility
>
> of meaningfulness. It is not an argument for a primitive ontological
>
> status
>
> for matter. You even seem to follow this reasoning when I ask you
>
> where
>
> does
>
> the computation occur then there is not paper tape for the TM and you
>
> say
>
> "on the walls of Platonia".
>
>
>
>
> Your arguments and discussions in support of ideal monism and,
>
>
>
> I prove that ideal monism is the only option, once you believe that
>
> consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitution done
>
> at
>
> some
>
> level.
>
>
>
>  No, you did not. Your result cannot do such a thing because you
>
> cannot
>
> have your cake (a meaningful set of expressions) and eat it too.
>
> Digital
>
> functional substitution is the substitution of one physical
>
> implementation
>
> for another, it shows that the fact of universality does not depend
>
> on
>
> any
>
> particular physical implementation but DOES NOT eliminate the need
>
> for
>
> at
>
> least one form of physical implementation. Digital substitutability
>
> is
>
> an
>
> invariance over the class of physical implementations, but what
>
> happens
>
> then
>
> you remove all members of a class? It vanishes!
>
>
>
>
>
> like Berkeley's, still fail because while the physical is not
>
> primitive,
>
> it
>
> is not merely the epiphenomena of the mind either.
>
>
>
> It has to be by the UDA.
>
>
>
>  And the UDA (like the UD) must have some implementation, even though
>
> the
>
> particulars of that implementation are irrelevant.
>
>
>
> You are perhaps confused by the fact that unlike the physical, ideas
>
> can
>
> represent themselves.
>
>
>
> I believe that comp makes the "physical" into an aspect of number's
>
> self-reference.
>
>
>
>  There we agree but I would say that a number's self-reference is its
>
> connection to some physical representation. My point is that there
>
> cannot
>
> be
>
> a self-reference without an implementation even if the particulars of
>
> the
>
> implementation do not matter.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If I take away all forms of physical means of communicating ideas, no
>
> chalkboards, paper, computer screens, etc., how can ideas be possibly
>
> communicated?
>
>
>
> Because arithmetical truth contains all machine 'dreams", including
>
> dreams
>
> of chalkboards, papers, screens, etc. UDA has shown that a "real
>
> paper",
>
> or
>
> & "real screen" is an emergent stable pattern supervening on
>
> infinities
>
> of
>
> computation, through a competition between all universal numbers
>
> occurring
>
> below our substitution level. You might try to tell me where in the
>
> proof
>
> you lost the arguement.
>
>
>
>  When these "infinities of computations" are taken to have specific
>
> properties merely because of their existence. You are conflating
>
> existence
>
> with property definiteness. Most people have this problem.
>
>
>
> This does not make sense. I assume not just O, s(0), etc. I assume
>
> also
>
> addition and multiplication. That's enough to get the properties.
>
>
>
>  There is an "I" in that statement! What is this "I"? What is its
>
> function? What class is it an invariant upon? Exactly how is it that
>
> you
>
> know of these properties? Absent the possibility of some form of
>
> implementation in the physical, there is no distinction between you
>
> and
>
> anything. Meaning requires distinction. Some even say that meaning
>
> *is*
>
> distinction. What other than the persistence of pattern that the
>
> physical
>
> offers acts to allow for the ability to know differences?
>
>
>
>
>
> Mere existence does not specify properties.
>
>
>
> That's not correct. We can explain the property "being prime" from
>
> the
>
> mere
>
> existence of 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition
>
> and
>
> multiplication.
>
>
>
>
>  No, existence does not specify anything, much less that "0, s(0),
>
> s(s(0)), ..." is distinct from any other string, nor does it specify
>
> the
>
> laws of addition or multiplication. Existence is not a property that
>
> an
>
> object has.
>
>
>
> Exactly. that's the point. You seem to contradict it.
>
>
>
>  But existence is thus independent of properties and thus
>
> distinctions.
>
> So your claim that " "being prime" from the mere existence of 0,
>
> s(0),
>
> s(s(0)), ... and the recursive laws of addition and multiplication"
>
> requires
>
> a substrate that allows form representative patterns to obtain.
>
> Universality
>
> allows us to substitute one form of substrate for another so long as
>
> the
>
> function is the same. But universality and existence alone are
>
> insufficient
>
> for your claim that "I prove that ideal monism is the only option".
>
> You
>
> also
>
> have to show how the properties are both definite and invariant. This
>
> requires implementation in a form that is invariant (to some degree)
>
> with
>
> respect to time. There is not time in Platonia therefore there in no
>
> invariance with respect to time for the patterns of difference to
>
> occur
>
> for
>
> implementation to be said to obtain.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You need to study the "problem of universals" in philosophy, it is
>
> well
>
> known and has been debated for even thousands of years. For example
>
> see
>
> 1
>
> or
>
> 2.
>
>
>
> This is a red herring.
>
>
>
>  In a way, surely, but the essence of the problem is not. The paper
>
> that
>
> is reference 1 explains this well.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I go so far as considering that the wavefunction and its unitary
>
> evolution
>
> exists and it is a sufficiently universal "physical" process to
>
> implement
>
> the UD, but the UD as just the equivalent to Integers, nay, that I
>
> cannot
>
> believe in. “One cannot speak about whatever one cannot talk.” ~
>
> Maturana
>
> (1978, p. 49)
>
>
>
> I think Maturana was alluding to Wittgenstein, and that sentence is
>
> almost
>
> as ridiculous as Damascius saying "one sentence about the ineffable
>
> is
>
> one
>
> sentence too much". But it is a deep meta-truth playing some role in
>
> number's theology.
>
>
>
>  OK, I deeply appreciate your erudition, you are much more educated
>
> than
>
> I am, but nevertheless, I submit to you that you cannot just ignore
>
> the
>
> universals vs. nominal problem and posit by fiat that just because
>
> one
>
> can
>
> proof the truth of some statement that that statement's existence
>
> determines
>
> its properties. Our ability to communicate ideas follows from their
>
> universality, that they do not require *some particular* physical
>
> implementation, but that is not the same as requiring *no* physical
>
> implementation. You argue that *no* physical implementation is
>
> necessary;
>
> I
>
> disagree.
>
>
>
> It is the result of the proof. It is up to you to show the flaw, or
>
> to
>
> abandon comp.
>
>
>
>  The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than
>
> by
>
> invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter. What you
>
> seem
>
> to think is that mathematics can prove things to itself in a manner
>
> consistent with how I might be able to write out a set of symbols on
>
> your
>
> chalkboard that represent a proof of some theorem. You reject David
>
> Deutsch's discussion of how this is wrongheaded out of hand, that is
>
> unfortunate since it would greatly strengthen your case if you could
>
> show
>
> exactly where Deutsch is going wrong, if he is...
>
>
>
>
>
> But I think that you  cannot define the universal wave without
>
> postulating
>
> arithmetical realism. In fact real number+trigonometrical function is
>
> a
>
> stronger form of realism than arithmetical realism. Adding "physical"
>
> in
>
> front of it adds nothing but a magical notion of primary substance.
>
> Epistemologically it is a form of treachery, by UDA, it singles out a
>
> universal number and postulate it is real, when comp explains
>
> precisely
>
> that
>
> such a move cannot work.
>
>
>
>  I am allowing for realism, it is a belief that may be true, but it
>
> is
>
> not a unique singleton in the universe of models. I am arguing
>
> against
>
> the
>
> idea that the physical is primitive, against substantivalism
>
> especially
>
> as
>
> it is occurring in physics, for example see:
>
> www.dur.ac.uk/nick.zangwill/Haeccieties.doc or 4.
>
>  In physics there is a huge debate over the haecceity of space-time
>
> and
>
> your result is important in this, but your attempt to argue from the
>
> other
>
> side is as treacherous because it ignores the necessity of the
>
> physical.
>
>
>
> Comp makes necessary that there is no *primitive* physicalness. But
>
> as
>
> David
>
> points in his reply, you cannot say that I ignore the physical. The
>
> whole
>
> work is an explanation of why we believe in the physical, why and how
>
> such
>
> belief emerges and are persistent, etc. Physics is entirely given by
>
> the
>
> material hypostases, which are defined by number's self-reference, as
>
> UDA
>
> shows it to be the case necessarily so.
>
>
>
>  This is insufficient. Merely postulating a property does not make it
>
> so.
>
> You continued intransigence on the non-existence of the physical
>
> world
>
> with
>
> statements that is shown to not be primitive is an avoidance of the
>
> problem
>
> by ignoring it, not a solution to it. The fact that is removing all
>
> possibility of physical implementation by a theory of Everything
>
> makes
>
> it
>
> worse than mute, it eliminates itself as a meaningful theory simply
>
> because,
>
> to be consistent, it cannot be communicated.
>
>
> Onward!
>
>
> Stephen
>
>
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