On 24 Jan 2012, at 13:23, ronaldheld wrote:

Since there was a thread on Turing:arXiv:1201.4504v1 [math.LO]
Here is the abstract:

We discuss historical attempts to formulate a physical hypothesis from
which Turing’s thesis may be derived, and also discuss some related
at-
tempts to establish the computability of mathematical models in
physics.
We show that these attempts are all related to a single, unified
hypothesis.

comments?

The author asks if Turing’s Thesis is the Consequence of a More General Physical Principle. So he is unaware of the (comp) mind body problem. It is still a defense of the digital physics thesis, which is non sensical as it should be quasi-obvious for anyone understanding the first person indeterminacy and its main invariance properties. You might ask question if this is not yet clear for you.

The opposite thesis is more plausible: the physical principles are a consequence of the Turing thesis. And that is good because the Turing thesis (Church thesis) is more solid on both empiric and conceptual grounds than any primary-physical thesis, which ask for fuzzy strong ontological commitment. Also, the opposite thesis provides perhaps the first rational explanation where the beliefs in the physical laws and the apparent material worlds come from, without assuming a physical reality, nor ad hoc implicit identity theses.

So it looks like one more failed attempt to save Aristotle theology, physicalism and naturalism.

Note that I am open that Turing thesis is a consequence of a deeper thesis, notably of the thesis of the existence and uniqueness of the standard model of Peano Arithmetic, but that intuition is hard to make precise, and might be using comp at some level (which would make the argument circular).

Thanks for the link.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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