>Arithmetic itself can admit many interpretation and axioms tell you what
'>arithmetic' isn't and what theorems must follow, not what it is
I don't see that. I mean, sure you can't say what a number 'is' beyond
a certain point, but everything falters on a certain circularity at
some point. With maths we don't have to ask what it is beyond what it
is defined as being, and my argument is that adding qualia into it is
adding something outside its own internal logic, when maths is, purely
and entirely, exactly that logic.
>can you explain to me what a number is without appealing to a model or
Can you explain what anything is, indeed can you speak or think at all
without appealing to a model or interpretation?
> Attributing consciousness to
>(undefinable) arithmetical truth appears to me like a better theory than
>attributing it to some uncomputable God-of-the-gaps physical magic
I associate the term 'god of the gaps' with theological arguments
based on incomplete scientific theories/knowledge. We aren't arguing
about God but about consciousness. Also, there's an ambiguity to what
you mean by 'uncomputable' here. We are talking about qualia which one
can't describe as uncomputable in a mathematical sense, but perhaps
better as 'unmathematical', not subject to mathematical treatment at
all. Qualia are 'uncomputable' in this sense also in an arithmetical
ontology in that nobody could ever 'predict' a quale, just as nobody
can ever describe one, except by fallible analogies. As for the
'magic' in the physics, the magic is *somewhere*, like it or not.
There is no explanation in mathematics for why numbers should have a
quality of feeling built into them. I don't like material
epiphenomenalism either, and increasingly I am finding Bruno's movie
graph argument convincing, but more as an argument against comp than
as proof that mind is a property of arithmetic.
>although some philosophers do just that (like Dennett),
Jaron Lanier argues (jokingly) in 'You are not a gadget' that you can
only tell zombies by their philosophy, and that clearly therefore
Dennet is a philosophical zombie...
>and that you admit a digital substitution
Yep, I think that's where the philosophical rot begins. The assumption
is that the consciousness is inside the circuits - be it their logical
or their physical arrangement. Near death experiences are an argument
against that proposition. (I say that knowing full well I'm about to
get stomped by the materialists for it.) Another thought that makes me
wonder about computationalism is the experience of pure consciousness
that many people in deep meditation have reported - a state of mind
without computation, if real, would constitute an experiential
refutation of comp. I have experienced something like this myself,
alas not as a result of years of meditation, but when I passed out at
the chemist with the flu while waiting for a prescription! It was so
terribly disappointing to return to the 'thousand shocks that flesh is
heir to'. This does not make me a secret or not-so-secret theist BTW.
Unfortunately that whole ridiculously simplistic debate has blinded
us to the infinite possible ways the world might be in between having
been created by a guy with a beard and being a meaningless tornado of
particles of stuff.
On Jan 26, 11:08 pm, acw <a...@lavabit.com> wrote:
> On 1/26/2012 08:19, Pierz wrote:
> > As I continue to ponder the UDA, I keep coming back to a niggling
> > doubt that an arithmetical ontology can ever really give a
> > satisfactory explanation of qualia. It seems to me that imputing
> > qualia to calculations (indeed consciousness at all, thought that may
> > be the same thing) adds something that is not given by, or derivable
> > from, any mathematical axiom. Surely this is illegitimate from a
> > mathematical point of view. Every mathematical statement can only be
> > made in terms of numbers and operators, so to talk about *qualities*
> > arising out of numbers is not mathematics so much as numerology or
> > qabbala.
> > Here of course is where people start to invoke the wonderfully protean
> > notion of emergent properties . Perhaps qualia emerge when a
> > calculation becomes deep enough.Perhaps consciousness emerges from a
> > complicated enough arrangement of neurons. But I ll venture an axiom
> > of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
> > are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
> > is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent
> > property of pumping blood arises out of collections of heart cells,
> > that property is a logical extension of the properties of the parts -
> > physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity,
> > volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody
> > invoking emergent properties to explain consciousness in the brain
> > has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of
> > the known properties of brain cells - or indeed of matter at all.
> > In the same way, I can t see how qualia can emerge from arithmetic,
> > unless the rudiments of qualia are present in the natural numbers or
> > the operations of addition and mutiplication. And yet it seems to me
> > they can t be, because the only properties that belong to arithmetic
> > are those leant to them by the axioms that define them. Indeed
> > arithmetic *is* exactly those axioms and nothing more. Matter may in
> > principle contain untold, undiscovered mysterious properties which I
> > suppose might include the rudiments of consciousness. Yet mathematics
> > is only what it is defined to be. Certainly it contains many mysteries
> > emergent properties, but all these properties arise logically from its
> > axioms and thus cannot include qualia.
> > I call the idea that it can numerology because numerology also
> > ascribes qualities to numbers. A 2 in one s birthdate indicates
> > creativity (or something), a 4 material ambition and so on. Because
> > the emergent properties of numbers can indeed be deeply amazing and
> > wonderful - Mandelbrot sets and so on - there is a natural human
> > tendency to mystify them, to project properties of the imagination
> > into them. But if these qualities really do inhere in numbers and are
> > not put there purely by our projection, then numbers must be more than
> > their definitions. We must posit the numbers as something that
> > projects out of a supraordinate reality that is not purely
> > mathematical - ie, not merely composed of the axioms that define an
> > arithmetic. This then can no longer be described as a mathematical
> > ontology, but rather a kind of numerical mysticism. And because
> > something extrinsic to the axioms has been added, it opens the way for
> > all kinds of other unicorns and fairies that can never be proved from
> > the maths alone. This is unprovability not of the mathematical
> > variety, but more of the variety that cries out for Mr Occam s shaving
> > apparatus.
> Why would any structure give rise to qualia? We think some structure
> (for example our brain, or the abstract computation or arithmetical
> truth/structure representing it) does and we communicate it to others in
> a "3p" way. The options here are to either say qualia exists and our
> internal beliefs (which also have 'physical' correlates) are correct, or
> that it doesn't and we're all delusional, although in the second case,
> the belief is self-defeating because the 3p world is inferred through
> the 1p view. It makes logical sense that a structure which has such
> beliefs as ourselves could have the same qualia (or a digital
> substitution of our brain), but this is *unprovable*.
> If you don't eliminate qualia away, do you think the principle described
> here makes sense?http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
> If we don't attribute consciousness to some structures or just 'how a
> computation feels from the inside' then we're forced to believe that
> consciousness is a very fickle thing.
> As for arithmetic/numbers - Peano Arithmetic is strong enough to
> describe computation which is enough to describe just about any finite
> structure/process (although potentially unbounded in time) and our own
> thought processes are such processes if neuroscience is to be believed.
> Arithmetic itself can admit many interpretation and axioms tell you what
> 'arithmetic' isn't and what theorems must follow, not what it is - can
> you explain to me what a number is without appealing to a model or
> interpretation? Arithmetical realism merely states that arithmetical
> propositions have a truth value, or that the standard model of
> arithmetic exists.
> If you think that isn't enough, I don't see what else could be enough
> without positing some form of magic in the physics, but that forces us
> to believe consciousness is very fickle. Attributing consciousness to
> (undefinable) arithmetical truth appears to me like a better theory than
> attributing it to some uncomputable God-of-the-gaps physical magic , if
> one has to believe in consciousness (as a side note, the set of
> arithmetical truths is also uncomputable and undefinable within
> arithmetic itself). If you must use Occam, the only thing that you can
> shave would be your own consciousness, which I think is overreaching,
> although some philosophers do just that (like Dennett), if you use Occam
> and accept consciousness and that you admit a digital substitution, an
> arithmetical ontology is one of the simplest solutions.
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