On Jan 27, 12:20 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >> As for 'the universe', in COMP - the universe is a matter of > >> epistemology (machine's beliefs), and all that is, is just > >> arithmetical > >> truth reflecting on itself (so with a very relaxed definition of > >> 'universe', there's really nothing that isn't part of it; but with > >> the > >> classical definition, it's not something ontologically primitive, > >> but an > >> emergent shared belief). > > > Right. All I'm doing is taking it a step further and saying that the > > belief is not emergent, but rather ontologically primitive. Arithmetic > > truth is a sensemaking experience, but sensemaking experiences are not > > all arithmetic. > > But many things about numbers are not arithmetical. Arithmetical truth > is not arithmetical. Machine's knowledge can be proved to be non > arithmetical. > If you want, arithmetic is enough rich for having a bigger reality > than anything we can describe in 3p terms.
But all arithmetic truths, knowledge, beliefs, etc are all still sensemaking experiences. It doesn't matter whether they are arithmetic or not, as long as they can possibly be detected or made sense of in any way, even by inference, deduction, emergence, etc, they are still sense. Not all sense is arithmetic or related to arithmetic in some way though. Sense can be gestural or intuitive. > > > There is nothing in the universe > > The term universe is ambiguous. Only in theory. I use it in a literal, absolutist way. > > > My hypothesis explains why that is the case. Comp is too stupid not to > > prove itself. The joke is on us if we believe that our lives are not > > real but numbers are. This is survival 101. It's an IQ test. If we > > privilege our mechanistic, testable, solid, logical sense over our > > natural, solipsistic, anthropic sense, then we will become more and > > more insignificant, and Dennet's denial of subjectivity will draw > > closer and closer to self-fulfilling prophesy. The thing about > > authentic subjectivity, it is has a choice. We don't have to believe > > in indirect proof about ourselves because our direct experience is all > > the proof anyone could ever have or need. We are already real, we > > don't need some electronic caliper to tell us how real. > > You confuse proving p, which can be explained in arithmetic, and > "proving p & p is true", which can happen to be true for a machine, > but escapes necessarily its language. > The same for consciousness. It cannot be explained in *any* third > person terms. But it can be proved that self-observing machine cannot > avoid the discovery of many things concerning them which are beyond > language. I think that are confusing p with a reality rather than a logical idea about reality. I have no reason to believe that a machine can observe itself in anything more than a trivial sense. It is not a conscious experience, I would guess that it is something like an accounting of unaccounted-for function terminations. Proximal boundaries. A silhouette of the self offering no interiority but an extrapolation of incomplete 3p data. That isn't consciousness. > > > "But I’ll venture an axiom > > of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that > > are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There > > is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent > > property of ‘pumping blood’ arises out of collections of heart cells, > > that property is a logical extension of the properties of the parts - > > physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity, > > volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody > > invoking ‘emergent properties’ to explain consciousness in the brain > > has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of > > the known properties of brain cells - or indeed of matter at all. " > > Pierz, Craig, I disagree. Consciousness can be explained as a non 3p > describable fixed point when machine's observe themselves. This > provides a key role to consciousness, including the ability to develop > meanings, to speed decisions, to make decision in absence of > information, etc. I disagree. It provides a key role to the function of agency but it has nothing to do with consciousness and qualia per se. A sleep walker can navigate to the kitchen for a snack without being conscious. Consciousness does nothing to speed decisions, it would only cost processing overhead and add nothing to the efficiency of unconscious adaptation. > Consciousness is not explainable in term of any parts of something, > but as an invariant in universal self-transformation. > If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, then Peano Arithmetic > is already conscious. Why and how does universal self-transformation equate to consciousness? Anything that is conscious can also be unconscious. Can Peano Arithmetic be unconscious too? > > > > >>> My solution is that both views are correct on their own terms in > >>> their > >>> own sense and that we should not arbitrarily privilege one view over > >>> the other. Our vision is human vision. It is based on retina vision, > >>> which is based on cellular and molecular visual sense. It is not > >>> just > >>> a mechanism which pushes information around from one place to > >>> another, > >>> each place is a living organism which actively contributes to the > >>> top > >>> level experience - it isn't a passive system. > > >> Living organisms - replicators, > > > Life replicates, but replication does not define life. Living > > organisms feel alive and avoid death. Replication does not necessitate > > feeling alive. > > I am OK with this. Yet, replication + while-loop might be enough. Should we mourn the untying of our shoelaces each time? > > > > >> are fine things, but I don't see why > >> must one confuse replicators with perception. Perception can exist by > >> itself merely on the virtue of passing information around and > >> processing > >> it. Replicators can also exist due similar reasons, but on a > >> different > >> level. > > > Perception has never existed 'by itself'. Perception only occurs in > > living organisms who are informed by their experience. > > The whole point is to explain terms like "living", "conscious", etc. > You take them as primitive, so are escaping the issue. They aren't primitive, the symmetry is primitive. > > > There is no > > independent disembodied 'information' out there. There detection and > > response, sense and motive of physical wholes. > > Same for "physical" (and that's not obvious!). Do you doubt that if all life were exterminated that planets would still exist? Where would information be though? > > > > >>>> Neurons are also rather slow, they can only > >>>> spike about once per 5ms (~200Hz), although they rarely do so > >>>> often. > >>>> (Note that I'm not saying that conscious experience is only the > >>>> current > >>>> brain state in a single universe with only one timeline and nothing > >>>> more, in COMP, the (infinite amount of) counterfactuals are also > >>>> important, for example for selecting the next state, or for > >>>> "splits" and > >>>> "mergers"). > > >>> Yes, organisms are slower than electronic measuring instruments, but > >>> it doesn't matter because our universe is not an electronic > >>> measuring > >>> instrument. It makes sense to us just fine at it's native anthropic > >>> rate of change (except for the technologies we have designed to > >>> defeat > >>> that sense). > > >> Sure, the speed is not the most important thing, except when it > >> leads to > >> us wanting some things to be faster and with our current biological > >> bodies, we cannot make them go faster or slower, we can only build > >> faster and faster devices, but we'll eventually hit the limit (we're > >> nearly there already). With COMP, this is even a greater problem > >> locally: if you get a digital brain (sometime in the not too near > >> future) > > > Sorry, but I think it's never going to happen. Consciousness is not > > digital. > > If you survive with a digital brain, then consciousness is necessarily > not digital. > A brain is not a maker of consciousness. It is only a stable pattern > making it possible (or more probable) that a person can manifest > itself relatively to some universal number(s). Why not just use adipose tissue instead? That's a more stable pattern. Why have a vulnerable concentration of this pattern in the head? Our skeleton would make a much safer place four a person to manifest itself relatively to some universal number. > Keep in mind that comp makes materialism wrong. That's not why it's wrong. I have no problem with materialism being wrong, I have a problem with experience being reduced to non experience or non sense. > The big picture is > completely different. I think that you confuse comp, with its > Aristotelian version where computations seems to be incarnated by > physical primitive materials. Comp + materialism leads to person- > nihilism, so it is important to understand that comp should not be > assumed together with materialism (even weak). I don't think that I am confusing it. Comp is perfectly illustrated as modern investment banking. There is no material, in fact it strangles the life out of all materials, eviscerating culture and architecture, all in the name of consolidating digitally abstracted control of control. This is machine intelligence. The idea of unexperienced ownership as an end unto itself, forever concentrating data and exporting debt. > > > > >> , some neuromorphic hardware is predicted to be a few orders of > >> magnitude faster(such as some 1000-4000 times our current rate), > >> which > >> would mean that if someone wanted to function at realtime speed, they > >> might experience some insanely slow Internet speeds, for anything > >> that > >> isn't locally accessible (for example, between US and Europe or > >> Asia), > >> which mind lead to certain negative social effects (such as groups of > >> SIMs(Substrate Independent Minds) that prefer running at realtime > >> speed > >> congregating and locally accessible hubs as opposed to the much > >> slower > >> Internet). However, such a problem is only locally relevant (here in > >> this Universe, on this Earth), and is solvable if one is fine with > >> slowing themselves down relatively to some other program, and a > >> system > >> can be designed which allows unbounded speedup (I did write more on > >> this > >> in my other thread). > > > We are able to extend and augment our neurological capacities (we > > already are) with neuromorphic devices, but ultimately we need our own > > brain tissue to live in. > > Why? What does that mean? It means that without our brain, there is no we. We cannot be simulated anymore than water or fire can be simulated. Human consciousness exists nowhere but through a human brain. > > > We, unfortunately cannot be digitized, > > You don't know that. But you don't derive it either from what you > assume (which to be franc remains unclear) I do derive it, because the brain and the self are two parts of a whole. You cannot export the selfness into another form, because the self has no form, it's only experiential content through the interior of a living brain. > . > I think that you have a reductionist conception of machine, which was > perhaps defensible before Gödel 1931 and Turing discovery of the > universal machine, but is no more defensible after. I know that you think that, but you don't take into account that I started with with that. I read Gödel, Escher, Bach around 1980 I think. Even though I couldn't get too much into the math, I was quite happy with the implications of it. For the next 25 years I believed that the universe was made of 'patterns' - pretty close to what your view is. It's only been in the last 7 years that I have found a better idea. My hypothesis is post-Gödelian symmetry. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. 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