On Jan 28, 8:03 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 28 Jan 2012, at 02:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Jan 27, 12:20 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> But many things about numbers are not arithmetical. Arithmetical
> >> truth
> >> is not arithmetical. Machine's knowledge can be proved to be non
> >> arithmetical.
> >> If you want, arithmetic is enough rich for having a bigger reality
> >> than anything we can describe in 3p terms.
> > But all arithmetic truths, knowledge, beliefs, etc are all still
> > sensemaking experiences. It doesn't matter whether they are arithmetic
> > or not, as long as they can possibly be detected or made sense of in
> > any way, even by inference, deduction, emergence, etc, they are still
> > sense. Not all sense is arithmetic or related to arithmetic in some
> > way though. Sense can be gestural or intuitive.
> That might be possible. But gesture and intuition can occur in
> relative computations.

How do you know that they 'occur' in the computations rather than in
the eye of the beholder of the computations?

> >>> There is nothing in the universe
> >> The term universe is ambiguous.
> > Only in theory. I use it in a literal, absolutist way.
> This does not help to understand what you mean by "universe".

Universe means 'all that is' in every context.

> >> You confuse proving p, which can be explained in arithmetic, and
> >> "proving p & p is true", which can happen to be true for a machine,
> >> but escapes necessarily its language.
> >> The same for consciousness. It cannot be explained in *any* third
> >> person terms. But it can be proved that self-observing machine cannot
> >> avoid the discovery of many things concerning them which are beyond
> >> language.
> > I think that are confusing p with a reality rather than a logical idea
> > about reality.
> p refers to reality by definition. "p" alone is for "it is the case
> that p".

But it isn't the case, it's the idea of it being the case. You're just
saying 'Let p ='. It doesn't mean proposition that has any causal

> > I have no reason to believe that a machine can observe
> > itself in anything more than a trivial sense.
> It needs a diagonalization. It can't be completely trivial.

Something is aware of something, but it's just electronic components
or bricks on springs or whatever being aware of the low level physical

> > It is not a conscious
> > experience, I would guess that it is something like an accounting of
> > unaccounted-for function terminations. Proximal boundaries. A
> > silhouette of the self offering no interiority but an extrapolation of
> > incomplete 3p data. That isn't consciousness.
> Consciousness is not just self-reference. It is true self-reference.
> It belongs to the intersection of truth and self-reference.

It's more than that too though. Many senses can be derived from
consciousness, true self-reference is neither necessary nor
sufficient. I think that the big deal about consciousness is not that
it has true self-reference but that it is able to care about itself
its world that a non-trivial, open ended, and creative way. We can
watch a movie or have a dream and lose self-awareness without being
unconscious. Deep consciousness is often characterized by
unselfconscious awareness.

> >>> "But I’ll venture an axiom
> >>> of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
> >>> are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
> >>> is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent
> >>> property of ‘pumping blood’ arises out of collections of heart
> >>> cells,
> >>> that property is a logical extension of the properties of the
> >>> parts -
> >>> physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity,
> >>> volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody
> >>> invoking ‘emergent properties’ to explain consciousness in the brain
> >>> has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of
> >>> the known properties of brain cells  - or indeed of matter at all. "
> >> Pierz, Craig, I disagree. Consciousness can be explained as a non 3p
> >> describable fixed point when machine's observe themselves. This
> >> provides a key role to consciousness, including the ability to
> >> develop
> >> meanings, to speed decisions, to make decision in absence of
> >> information, etc.
> > I disagree. It provides a key role to the function of agency but it
> > has nothing to do with consciousness and qualia per se. A sleep walker
> > can navigate to the kitchen for a snack without being conscious.
> Yes. But everyday life is more complex than looking for a snack.

Not as complex as doing what the immune system does.

> > Consciousness does nothing to speed decisions, it would only cost
> > processing overhead
> That's why high animals have larger cortex.

Their decisions are no faster than simpler animals.

> > and add nothing to the efficiency of unconscious
> > adaptation.
> So, why do you think we are conscious?

I think that humans have developed a greater sensorimotive capacity as
a virtuous cycle of evolutionary circumstance and subjective
investment. Just as hardware development drives software development
and vice versa. It's not that we are conscious as opposed to
unconscious, it's that our awareness is hypertrophied from particular
animal motives being supported by the environment and we have
transformed our environment to enable our motives. Our seemingly
unique category of consciousness can either be anthropic prejudice or
objective fact, but either way it exists in a context of many other
kinds of awareness. The question is not why we are conscious, it is
why is consciousness possible and/or why are we human. To the former,
the possibility is primordial, and the latter is a matter of
probability and intentional efforts.

> >> Consciousness is not explainable in term of any parts of something,
> >> but as an invariant in universal self-transformation.
> >> If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, then Peano
> >> Arithmetic
> >> is already conscious.
> > Why and how does universal self-transformation equate to
> > consciousness?
> I did not say that. I said that consciousness is a fixed point for a
> very peculiar form of self-transformation.

what makes it peculiar?

> > Anything that is conscious can also be unconscious. Can
> > Peano Arithmetic be unconscious too?
> Yes. That's possible if you accept that consciousness is a logical
> descendent of consistency.

Aren't the moons of Saturn consistent? Will consciousness logically
descend from their consistency?

> It follows then from the fact that
> consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency (Gödel II). Of
> course, the reality is more complex, for consciousness is only
> approximated by the instinctive unconscious) inductive inference of
> self-consistency.

You need some kind of awareness to begin with to tell the difference
between consistency and inconsistency.

> >>>>> My solution is that both views are correct on their own terms in
> >>>>> their
> >>>>> own sense and that we should not arbitrarily privilege one view
> >>>>> over
> >>>>> the other. Our vision is human vision. It is based on retina
> >>>>> vision,
> >>>>> which is based on cellular and molecular visual sense. It is not
> >>>>> just
> >>>>> a mechanism which pushes information around from one place to
> >>>>> another,
> >>>>> each place is a living organism which actively contributes to the
> >>>>> top
> >>>>> level experience - it isn't a passive system.
> >>>> Living organisms - replicators,
> >>> Life replicates, but replication does not define life. Living
> >>> organisms feel alive and avoid death. Replication does not
> >>> necessitate
> >>> feeling alive.
> >> I am OK with this. Yet, replication + while-loop might be enough.
> > Should we mourn the untying of our shoelaces each time?
> ?

If we tie and untie our shoes many times, we replicate the knot
pattern and have a loop while it is tied within which subroutines of
changes to the laces occur with walking.

> >>>> are fine things, but I don't see why
> >>>> must one confuse replicators with perception. Perception can
> >>>> exist by
> >>>> itself merely on the virtue of passing information around and
> >>>> processing
> >>>> it. Replicators can also exist due similar reasons, but on a
> >>>> different
> >>>> level.
> >>> Perception has never existed 'by itself'. Perception only occurs in
> >>> living organisms who are informed by their experience.
> >> The whole point is to explain terms like "living", "conscious", etc.
> >> You take them as primitive, so are escaping the issue.
> > They aren't primitive, the symmetry is primitive.
> ?

Conscious and unconscious are aspects of the inherent subject-object
symmetry of the universe.

> >>> There is no
> >>> independent disembodied 'information' out there. There detection and
> >>> response, sense and motive of physical wholes.
> >> Same for "physical" (and that's not obvious!).
> > Do you doubt that if all life were exterminated that planets would
> > still exist? Where would information be though?
> In the arithmetical relation, which truth are independent of me.
> (I indulge in answering by staying in the frame of my working
> hypothesis without repeating this).

Why isn't arithmetic truth physical?

> >>> Sorry, but I think it's never going to happen. Consciousness is not
> >>> digital.
> >> If you survive with a digital brain, then consciousness is
> >> necessarily
> >> not digital.
> >> A brain is not a maker of consciousness. It is only a stable pattern
> >> making it possible (or more probable) that a person can manifest
> >> itself relatively to some universal number(s).
> > Why not just use adipose tissue instead? That's a more stable pattern.
> > Why have a vulnerable concentration of this pattern in the head? Our
> > skeleton would make a much safer place four a person to manifest
> > itself relatively to some universal number.
> Write a letter to nature for geographical reclamation.

Funny but avoiding a serious problem of comp. Why not have some
creatures with smart skulls or shells and stupid soft parts inside? It
seems to be a strong indicator of material properties consistently
determining mechanism and not the other way around.

> >> Keep in mind that comp makes materialism wrong.
> > That's not why it's wrong. I have no problem with materialism being
> > wrong, I have a problem with experience being reduced to non
> > experience or non sense.
> This does not happen in comp. On the contrary machines can already
> explain why that does not happen. Of course you need to believe that
> arithmetical truth makes sense. But your posts illustrate that you do.

Arithmetical truth does make sense, definitely, but so do other kinds
of experiences make sense and are not arithmetic truths.

> >> The big picture is
> >> completely different. I think that you confuse comp, with its
> >> Aristotelian version where computations seems to be incarnated by
> >> physical primitive materials. Comp + materialism leads to person-
> >> nihilism, so it is important to understand that comp should not be
> >> assumed together with materialism (even weak).
> > I don't think that I am confusing it. Comp is perfectly illustrated as
> > modern investment banking. There is no material, in fact it strangles
> > the life out of all materials, eviscerating culture and architecture,
> > all in the name of consolidating digitally abstracted control of
> > control. This is machine intelligence. The idea of unexperienced
> > ownership as an end unto itself, forever concentrating data and
> > exporting debt.
> Only in your reductionist appraisal of comp. That is widespread and
> dangerous indeed, but you add to the grains of it, imo.

Investment banking is just an example, I'm not trying to reduce comp
to that, but the example is defensible. Investment banking is almost
pure comp, is it not? All of those Wall Street quants... where is the
theology and creativity?

> >>> We are able to extend and augment our neurological capacities (we
> >>> already are) with neuromorphic devices, but ultimately we need our
> >>> own
> >>> brain tissue to live in.
> >> Why? What does that mean?
> > It means that without our brain, there is no we.
> That's not correct.

What makes you think that?

> > We cannot be
> > simulated anymore than water or fire can be simulated.
> Why? That's a strong affirmation. We have not yet find a phenomenon in
> nature that cannot be simulated (except the collapse of the wave,
> which can still be Turing 1-person recoverable).

You can't water a real plant with simulated water or survive the
arctic burning virtual coal for heat. If you look at substitution
level in reverse, you will see that it's not a matter of making a
plastic plant that acts so real we can't tell the difference, it's a
description level which digitizes a description of a plant rather than
an actual plant. Nothing has been simulated, only imitated. The
difference is that an imitation only reminds us of what is being
imitated but a simulation carries the presumption of replacement.

> > Human
> > consciousness exists nowhere but through a human brain.
> Not at all. Brain is a construct of human consciousness, which has
> some local role.
> You are so much Aristotelian.

If you say that human consciousness exists independently of a human
brain, you have to give me an example of such a case.

> >>> We, unfortunately cannot be digitized,
> >> You don't know that. But you don't derive it either from what you
> >> assume (which to be franc remains unclear)
> > I do derive it, because the brain and the self are two parts of a
> > whole. You cannot export the selfness into another form, because the
> > self has no form, it's only experiential content through the interior
> > of a living brain.
> That's the 1-self, but it is just an interface between truth and
> relative bodies.

Truth is just an interface between all 1-self and all relative bodies.

> >> .
> >> I think that you have a reductionist conception of machine, which was
> >> perhaps defensible before Gödel 1931 and Turing discovery of the
> >> universal machine, but is no more defensible after.
> > I know that you think that, but you don't take into account that I
> > started with with that. I read Gödel, Escher, Bach around 1980 I
> > think. Even though I couldn't get too much into the math, I was quite
> > happy with the implications of it. For the next 25 years I believed
> > that the universe was made of 'patterns' - pretty close to what your
> > view is.
> Not really. The physical universe is not made of any patterns. Nor is
> it made of anything. It is a highly complex structure which appears in
> first person plural shared dreams.

That's what I'm saying. 'Structure' = pattern.

> You might, like many, confuse
> digital physics (which does not work) and comp.
> "I am a machine" makes it impossible for both my consciousness, and my
> material body to be Turing emulable.

But your material body is Turing emulable (or rather, Turing

> I agree that this is counter-
> intuitive, and that's why I propose a reasoning, and I prefer that
> people grasp the reasoning than pondering at infinitum on the results
> without doing the needed (finite) work.
> > It's only been in the last 7 years that I have found a better
> > idea. My hypothesis is post-Gödelian symmetry.
> You have to elaborate a lot. You should study first order logical
> language to be sure no trace of metaphysical implicit baggage is put
> in your theory; in case you want scientists trying to understand what
> you say.

My whole point is revealing a universe description in which logic and
direct experience coexist in many ways. Limiting it to logical
language defeats the purpose, although I would love to collaborate
with someone who was interested in formalizing the ideas. Logic is a
3p language - a mechanistic, involuntary form of reasoning which
denies the 1p subject any option but to accept it. The 1p experience
is exactly the opposite of that. It is a 'seems like' affair which
invites or discourages voluntary participation of the subject. Half of
the universe is made of this.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to