On Jan 27, 1:26 am, acw <a...@lavabit.com> wrote: > On 1/26/2012 15:28, Pierz wrote: > > > > >> Arithmetic itself can admit many interpretation and axioms tell you what > > '>arithmetic' isn't and what theorems must follow, not what it is > > > I don't see that. I mean, sure you can't say what a number 'is' beyond > > a certain point, but everything falters on a certain circularity at > > some point. With maths we don't have to ask what it is beyond what it > > is defined as being, and my argument is that adding qualia into it is > > adding something outside its own internal logic, when maths is, purely > > and entirely, exactly that logic. > > >> can you explain to me what a number is without appealing to a model or > >> interpretation? > > > Can you explain what anything is, indeed can you speak or think at all > > without appealing to a model or interpretation? > > >> Attributing consciousness to > >> (undefinable) arithmetical truth appears to me like a better theory than > >> attributing it to some uncomputable God-of-the-gaps physical magic > > > I associate the term 'god of the gaps' with theological arguments > > based on incomplete scientific theories/knowledge. We aren't arguing > > about God but about consciousness. Also, there's an ambiguity to what > > you mean by 'uncomputable' here. We are talking about qualia which one > > can't describe as uncomputable in a mathematical sense, but perhaps > > better as 'unmathematical', not subject to mathematical treatment at > > all. Qualia are 'uncomputable' in this sense also in an arithmetical > > ontology in that nobody could ever 'predict' a quale, just as nobody > > can ever describe one, except by fallible analogies. As for the > > 'magic' in the physics, the magic is *somewhere*, like it or not. > > There is no explanation in mathematics for why numbers should have a > > quality of feeling built into them. I don't like material > > epiphenomenalism either, and increasingly I am finding Bruno's movie > > graph argument convincing, but more as an argument against comp than > > as proof that mind is a property of arithmetic. > > >> although some philosophers do just that (like Dennett), > > > Jaron Lanier argues (jokingly) in 'You are not a gadget' that you can > > only tell zombies by their philosophy, and that clearly therefore > > Dennet is a philosophical zombie... > > >> and that you admit a digital substitution > > > Yep, I think that's where the philosophical rot begins. The assumption > > is that the consciousness is inside the circuits - be it their logical > > or their physical arrangement. Near death experiences are an argument > > against that proposition. (I say that knowing full well I'm about to > > get stomped by the materialists for it.) Another thought that makes me > > wonder about computationalism is the experience of pure consciousness > > that many people in deep meditation have reported - a state of mind > > without computation, if real, would constitute an experiential > > refutation of comp. I have experienced something like this myself, > > alas not as a result of years of meditation, but when I passed out at > > the chemist with the flu while waiting for a prescription! It was so > > terribly disappointing to return to the 'thousand shocks that flesh is > > heir to'. This does not make me a secret or not-so-secret theist BTW. > > Unfortunately that whole ridiculously simplistic debate has blinded > > us to the infinite possible ways the world might be in between having > > been created by a guy with a beard and being a meaningless tornado of > > particles of stuff. > > If qualia doesn't correspond to a structure's properties, then we should > observe inconsistencies between what we observed and what we do. Yet, we > don't observe any of that. Which is why consciousness/qualia/'what it's > like to be some structure' as internal truth makes sense to me. If you > reject having a digital substitution, you either have to appeal to the > brain having some concrete infinities in its implementation, or you have > to say that there are some inconsistencies. To put it in another way, > where in the piece-by-piece digital substitution thought experiment (the > one I linked) do you think consciousness or qualia changes? Does it > suddenly disappear when you replace one neuron? Is it's fading, yet the > behavior never changes while the person reports having vivid and > complete qualia)? What about those people with digital implants(for > example, for hearing), do you think they are now p.zombies? I'd rather > bet on what seems more likely to me, but you're free to bet on less > likely hypotheses. > > As for "Near Death Experiences" or various altered states of > consciousness, I don't see how that shows COMP wrong:
No, you're right. They're just evidence against comp+phys (at least some NDEs are). Pure consciousness with no process may however be evidence against comp, though I'm sure the point could be argued. > those people were > conscious during them. I would even say that altered states of > consciousness merely means that the class of possible experiences is > very large. I had a fairly vivid lucid dream last night, yet I don't > take that as proof against COMP, I take that as proof that conscious > experience can be quite varied, and the more unusual (as opposed to the > usual awake state) the state is, the more unusual the nature of the > qualia can be. If after drinking or ingesting some mind-altering > substance, you have some unusual qualia, I'd say that at least partially > points to your local brain's 'physical' (or arithmetical or > computational or ...) state being capable of being directly affected by > its environment - again, points towards functionalism of some form, not > against it. > > > On Jan 26, 11:08 pm, acw<a...@lavabit.com> wrote: > >> On 1/26/2012 08:19, Pierz wrote: > > >>> As I continue to ponder the UDA, I keep coming back to a niggling > >>> doubt that an arithmetical ontology can ever really give a > >>> satisfactory explanation of qualia. It seems to me that imputing > >>> qualia to calculations (indeed consciousness at all, thought that may > >>> be the same thing) adds something that is not given by, or derivable > >>> from, any mathematical axiom. Surely this is illegitimate from a > >>> mathematical point of view. Every mathematical statement can only be > >>> made in terms of numbers and operators, so to talk about *qualities* > >>> arising out of numbers is not mathematics so much as numerology or > >>> qabbala. > > >>> Here of course is where people start to invoke the wonderfully protean > >>> notion of emergent properties . Perhaps qualia emerge when a > >>> calculation becomes deep enough.Perhaps consciousness emerges from a > >>> complicated enough arrangement of neurons. But I ll venture an axiom > >>> of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that > >>> are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There > >>> is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent > >>> property of pumping blood arises out of collections of heart cells, > >>> that property is a logical extension of the properties of the parts - > >>> physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity, > >>> volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody > >>> invoking emergent properties to explain consciousness in the brain > >>> has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of > >>> the known properties of brain cells - or indeed of matter at all. > > >>> In the same way, I can t see how qualia can emerge from arithmetic, > >>> unless the rudiments of qualia are present in the natural numbers or > >>> the operations of addition and mutiplication. And yet it seems to me > >>> they can t be, because the only properties that belong to arithmetic > >>> are those leant to them by the axioms that define them. Indeed > >>> arithmetic *is* exactly those axioms and nothing more. Matter may in > >>> principle contain untold, undiscovered mysterious properties which I > >>> suppose might include the rudiments of consciousness. Yet mathematics > >>> is only what it is defined to be. Certainly it contains many mysteries > >>> emergent properties, but all these properties arise logically from its > >>> axioms and thus cannot include qualia. > > >>> I call the idea that it can numerology because numerology also > >>> ascribes qualities to numbers. A 2 in one s birthdate indicates > >>> creativity (or something), a 4 material ambition and so on. Because > >>> the emergent properties of numbers can indeed be deeply amazing and > >>> wonderful - Mandelbrot sets and so on - there is a natural human > >>> tendency to mystify them, to project properties of the imagination > >>> into them. But if these qualities really do inhere in numbers and are > >>> not put there purely by our projection, then numbers must be more than > >>> their definitions. We must posit the numbers as something that > >>> projects out of a supraordinate reality that is not purely > >>> mathematical - ie, not merely composed of the axioms that define an > >>> arithmetic. This then can no longer be described as a mathematical > >>> ontology, but rather a kind of numerical mysticism. And because > >>> something extrinsic to the axioms has been added, it opens the way for > >>> all kinds of other unicorns and fairies that can never be proved from > >>> the maths alone. This is unprovability not of the mathematical > >>> variety, but more of the variety that cries out for Mr Occam s shaving > >>> apparatus. > > >> Why would any structure give rise to qualia? We think some structure > >> (for example our brain, or the abstract computation or arithmetical > >> truth/structure representing it) does and we communicate it to others in > >> a "3p" way. The options here are to either say qualia exists and our > >> internal beliefs (which also have 'physical' correlates) are correct, or > >> that it doesn't and we're all delusional, although in the second case, > >> the belief is self-defeating because the 3p world is inferred through > >> the 1p view. It makes logical sense that a structure which has such > >> beliefs as ourselves could have the same qualia (or a digital > >> substitution of our brain), but this is *unprovable*. > > >> If you don't eliminate qualia away, do you think the principle described > >> here makes sense?http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.