On Jan 27, 1:26 am, acw <a...@lavabit.com> wrote:
> On 1/26/2012 15:28, Pierz wrote:
> >> Arithmetic itself can admit many interpretation and axioms tell you what
> > '>arithmetic' isn't and what theorems must follow, not what it is
> > I don't see that. I mean, sure you can't say what a number 'is' beyond
> > a certain point, but everything falters on a certain circularity at
> > some point. With maths we don't have to ask what it is beyond what it
> > is defined as being, and my argument is that adding qualia into it is
> > adding something outside its own internal logic, when maths is, purely
> > and entirely, exactly that logic.
> >> can you explain to me what a number is without appealing to a model or
> >> interpretation?
> > Can you explain what anything is, indeed can you speak or think at all
> > without appealing to a model or interpretation?
> >> Attributing consciousness to
> >> (undefinable) arithmetical truth appears to me like a better theory than
> >> attributing it to some uncomputable God-of-the-gaps physical magic
> > I associate the term 'god of the gaps' with theological arguments
> > based on incomplete scientific theories/knowledge. We aren't arguing
> > about God but about consciousness. Also, there's an ambiguity to what
> > you mean by 'uncomputable' here. We are talking about qualia which one
> > can't describe as uncomputable in a mathematical sense, but perhaps
> > better as 'unmathematical', not subject to mathematical treatment at
> > all.  Qualia are 'uncomputable' in  this sense also in an arithmetical
> > ontology in that nobody could ever 'predict' a quale, just as nobody
> > can ever describe one, except by fallible analogies.  As for the
> > 'magic' in the physics, the magic is *somewhere*, like it or not.
> > There is no explanation in mathematics for why numbers should have a
> > quality of feeling built into them. I don't like material
> > epiphenomenalism either, and increasingly I am finding Bruno's movie
> > graph argument convincing, but more as an argument against comp than
> > as proof that mind is a property of arithmetic.
> >> although some philosophers do just that (like Dennett),
> > Jaron Lanier argues (jokingly) in 'You are not a gadget' that you can
> > only tell zombies by their philosophy, and that clearly therefore
> > Dennet is a philosophical zombie...
> >> and that you admit a digital substitution
> > Yep, I think that's where the philosophical rot begins. The assumption
> > is that the consciousness is inside the circuits - be it their logical
> > or their physical arrangement. Near death experiences are an argument
> > against that proposition. (I say that knowing full well I'm about to
> > get stomped by the materialists for it.) Another thought that makes me
> > wonder about computationalism is the experience of pure consciousness
> > that many people in deep meditation have reported - a state of mind
> > without computation, if real, would constitute an experiential
> > refutation of comp. I have experienced something like this myself,
> > alas not as a result of years of meditation, but when I passed out at
> > the chemist with the flu while waiting for a prescription! It was so
> > terribly disappointing to return to the 'thousand shocks that flesh is
> > heir to'. This does not make me a secret or not-so-secret theist BTW.
> > Unfortunately that whole ridiculously simplistic  debate has blinded
> > us to the infinite possible ways the world might be in between having
> > been created by a guy with a beard and being a meaningless tornado of
> > particles of stuff.
> If qualia doesn't correspond to a structure's properties, then we should
> observe inconsistencies between what we observed and what we do. Yet, we
> don't observe any of that. Which is why consciousness/qualia/'what it's
> like to be some structure' as internal truth makes sense to me. If you
> reject having a digital substitution, you either have to appeal to the
> brain having some concrete infinities in its implementation, or you have
> to say that there are some inconsistencies. To put it in another way,
> where in the piece-by-piece digital substitution thought experiment (the
> one I linked) do you think consciousness or qualia changes? Does it
> suddenly disappear when you replace one neuron? Is it's fading, yet the
> behavior never changes while the person reports having vivid and
> complete qualia)? What about those people with digital implants(for
> example, for hearing), do you think they are now p.zombies? I'd rather
> bet on what seems more likely to me, but you're free to bet on less
> likely hypotheses.
> As for "Near Death Experiences" or various altered states of
> consciousness, I don't see how that shows COMP wrong:

No, you're right. They're just evidence against comp+phys (at least
some NDEs are). Pure consciousness with no process may however be
evidence against comp, though I'm sure the point could be argued.

> those people were
> conscious during them. I would even say that altered states of
> consciousness merely means that the class of possible experiences is
> very large. I had a fairly vivid lucid dream last night, yet I don't
> take that as proof against COMP, I take that as proof that conscious
> experience can be quite varied, and the more unusual (as opposed to the
> usual awake state) the state is, the more unusual the nature of the
> qualia can be. If after drinking or ingesting some mind-altering
> substance, you have some unusual qualia, I'd say that at least partially
> points to your local brain's 'physical' (or arithmetical or
> computational or ...)  state being capable of being directly affected by
> its environment - again, points towards functionalism of some form, not
> against it.
> > On Jan 26, 11:08 pm, acw<a...@lavabit.com>  wrote:
> >> On 1/26/2012 08:19, Pierz wrote:
> >>> As I continue to ponder the UDA, I keep coming back to a niggling
> >>> doubt that an arithmetical ontology can ever really give a
> >>> satisfactory explanation of qualia. It seems to me that imputing
> >>> qualia to calculations (indeed consciousness at all, thought that may
> >>> be the same thing) adds something that is not given by, or derivable
> >>> from, any mathematical axiom. Surely this is illegitimate from a
> >>> mathematical point of view. Every  mathematical statement can only be
> >>> made in terms of numbers and operators, so to talk about *qualities*
> >>> arising out of numbers is not mathematics so much as numerology or
> >>> qabbala.
> >>> Here of course is where people start to invoke the wonderfully protean
> >>> notion of emergent properties . Perhaps qualia emerge when a
> >>> calculation becomes deep enough.Perhaps consciousness emerges from a
> >>> complicated enough arrangement of neurons. But I ll venture an axiom
> >>> of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that
> >>> are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There
> >>> is nothing mystical about emergent properties. When the emergent
> >>> property of pumping blood arises out of collections of heart cells,
> >>> that property is a logical extension of the properties of the parts -
> >>> physical properties such as elasticity, electrical conductivity,
> >>> volume and so on that belong to the individual cells. But nobody
> >>> invoking emergent properties to explain consciousness in the brain
> >>> has yet explained how consciousness arises as a natural extension of
> >>> the known properties of brain cells  - or indeed of matter at all.
> >>> In the same way, I can t see how qualia can emerge from arithmetic,
> >>> unless the rudiments of qualia are present in the natural numbers or
> >>> the operations of addition and mutiplication. And yet it seems to me
> >>> they can t be, because the only properties that belong to arithmetic
> >>> are those leant to them by the axioms that define them. Indeed
> >>> arithmetic *is* exactly those axioms and nothing more. Matter may in
> >>> principle contain untold, undiscovered mysterious properties which I
> >>> suppose might include the rudiments of consciousness. Yet mathematics
> >>> is only what it is defined to be. Certainly it contains many mysteries
> >>> emergent properties, but all these properties arise logically from its
> >>> axioms and thus cannot include qualia.
> >>> I call the idea that it can numerology because numerology also
> >>> ascribes qualities to numbers. A 2 in one s birthdate indicates
> >>> creativity (or something), a 4 material ambition and so on. Because
> >>> the emergent properties of numbers can indeed be deeply amazing and
> >>> wonderful - Mandelbrot sets and so on - there is a natural human
> >>> tendency to mystify them, to project properties of the imagination
> >>> into them. But if these qualities really do inhere in numbers and are
> >>> not put there purely by our projection, then numbers must be more than
> >>> their definitions. We must posit the numbers as something that
> >>> projects out of a supraordinate reality that is not purely
> >>> mathematical - ie, not merely composed of the axioms that define an
> >>> arithmetic. This then can no longer be described as a mathematical
> >>> ontology, but rather a kind of numerical mysticism. And because
> >>> something extrinsic to the axioms has been added, it opens the way for
> >>> all kinds of other unicorns and fairies that can never be proved from
> >>> the maths alone. This is unprovability not of the mathematical
> >>> variety, but more of the variety that cries out for Mr Occam s shaving
> >>> apparatus.
> >> Why would any structure give rise to qualia? We think some structure
> >> (for example our brain, or the abstract computation or arithmetical
> >> truth/structure representing it) does and we communicate it to others in
> >> a "3p" way. The options here are to either say qualia exists and our
> >> internal beliefs (which also have 'physical' correlates) are correct, or
> >> that it doesn't and we're all delusional, although in the second case,
> >> the belief is self-defeating because the 3p world is inferred through
> >> the 1p view. It makes logical sense that a structure which has such
> >> beliefs as ourselves could have the same qualia (or a digital
> >> substitution of our brain), but this is *unprovable*.
> >> If you don't eliminate qualia away, do you think the principle described
> >> here makes sense?http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
> ...
> read more »

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